Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence:  Benefits, Linkage and Future Prospects as Modified by Trends in Globalization by Looney, Robert et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Reports and Technical Reports All Technical Reports Collection
2001-12
Economic Impact of Naval Forward
Presence:  Benefits, Linkage and Future
Prospects as Modified by Trends in Globalization
Looney, Robert
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/15358
This document was downloaded on March 12, 2013 at 08:56:34
 
Author(s) Looney, Robert
Title Economic impact of naval forward presence benefits




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence: 
Benefits, Linkage and Future Prospects as Modified 






Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
Prepared for: Chief of Naval Operations, N81 
2000 Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
20020312 064 
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY, CA 93943-5000 




This report was prepared for and funded by the Chief of Naval Operations, N81, 2000 
Navy Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-2000. 
Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized. 
Professor ofNational Security Affairs 
Reviewed by: 
1·:'.·. ··~ • 1 • • t I t · • • ' 4 • 
......_-----~-----~·---------- ---
Distinguished Professor of 
Operations Research 
Released by: 
Associate Provost and Dean of Research 
Form approved 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
OMB No 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average I hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection 
of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Wasbing11n Headquarters Services, Directorate for information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, 
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Mana ement and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3.REPORTTYPEANDDATESCOVERED 
December 2001 Technical Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE S.FUNDING 
Economic Impact ofNaval Forward Presence: Benefits, Linkage and Future Prospects as 
Modified by Trends in Globalization N000390l~JRDR036 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Robert Looney, David Schrady and Douglas Porch 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING OR<fANIZATION 
Chief of Naval Operations, N81 REPORT NUMBER 
2000 Navy Pentagon NPS-NS-02-001 
Washington, DC 20350-2000 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
12a. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words.) 
The study extends the analysis of the economic benefits of naval forward presence undertaken by the Naval Postgraduate School in two previous 
studies: QDR97 and FY2000. The first of those studies developed an operational methodology for quantifying these benefits. Drawing on that 
methodology, significant economic benefits were found associated with naval operations in the Arabian Gulf The second study expanded the QDR97 
effort in several important directions. First, event analysis was introduced to link naval activity with price movements in key commodity, exchange, and 
share markets. Second, several additional cases, one not directly involving oil, were developed to assess the generality of our findings. The findings of 
the first study were confirmed with naval forward presence/crisis response shown to produce extensive economic benefits for the US economy in each of 
the cases examined. The current study places the two previous ones in a larger context. Here the linkages between naval forward presence/crisis response 
and oil prices are examint!d in the context of changes in the global economy and the various dimensions of globalization. An operational procedure is 
developed to measure the various facets of globalization and track their movements over time. The magnitude of oil price shocks' effect on domestic 
economies is shown to depend critically on the global environment in which they occur. In all, the three studies paint a similar picture-that of naval 
forward presence playing an increasingly important role in stabilizing the economies of the advanced industrial nations. Other parts of the world benefit 
also, although trends in globalization suggest the economic gains that accrue from naval forward presence are of a lower magnitude. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
naval forward presence, globalization, economic benefits, econometrics 
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF REPORT OFffiiSPAGE 
Unclassified Unclassified 
NSN 7540-01-280-5800 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 
16. PRICE CODE 





Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std 239-18 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over the years, one of the more illusive questions posed to-and by-the 
Navy has concerned the potential economic benefits to the United States and 
allied countries provided by U.S. naval forward presence. While most 
authorities on the subject contend that these benefits are significant, their 
measurement has been fraught with conceptual and computational difficulties. 
The greatest obstacle has involved developing a convincing 
counterfactual-what would the state of affairs have been in the absence of 
forward deployed naval forces? 
THE 1997 QDR AND FY2000 STUDIES 
Our 1997 QDR study of three cases of naval forward presence/crisis 
response in the Persian Gulf suggested that it is possible to design 
methodologies capable of quantifying the benefits of naval forward presence. 
More importantly the benefits in dollars were shown to be significant. 
A second study undertaken in FY2000 extended our methodology 
through: (1) the use of a highly objective statistical analysis; and (2) the 
development of new test cases. We selected several new instances of naval 
forward pres·ence/crisis response to provide our sample with greater 
geographical diversity and a wider range of market impacts. In addition, we 
took care to assure that these cases involved primarily naval units, with at best 
limited participation .from the other services. The study produced a number of 
significant findings. As in the first study, this analysis showed that all cases 
produced positive economic benefits for the U.S. economy. These benefits, 
measured in 1995 U.S. dollars, were not trivial, with each operation yielding 
well over a billion dollars in terms of added U.S. GDP. 
While oil markets were the one constant throughout the cases, several 
other markets were affected by naval actions. These included: the dollar/yen 
exchange rate, the CRB commodity index, the Goldman-Sachs Commodity 
Index, the S&P-100, the NIKKEI 100, the Hang-Seng, and the New York Stock 
Exchange Composite Index. More importantly, naval events had a positive 
effect at all times. In each case involving oil or commodity markets, naval 
activity reduced the price from what it would have been in the navy's absence. 
In the case of share markets and the dollar/yen exchange rate, prices were 
higher than they would have been had naval forces not been involved. 
Naval presence was shown to produce a strong short-run (overnight) 
beneficial effect on markets. More importantly, the analysis found that the 
impact of naval response on these markets lingers for a significant time, 
altering prices long enough to bring significant benefits to the U.S. economy. 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
The generalizations noted above can serve as a basis on which to assess 
future economic impacts associated with naval forward presence/crisis 
response. With each finding, however, several other questions arise. In 
particular, the current study addresses the following issues: Can we predict in 
advance the general magnitude of economic benefits accruing from similar 
operations? What methods will best accomplish this? What factors need to be 
taken into account to make an accurate prediction? How might these factors 
change with the evolution of globalization and increased economic 
integration? Will changes in the international economic environment likely 
strengthen or weaken the positive economic impacts associated with naval 
forward presence/crisis response? 
To address these questions, the current study develops an integrated 
framework for assessing the consequences of globalization on the market 
forces likely to be affected by naval forward presence/crisis response. This 
model draws heavily on the rapidly expanding literature on globalization, 
integrating it with the quantitative findings on economic benefits. In 
particular, the study focuses on the link between naval forward presence and 
oil prices. Has globalization over time strengthened or weakened this link? 
What elements of globalization have been most important in this regard? Are 
these trends likely to continue into the foreseeable future? 
The analysis of globalization and oil price shocks reveals some interesting 
and unanticipated patterns. First, the study demonstrates that it is possible to 
develop an operational definition for quantifying globalization. To date, the 
literature has had a hard time generalizing about globalization and its 
implications for national economic performance. In large part this is due to 
the multidimensional nature of globalization. 
The analysis developed here shows that globalization comprises four 
primary dimensions: (1) structural openness-the share of imports and 
exports in GDP; (2) financial globalization-flows of various forms of capital 
such as foreign direct investment; (3) global growth-the rate of expansion 
primarily in imports and exports, but also of the overall economy (as 
measured by GDP); and (4) general globalization-the growth model best 
depicting a country's national economic dynamics. 
Over time, the first three aspects of globalization-openness, finance and 
growth-have become more closely associated with the general globalization 
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dimension, suggesting an increasingly strong link between elements in the 
global economy and the dynamics of economic growth in individual countries. 
Largely because of this last dimension it is possible to group most countries in 
the world according to their pattern of integration into the world economy. 
These groups include: (1) endogenous growth countries, characterized by 
internally generated rapid innovation and technological adaptation. Group 1 
includes the main industrial countries of North America, Europe, and 
Japan/Australia. In the period since 1985, countries in this group have seen a 
rapid increase in the general globalization dimension of their economies; (2) 
"catching-up" countries, characterized by increasing general globalization, 
although at a much slower pace than the endogenous growth countries; 
increasing structural openness; but declining relative financial globalization. 
Data limitations made it impossible to undertake a detailed examination of the 
remaining groups: (3) primary producers; (4) Malthusian or stagnant 
developing economies-mainly in sub-Saharan Africa; and (5) isolated 
economies or landlocked economies out of the main stream of international 
trade and commerce. Groups 1 and 2, however, include those economies that 
comprise the great bulk of world trade and production. 
The second pattern the study found was a clear linkage between the 
highly globalized countries and the manner in which oil shocks affect their 
economies. Over time, and contrary to popular assumptions, Group 1 
countries have become more vulnerable to oil price shocks, so that a 10 
percent increase in the price of oil today would cause a greater reduction in 
income than it would have twenty years ago. In other words, the loss in 
income as a percentage of GDP resulting from an oil shock has increased 
gradually over time in line with the process of globalization. 
For these trade-dependent countries, general globalization and structural 
openness have been most responsible for the increased severity of oil shocks. 
Changes in financial globalization and the global growth dimension of 
globalization have not only played a much smaller role in this regard, but 
have made some countries less vulnerable and others more vulnerable-no 
clear patterns emerge from these aspects of globalization. Because naval 
forward presence/crisis response tends to suppress oil shocks and return 
prices to their equilibrium levels, the role of naval activities in economic 
stabilization has not only taken on increased importance in recent years but, 
with the likely continuation of global trends, should play an even greater 
positive economic role for the United States and other industrial countries in 
the foreseeable future. 
A very different globalization/oil shock pattern characterizes the Group 2 
(catch-up) countries. For the members of Group 2 that export oil, the net 
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effect of oil shocks has been a gradual increase in income. Growth in the 
general globalization dimension of their economies, however, has lessened the 
benefit of price shocks to the oil-exporters and increased their vulnerability. 
For those Group 2 countries that do not export significant quantities of oil, 
their economies' relative lack of integration into world markets-the openness 
dimension-has served to insulate them from the worst, though not all, effects 
of oil-price shocks. As their openness grows, however, the impact of oil shocks 
on the Group 2 economies will be increasingly severe. Given these patterns, 
naval forward presence/crisis response should continue to play an important 
role (though less critical than for Group 1) in stabilizing the catch-up 
economies. 
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
These findings, combined with likely trends in globalization, suggest that 
the Navy's forward presence is likely to produce economic benefits to the U.S. 
economy and those of the other major industrial nations in the years to come. 
Increased integration of markets should aid in transmitting the Navy's 
stabilizing effect on markets to countries around the world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION AND NAVAL FORWARD 
PREsENCE 
Current debates over the relative merits of globalization 
provide some insight into the manner in which market price 
modifications brought about by naval forward presence affect 
economies in different parts of the world (Appendix A). In a recent 
article1, Amartya Sen of Cambridge University provides answers to 
several key questions in this debate that have relevance to the 
changing economic impact of naval forward presence: 
1. Globalization is not new, nor is it just a phenomenon of 
Westernization. Over thousands of years, globalization has 
progressed through travel, trade, migration, spread of cultural 
influences, and dissemination of knowledge and 
understanding (including science and technology). 
2. Globalization is not in itself a folly. It has enriched the world 
scientifically and culturally, and benefits many people 
economically as well. In this regard, modern technologies as 
well as economic interrelationships have influenced 
development around the world. The predicament of the 
world's poor cannot be reversed by withholding from them 
the great advantages of contemporary technology, the well-
established efficiency of international trade and exchange, and 
the social as well as economic merits of living in open, rather 
than closed societies. 
3 . The use of the market economy can produce different 
outcomes. The central question cannot be whether to make 
use of markets- markets are essential to development of a 
prosperous economy. The market economy, however, can 
generate many different results, depending on a large number 
of variables, e.g., how physical resources are distributed, how 
human resources are developed, or what rules prevail. States 
and societies have roles to play in determining the nature and 
impact of these variables on domestic and global prosperity. 
4. The world has changed since the 1944 Bretton Woods 
Agreement: The current economic, financial, and political 
architecture of the world (including the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and other institutions) was 
largely set up in the 1940s, following the Bretton Woods 
Conference. This system is now coming under heavy criticism 
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because it lacks institutions that are responsive to changing 
economic circumstances; as a result, many parts of the world 
are not well served by the current structure. 
Sen is suggesting that various parts of the world have evolved 
differently over the last several decades and, as a result, possess 
economic environments that respond differently to various types of 
external shocks. The main problem for assessing the economic 
consequences of naval forward presence is, therefore, to derive an 
operational classification of these unique environments for the 
purpose of assessing the differential economic impact produced by 
naval operations. 
1.1 COUNTRY CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
Jeffrey Sachs's recent paper, "Globalization and Patterns of 
Economic Development," provides a good starting point for 
assessing various economic environments.2 The country 
classification scheme Sachs developed was intended to clarify the 
consequences of globalization on growth potential in various parts 
of the world. This scheme seems appropriate for examining the 
manner in which market changes linked to naval forward presence, 
such as oil market price movements, diversely affect domestic 
economies. Sachs developed five main groupings (Table 1): 
endogenous growth, catching-up, primary, Malthusian, and isolated 
economies. 
1.1.1 Endogenous Growth Countries 
Countries that are experiencing endogenous growth benefit 
from self-sustaining increases in income generated mainly by 
technological innovation. Innovation raises national income, which 
in turn stimulates further innovation in a positive feedback 
process.3 
For this group of countries, globalization should spur 
innovation by increasing the range of the market. It may also 
concentrate innovative activity geographically if it creates a more 
integrated global labor market for scientists and engineers, who are 
then likely to aggregate in the highly innovative core economies. 
Most proxies of innovative activity (patents, R&D expenditures, and 
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numbers of scientific publications) suggest a huge spurt in such 
activities in the 1990s. The rapid growth of labor productivity in the 
United States since the early 1990s also supports the notion of a 
surge in innovation in line with the increasing globalization of the 
world economy and labor markets. 
By contrast, it is not obvious that globalization is reducing or 
increasing Group 1 members' vulnerability to oil price shocks. The 
standard assumption is that information-based economies use less 
oil per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and therefore are 
becoming less dependent on imported energy. In the case of the 
United States for example, Irwin Stelzer notes that in the 1970s oil 
products accounted for almost 9% of Gross Domestic Product.4 
Today the figure is about 3%. More efficient car engines are one 
explanation. Another is the steady shift of the American economy to 
knowledge driven activities. 
The flexibility of endogenous economies and their ability to 
shift to alternative sources of energy in the short run might also aid 
in minimizing the economic impact produced by oil price shocks. A 
good case could be made, however, that increased globalization has 
greatly expanded the set of macroeconomic linkages , between these 
and many non-endogenous group countries, which may be 
becoming more vulnerable to oil price shocks as they speed up 
industrialization. An oil shock-induced recession in these countries 
could feed back to the endogenous countries, seriously affecting 
their economies through declining export sales. Ultimately then, the 
net impact of oil price movements on the endogenous countries can 
only be assessed through empirical testing. 
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Table 1 
Initial Categorization of Countries 
According to Globalization and Growth Mechanism5 
Endogenous Catching up Primary Malthusian 
Growth Producer 
Australia Bangladesh Algeria Afghanistan 
Austria Bulgaria Angola Benin 
Belgium China Bolivia Botswana 
Canada Dominican R. Camaroon Burkina 
Denmark Hungary Chile Fa so 
Finland Indonesia Congo Cambodia 
France Jamaica Costa Rica Central African 
Germany Malaysia Cote d'Ivoire Republic 
Hong Kong Mauritius Ecuador Chad 
Ireland Mexico Gambia Congo, DR 
Israel Mongolia Ghana Eritrea 
Italy Nicaragua Guinea Bissau Ethiopia 
Japan Oman Honduras Gabon 
South Korea Philippines Kenya Guatemala 
Netherlands Poland Kuwait Haiti 
New Zealand Portugal Mauritania Iraq 
Norway Romania Mozambique Jordan 
Singapore South Africa Nigeria Laos 
Sweden Spain Papua New Lesotho 
Switzerland Sri Lanka Guinea Liberia 
Taiwan Thailand Saudi Arabia Mali 
United Tunisia Sierra Leone Namibia 
Kingdom Turkey Syria Nepal 



















1.1.2 Catching-up-Growth Countries 
The economy of a country in the "catch-up" (or "follower") 
group has a lower level of technology and income than one in the 
endogenous group. A catch-up country will narrow the income gap 
with the more technologically capable and richer countries (the 
"leaders") through a process of technological diffusion and capital 
flows from leader to follower. 
While all countries enjoy some benefit from technological 
growth in a leading country, the rate at which technology diffuses 
from leader to follower differs sharply around the world. A region 
that is geographically isolated, for example, is much less likely to 
benefit from technological diffusion. 
Two kinds of countries appear to be winners in the race to 
absorb technologies from abroad. Countries with successful export-
promotion policies, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have earned 
the foreign exchange necessary to import technologies from abroad. 
Also, countries that have been able to attract large flows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) have similarly been able to upgrade 
technologies with particular success. China, Malaysia, and Singapore 
were especially notable recipients of large FDI flows in the 1980s 
and 1990s. More recently, Mexico and Eastern European economies 
such as Hungary and Poland have similarly been successful in 
attracting FDI. . 
Most of the countries in this group are proximate to major 
markets or are on major international sea lanes and thus face low 
transport costs for moving goods to major markets. In the Americas, 
Mexico, several Central American states, and some Caribbean island 
states successfully attracted high levels of FDI in the 1990s and 
thereby also benefited from technology transfers. South American 
countries, further from the U.S. market, have lagged further behind. 
In Europe, it is the post-communist countries on the border of 
Western Europe (including the Baltic States, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia), as well as the 
North African states bordering the Mediterranean (especially 
Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt), that have benefited from their 
geographical proximity to the richer economies of Western Europe 
to achieve solid catching-up growth. In Asia, the countries 
proximate to Japan (South Korea, Taiwan, the costal provinces of 
mainland China) and countries that lie on the sea lanes connecting 
5 
Asia and Europe (such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Mauritius) have most successfully achieved catching-up growth. 
Successful catching-up growth involves a positive feedback loop 
between technological diffusion and human capital accumulation. 
Initially, human capital is low in the laggard economy and 
technologies are rudimentary. The country may achieve some 
modest inflow of technology by attracting labor intensive, export-
oriented foreign direct investment, e.g., labor· intensive assembly 
operations in export processing zones. These simple assembly 
operations generate income, some modest skills, and the resources 
to invest in improved education. The combination of rising skill 
levels and rising educational attainment leads to upgrades in 
foreign investment facilities. 
As with the endogenous-growth countries, it is impossible to say 
a priori much about the extent to which increased globalization is 
affecting the net impact on these economies of an oil shock. On the 
one hand, increased globalization has accelerated the long term 
growth path of these countries (Table 2), suggesting that they may 
be operating at close to full potential and thus be more vulnerable 
to oil price increases. On the other hand, with increased 
diversification these economies may be able to shift to alternative 
sources of energy, thus avoiding the full brunt of the external 
shocks. Finally, as in the case of the endogenous growth countries, 
oil price shocks may impact indirectly through slowing down the 
growth of major external markets. Again the matter must ultimately 
be resolved through empirical testing and simulation. 
6 
Table 2 
Characteristics of Countries According to 
G th/GI b r t" C t · 6 row o a Iza wn a egones 
Country Number of Total GNP per Annual GNP %of % 
Types Countries Population Capita (US Growth per Polpulation Population 
for Group basis) Capita in within 100 
(millions) 1990-99 Termperate km of the 
Ecozones 
Endogenous 23 844 20,400 2.1' 76 
Catching-up 23 2,063 5,599 2.7 28 
Primary 32 465 3,694 0.0 9 
Commodity 
Malthusian 3 1 466 1, 782 -0.3 4 
Isolated 8 74 2,372 na 14 
1.1.3 Resource-based Growth 
The resource-based economy experiences high and low cycles of 
per capita income mainly as the result of resource booms and busts. 
It has often been noted in recent years that natural resource-rich 
economies have faired particularly badly (Table 2), especially in 
comparison with many of the resource-scarce economies. Even oil 
booms may have an adverse effect on oil producing countries 
through the so-called "Dutch Disease" mechanisms: an overvalued 
exchange rate, increased domestic inflation, and a shift to non-trade 
activities.7 It is probably safe to conclude, however, given that the 
Dutch Disease effect is a longer term phenomenon, that the 
increased globalization of oil producing economies will render the 
short run effect of an oil price increase positive. Given their rigidity 
and lack of diversification, non-oil producing countries in the 
catching-up group would most likely experience declining incomes 
following oil price shocks, especially as globalization increases their 








1.1.4 Malthusian Decline 
Malthusian decline is a cycle of falling per capita income caused 
by population pressures outstripping the carrying capacity of the 
local economy. The Malthusian economy is neither innovating nor 
successfully adopting technologies from abroad. Countries in this 
category experience a long-term decline in living standards that 
transcends the effects of terms-of-trade shocks of cyclical 
phenomena. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most disturbing case of an 
impoverished region suffering outright declines in living standards. 
Somewhat less dramatically, the Andean region seems also to be 
struck with stagnant or even falling living standards. Given the 
economic structure of this group of countries, it is probably safe to 
assume that greater globalization would increase their vulnerability 
to oil price shocks. 
1.1.5 Economic Isolation 
Economic isolation from world markets, whether physical (a 
small landlocked country) or political (a communistic, command 
economy), leads to economic stagnation. It is notable that regions 
that Adam Smith identified in the 18th Century as geographically 
disadvantaged-the interior of Africa and the landlocked regions of 
Asia-are still among the poorest and slowest growing in the world 
today. Smith's observations about the importance of coastal access 
hold true today even though globalization is linking countries more 
closely through electronic communications, along with rapid air, 
rail, and road travel. Sea-based freight is still by far the cheapest 
form of international transportation, and countries that are far from 
coastal ports face a tremendous burden in the shipment of bulky 
products. While some of the non-European landlocked countries 
have achieved periods of at least modest growth (Bolivia, Botswana 
and Uganda are three such examples), in general the growth is 
modest by international standards, and often is the result of 
catching up to past income levels after an economic disaster or 
other special factors. 
International trade with landlocked, economically isolated 
countries is sharply hindered by those countries' lack of direct 
access to a seaport. Foreign investors in particular do not view 
isolated, impoverished nations as effective platforms for export-
oriented foreign direct investment. Thus these countries are 
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typically unable to attract the kind of assembly operations in 
garments, electronics, footwear, and other goods that have been 
important stepping stones to economic development in more 
favorably located economies. Foreign investors come, if at all, only 
to exploit primary commodities with a high value per unit 
weight-such as oil and gas, diamonds and other metals-because 
such commodities can be profitably exploited even when transport 
costs are high. Without the diversification and flexibility needed to 
modify oil price shocks, landlocked countries that are not oil 
producers are very vulnerable to developments in the international 
oil market. 
1.2 QUANTIFICATION METIIOOOLOGY 
The previous section outlined a framework for exammmg how 
trends in globalization may affect the economic benefits derived 
from naval forward presence. Although the great diversity of 
economic environments makes generalization in this area very 
hazardous, several distinctive national economic environments can 
be identified. It is reasonable to expect that most or all countries in 
a particular group would be affected in a roughly similar manner by 
external oil shocks. 
Building on this framework, the next section provides an 
operational method for quantifying these country groupings and, 
when necessary, reclassifying countries to better reflect a common 
underlying set of global economic forces. More importantly, the 
analysis will assess the manner in which globalization has altered 
the structure of these countries over time, making them more or less 
vulnerable to oil price shocks. In other words, under increasing 
globalization, which countries are benefiting more from naval 
forward presence and to what extent? Which are less affected by the 
Navy's presence, and by how much? 
1.2.1 Quantification of Globalization 
One important obstacle to understanding how globalization 
affects the economic benefits of naval forward presence is that the 
term globalization means different things to different people and 
groups. There is, however, a consensus that globalization-whether 
economic, political, cultural or environmental-is defined by 
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increasing levels of interdependence over vast distances.8 A.T. 
Kearny points out, however, that few people have undertaken the 
task of actually trying to measure those levels of interdependency. 
"For instance, how do we determine the extent to which a country 
has become embedded within the global economy? How do we 
demonstrate that globalization is racing ahead, rather than just 
limping along?" The lack of a clear, precise definition underlies 
many of the current arguments and debates over the extent of 
globalization and the manner in which that phenomenon is 
changing the structure of national economies. As the Kearney study 
notes: "Without the means to quantify the extent of globalization, 
any meaningful evaluation of its effects will remain elusive."9 
1.2.2 Previous Attempts at Quantification 
The Kearney approach reverse-engineers globalization and 
breaks it down into its component parts. On a country-by-country 
basis, Kearney quantifies the levels of personal contact across 
national boarders by combining data on international travel, 
international phone calls, and cross-border remittances and other 
transfers. The Kearney index charts the World Wide Web by 
assessing not only its growing numbers of users, but also the 
number of internet hosts and secure servers through which they 
communicate, find information and conduct business transactions. 
The Kearney globalization index also measures economic 
integration: It tracks the movements of goods and services by 
examining the changing share of international trade in each 
country's economy, and it measures the permeability of national 
borders through the convergence of domestic and international 
prices. The index tracks the movements of money by tabulating 
inward and outward direct foreign investment and portfolio capital 
flows, as well as income payments and receipts. As the Kearney 
study makes clear, much of the conventional wisdom cherished by 
both champions and critics of globalization collapses under the 
weight of hard data, ranging from the pace and scale of global 
integration and the characteristics of the digital divide to the impact 
of globalization on income inequality, democratization, and 
corruption.10 
While the Kearney index is a step in the right direction, it still 
fails to address several basic questions associated with index 
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construction: (1) What measures should be included in the index; 
(2) are these measures comparable across countries (i.e., is there a 
universal standard on what each measure comprises and is the data 
of equal quality across countries); and, (3) what system of weights 
will be used to combine the various measures into a final summary 
index? Clearly each possible (arbitrary) weighting system will 
provide a somewhat different picture of the extent of globalization 
in any particular country. These questions need concrete answers 
before Kearney's or any other index can provide meaningful 
insights into the globalization process.11 
1.2.3 A New Approach to Quantification 
One way around this problem is to compile an extensive data 
set of the most widely used economic statistics and measures of 
world trade, capital flows, and economic integration. Although 
many of these measures will overlap and thus be redundant, the use 
of "factor analysis" to sort the data will help identify the main 
dimensions of global diversity. 
Factor analysis uses a limited number of underlying 
dimensions-factors-to explain complex phenomena. The resulting 
consolidated data produce a limited number of independent 
(uncorrelated) composite measures. In the current example, 
measures such as value added per unit of capital, value added per 
laborer, and value added per firm could provide a composite index 
of productivity or relative efficiency in factor usage. One advantage 
of indexes formed in this manner is that they avoid the problem of 
selecting one measure of efficiency-e.g., value added per 
worker-over equally logical alternatives. 
As an initial step in exploratory data analysis, factor analysis 
has three objectives: to study the correlations of a large number of 
variables by clustering the variables into factors such that variables 
within each factor are highly correlated; to interpret each factor 
according to the variables belonging to it; and to summarize many 
variables by a few factors. 
The usual factor analysis model expresses each variable as a 
function of the factors common to several variables and a factor 
unique to the variable: 
Zj = aj1F1 + aj2F2 + ...... +ajmFm + Uj 
Where 
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Zj = the jth standardized variable 
m = the number of factors common to all the variables 
Uj = the factor unique to variable Zj 
aji - factor loadings 
The number of factors, m, should be small and the contribution 
of the unique factors should also be small. The individual factor 
loadings, aji' for each variable should be either very large or very 
small, so each variable is associated with a minimal number of 
factors. 
To the extent that this factor analysis model is appropriate to 
the problem at hand, the objectives noted above can be achieved. 
Variables with high loadings on a factor tend to be highly correlated 
with each other, while variables that do not have the same loading 
patterns tend to be less highly correlated. Each factor is interpreted 
according to the magnitudes of the loadings associated with it. 
More importantly for this study, the original variables can be 
replaced by the factors with little loss of information. Each case 
(country) receives a score for each factor; these factor scores can be 
computed as: 
Fi = bilZl + bi2Z2 + ... bipZp 
where bij are the factor score coefficients. Factor scores in turn are 
used in the discriminant analysis that follows. These factor scores 
generally have less error and are therefore more reliable measures 
than the original variables. The scores express the degree to which 
each case possesses the quality or property that the factor describes. 
The factor scores have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 
one. 
Operationally, the computations of factors and factor scores for 
each country were obtained through a principle components 
procedure (available in SPSS) [spell out]. The data used in the 
analysis was taken from the annual World Bank World Development 
Indicators (specific details on each variable is presented in 
Appendix B). 
• Domestic absorption (% of GDP) 
• Domestic credit provided by banking sector (% of GDP) 
• Expenditure, total (% of GDP) 
• Trade (% of GDP) 
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• Trade (% of goods GDP) 
• Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
• Financing from abroad (% of GDP) 
• Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
• Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
• Domestic financing, total (% of GDP) 
• Gross private capital flows (% of GDP, PPP) 
• Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) 
• Gross foreign direct investment (% of GDP, PPP) 
• GDP growth (annual %) 
• Import Growth (annual %) 
• Exports of goods and services (annual % growth) 
• Sub-Saharan Dummy 
• Small Country Dummy 
• Oil dummy 
• Revised Country Classification 
1.2.4 Quantified Dimensions of Globalization 
While the exact composition of factors varied slightly from year 
to year over the analysis period (1985-97), the 20 variables 
generally produced five main dimensions, or factors: 
1. Structural Openness depicts the degree of national economic 
integration into the world economy. Operationally, this factor 
comprises the share of imports and exports as a percentage of 
GDP. The variables comprising structural openness do not 
change much over time, and this usually is the first factor to 
be extracted from the data set. 
2. General Globalization (for lack of a better term) incorporates 
those variables that load on Sachs's country grouping 
dimension (Table 1). This study also expands Sachs's list of 
countries to include several additions, such as Brazil. The 
number of variables loading on this factor increases 
considerably over time, with the factor incorporating an 
increasingly diverse set of global indices. The study makes 
clear that globalization affects each of the different country 
groupings in unique ways, and that globalization is an on-
going process. 
3. Finance comprises both domestic and foreign components, for 
example, foreign direct investment and financing from abroad. 
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4. Growth/Trade Expansion includes both external and internal 
measures of economic expansion. The main variables that 
make up this factor are import and export growth, and overall 
GDP growth. The growth of GDP usually, but not always, is 
highly correlated with measures of trade expansion. 
5 . Global Structure comprises several structural variables 
(Appendix C) to take into account several unique country 
characteristics. The Sub-Saharan African countries, for 
instance, may have a unique set of factors that sets them apart 
from other developing countries.12 To take this potential 
factor into account, a variable (SUBAF) was created that gives 
a score of zero to the non-African countries and a one to the 
African nations. 
Researchers also contend that small countries, with much 
narrower resource bases and smaller domestic markets, are at a 
disadvantage vis a vis their larger counterparts.13 To take this effect 
into account, the study utilizes a unique variable with a value of one 
assigned to the smaller nations (usually those with a population less 
than 5 million), and a zero for the larger countries. 
Finally, studies stress the unique structure of the oil 
economies.14 This factor is taken into account with a final variable 
"oil" which assigns a value of one to the oil economies and a zero to 
non-oil nations. 
1.2.5 Revised Factor Scores and Country Groupings 
Because Sachs's classification was intended to examine the 
growth potential of a large group of countries, his country 
groupings may not be ideal for the identification of differential 
impacts on unique economic environments stemming from oil price 
shocks. Also, Sachs's classification scheme appears to be static. 
There is little evidence of movement between groups, or a precise 
indication of the circumstances under which movement might take 
place. In the case of economic environments, we would expect 
discernable shifting between groups as countries and their economic 
policies evolve. 
To overcome these limitations, this study used the following 
procedure (Figure 1; the results for a typical year, 1995, are 
presented in Appendix D): 
14 
First, for each year examined, a factor analysis was undertaken 
using the 20 variables noted above. In 1995, 54 countries had 
complete data observations for this period and were retained in the 
analysis (Table D-1). The 20-variable data set was comprised of five 
main dimensions or factors (based on the constraint of an eigen 
value of one or greater). 
Figure 1 
Globalization and Country Economic Environments 


































and Rankings by 
Year 
Sachs's country classification term was included in the second 
factor, along with gross private capital flows, export share in GDP, 
and gross foreign direct investment. These variables differed 
significantly by country grouping. The country factor scores on 
each dimension are based on a scale with a mean of zero. Positive 
numbers indicate above-normal attainment of a 
global dimension, while negative values 
country/group is below average in attainment 
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particular factor or 
indicate that the 
of that dimension. 
I • 
! 
For example, in 1995 the trade patterns of the United States 
accounted for a considerably smaller share of GDP than the sample 
norm. The United States was even well below the norm of the 
endogenous growth countries (Group 1). The United States was 
considerably above the sample average for its attainment of General 
Globalization (Dimension 2), but again considerably below the norm 
for Group 1. The United States was, however, slightly above the 
norm even for Group 1 for global financial flows. Finally, the 
United States had above-average growth during this period, again 
somewhat above that of the Group 1 countries. The global structure 
dimension is an amalgamation of variables that do not load on one 
of the main globalization dimensions, so its significance is hard to 
interpret. It is included here to show the complete results of the 
analysis. 
Second, using the country factor scores from this step, a 
discriminant analysis was undertaken to assign a new set of country 
groupings. The five main dimensions of globalization noted above 
were weighted in assigning countries to one of the five groups as 
follows. For 1995 (Table D-2 in Appendix D) two dimensions, 
general globalization and trade expansion, were statistically 
significant in separating the sample countries into five main 
groupings. Of these groups, 1 and 3 were the most dissimilar (Table 
D-5), followed by 1 and 4, and 1 and 2. Of the original country 
classifications, 71.7 percent (Table D-8) remained in their initial 
groups, with the remainder assigned to new groups. For example, 
South Korea had only an 8.3 percent chance of being a Group 1 
country, but a 90.3 percent chance of correctly falling into Group 2 
(Table D-7). 
The results from this discriminant analysis therefore are 
tailored to the needs of this study, whereas the Sachs table is not. 
These revised groupings provide a more homogenous sample for the 
analysis that follows (illustrated by the improved probabilities by 
group in Table D-15), and comprise the country sets used for the 
remainder of the analysis for each year. It is important to note, 
however, that as circumstances change, we would get a slightly 
different grouping for each year. The results for 1995 only are listed 
for illustrative purposes.15 
The third step entailed redefining the country classification 
variable from the results of the second step. Here, the factor 
analysis was rerun to generate a new set of factor scores, more 
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reflective of each country's posltwn in the total sample and in its 
assigned group (Table D-9). Of the countries that remained in the 
analysis after the factor/discriminate step, only nineteen were 
found to have sufficient time series data to facilitate the V AR 
analysis. 
Finally, using these scores, a new discriminant analysis found 
that General Globalization (Factor 2) and Global Expansion (Factor 
3) were statistically significant in assigning countries to the five-
group model. On this basis, the probability of correct placement in 
one of the five groups was 92.6 percent, with all of the Group 1 
countries correctly placed. This last step provides the country 
groupings and factor scores used in the oil price impact analysis. 
The analysis was undertaken for 1977, 1980, 1983 and each year 
over the 1985-1997 interval. 
1.3 GLOBALIZATION AND THE STRENGTH OF OIL SHOCKS 
The revised factor scores or globalization dimensions for each 
country are a key element in assessing the manner in which oil price 
shocks have been modified over time by changes in the world 
economy. Using the United States as an example, the link between 
oil price shocks and globalization is outlined in Figure 2. 
As a starting point, a macroeconomic model was constructed for 
each of the nineteen countries examined. In the case of the United 
States economy, the model consisted of three endogenous 
macroeconomic variables: gross capital formation, government 
consumption, and exports (all at constant dollar prices); and three 
exogenous variables: Japanese constant-price GDP, the dollar/SDR 
exchange rate, and world oil prices. A first set of simulations for 
each year (1985-97) was made using the historical values for oil 
prices. A second set of simulations was made assuming a 10 percent 
increase in the price of oil for each base year. The net impact on 
GDP was then calculated by subtracting the simulations 
incorporating oil price shocks from the historical series. Oil shock 
impacts were calculated for the shock year and two subsequent 
years. Finally, the resulting oil shocks were put through a regression 
analysis on the various globalization dimensions to assess the role 
that changes in a country's level of globalization might have had in 
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modifying the manner in which oil prices altered that country's 
GDP. 
Based on these findings, implications were drawn (Figures 2 
and 3) for the likely future role of naval forward presence/crisis 
response. On the one hand, for example, if the size of oil price 
shocks grows over time for a particular country, then naval forward 
presence, by limiting the rise of oil prices, would play an 
increasingly important role in stabilizing that country's GDP. On the 
other hand, if the dimensions of globalization lessened the loss in a 
country's GDP associated with oil price shocks, then the importance 
of naval forward presence to that country's economy would decline. 
1.3 ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NAVAL FORWARD PRESENCE 
This study analyzes a sample of 19 countries using the 
framework outlined above to determine the changing strength of oil 
price shocks. Based on this analysis, the study draws a number of 
generalizations for two of the country groupings concerning the 
likely future economic role naval forward presence will play in their 
growth and development. 
Figure 2 
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2. PATTERNS OF GLOBALIZATION IN DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
(COUNTRY PROFILES) 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section 
profiles fourteen endogenous growth countries (Australia, Austria, 
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States), 
while the second section includes five catching-up countries 
(Mexico, the Philippines, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, and South 
Africa). Selection was limited to those countries that had sufficient 
data available for the period of study (1985-1997). No countries in 
the primary producer, Malthusian, or isolated categories provided 
enough data to make inclusion in this study possible. 
Each profile in turn is divided into three parts (with the 
exception of the United States, which includes a more in-depth look 
at the U.S. economy): Patterns of Globalization describes the 
background and present characteristics of the country's economy; 
Globalization and Oil Price Shocks examines the interplay of 
globalization factors and oil shocks, and their combined impact on 
the economy in question; and Implications for Naval Forward 
Presence draws conclusions about the ability of naval operations to 
benefit, or in some cases hinder, economic growth in that country. 
2.1 GROUP ONE: THE ENDOGENOUS GROWTH COUNTRIES 
2.1.1 Australia 
Australia is a Group 1 country whose economy has become 
significantly integrated since the implementation of reforms in the 
mid-1980s. Australia's high rate of economic growth has somewhat 
mitigated the magnitude of oil price shocks by reducing oil's share 
of GDP (Figures 5 and 6). Nevertheless, the share of lost income in 
GDP has been increasing since 1994. The current slowdown in 
Australia's growth will no doubt contribute to any increase in the 
share of GDP lost following a sharp rise in oil prices.16 These 
findings indicate that future naval forward presence/crisis response 
will be significantly beneficial to Australia's economic growth. 
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2.1.1.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Th~ Australian government has initiated a number of reforms 
over the last 15 years designed to make its economy more 
competitive in global markets. 17 These reforms have improved 
economic performance to the point where recent growth has 
averaged around 4% per annum, with marked improvements in 
productivity. This has occurred in an environment of relatively low 
rates of inflation and unemployment. Another outcome of the 
reforms has been a fairly dramatic increase in several globalization 
dimensions (Table 3, Fig 4). 
In addition to enhancing the global growth dimension of the 
Australian economy, the reforms also have contributed to the 
dramatic increase in the country's general globalization factor. In 
addition, the financial flow dimension has shown a distinct increase 
over time. In contrast, Australia's relative trade openness has 
declined somewhat during this period. 
Previous macroeconomic assessments of the Australian 
economy have found it susceptible to a number of demand and 
supply shocks. Ramon Moreno found that shocks to technology 
raise output and lower the price level, while shocks to demand 
temporarily raise output and permanently raise the price level.18 
Moreno found that supply shocks in Australia are dominated by 
shocks to technology, with shocks to the labor supply or the oil 
price level playing a smaller role. His analysis suggests that demand 
shocks are dominant in determining fluctuations in output at a one-
quarter horizon, but supply shocks assume the larger role at longer 
horizons. Supply shocks also account for most of the fluctuations in 
the Australian price level. 
2.1.1.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
While Moreno's study provides some valuable insights into 
how the Australian economy has adjusted to oil price shocks, his 
work is somewhat dated, and fails to examine systematically the 
trends in globalization noted in this study. Regression analysis of 
the four globalization factors on a year-by-year, 10 percent oil price 
increase suggests (Figure 4) that several have served to increase the 
loss in GDP brought about by these external shocks. This pattern 
holds for the three measures of lost GDP: the cumulative absolute 
amount, the cumulative amount as a percent of GDP, and the year-
by-year amount for the shock and two subsequent years. The 
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general globalization dimension is significant for all years examined. 
Increased openness also appears to be reinforcing this pattern of 
increased vulnerability, although chiefly in the impact year and 
subsequent year. Increased global financial flows also contributed to 
the loss in income associated with the oil price shocks. In this case, 
the effect probably is a significant factor in the year following the 
oil price shock. Finally, in Australia's case increased growth and 
trade expansion does not appear to create increased vulnerability to 
oil price shocks. 
2.1.1.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
With so many globalization factor working to increase the 
severity of oil price shocks, the ability of naval forward 
presence/crisis response to reduce the magnitude of oil price 
increases associated with a conflict would play a significant role in 
contributing to Australia's economic health. 
Table 3 
Dimensions of Globalization: Australia 1988-1996 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1988 Australia -0.375 2.046 -0.616 0.028 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 Australia -0.297 1.142 -0.742 -0.200 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 Australia -0.507 1.047 -0.654 0.209 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 -0.722 -0.109 
Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 Australia -0.468 1.143 -0.468 0.219 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
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1992 Australia -0.525 0.951 -0.385 0.282 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 Australia -0.488 0.830 -0.384 0.305 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
1994 Australia -0.747 0.951 0.473 0.155 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
1995 Australia -0.677 1.191 -0.085 0.236 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
1996 Australia -0.626 1.182 -0.076 0.083 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
Average · Australia -0.523 1.165 -0.326 0.146 
Group 1 -0.153 1.492 -0.089 -0.144 
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Dimensions of Globalization 
-- Global Growth 
........... Financial Flows 
----e-- Trade Openness 
.......... General Globalization 
Table 4 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Australia 
Period of Impact Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 
Globalization Openness Globalization Growth 
Cumu]atiye 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Cumu]atiye % GDP 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 


























Impact Year + + ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + + + ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 country. Australian data used. Complete analysis 
available from the author upon request. + indicates a factor 
enhancing the impact of oil price increases on GDP; ins = 
statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a factor 
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2.1.2 Austria 
Austria is a Group 1 country undergoing significant economic 
restructuring due in part to pressure from exogenous circumstances. 
Its producers are increasingly vulnerable to competition from the 
newly opened economies and educated, cheap labor of countries in 
Eastern and Central Europe, and from the introduction of a single 
currency to the European Union. Although its financial globalization 
dimension has increased faster than any other dimension, Austria 
remains within the mainstream of Group 1 countries. 
The net effect of Austria's globalization has been to increase 
the share of GDP lost following an oil price shock. Price stabilization 
through naval forward presence/crisis response will be important to 
Austria's future economic growth as it continues to open its 
economy to global forces. 
2.1.2.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Throughout most of the postwar era, Austria, like other 
countries with small, open and vulnerable economies, opted for a 
variety of economic and social policies that prevented the costs of 
opening to international markets forces from causing political 
instability.19 The Austrian government had full employment as its 
primary economic goal. It promoted investment and maintained a 
relatively large public sector of nationalized industries. Wage and 
price increases stayed stable within a corporatist system, while 
Keynesian deficit spending was complemented by a hard currency 
policy. In addition, a comprehensive regulatory system imposed 
restraint on the financial markets. Achieved via the control of 
currency transactions, this regulatory environment put the 
government in a strong position to manage its national economy. 
By the mid-1980s, the process of globalization was well 
underway in Austria. Together with Ireland and Canada, Austria 
showed the highest degree of foreign penetration among 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
states in the mid-1980s. Furthermore, the globalization of financial 
markets put increasing pressure on Austria to liberalize its own 
financial markets. Partly because of this pressure, partly in order to 
shadow developments within the European Community (EC), 
Austrian capital markets were gradually liberalized between 1986 
and 1991. These changes in the production and finance structures 
28 
served to create forces for market linearization and asset 
privatization throughout the economy. 
The 1990s were a decade of unprecedented change for Austria, 
in which rising competitive pressure was a constant theme. The 
opening of the Central and Eastern European economies in 1990, 
followed by Austria's accession to the European Union (EU) in 1995 
and the advent of the Euro, the Union's single currency, in 1999, 
have all played a part in forcing structural changes to Austria's 
economy. Globalization is likely to mean that the pressure remains 
unrelenting. 
Of these events, the opening of the reform economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe has been of particular significance. Austria's 
border with former Eastern Bloc countries is the longest of any EU 
member state. This proximity gave Austria the opportunity to build 
on traditional links with these countries, both via direct investment 
in them from Austria, and through the increasing use of Austria as a 
location for regional headquarters by companies wishing to 
establish a presence in the area. 20 On the negative side, however, is 
a growing competitive challenge for Austrian industries from the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia-immediate 
neighbors that have well-trained, industrialized, but exceedingly 
cheap labor forces. The result has been that several of Austria's low-
technology industries producing intermediate goods have seen their 
production severely curtailed. 
Due at least in part to these various developments, the 
globalization process in Austria has been erratic, most notably with 
the expansion of the general globalization dimension since 1989 
(Table 5, Figure 7). While financial liberalization has been extensive, 
this dimension has not increased any faster for Austria than for 
most of the other Group 1 countries. The same applies to the trade 
openness dimension, while the global growth dimension has 
declined slightly relative to the progress made by other countries 
during this period. 
In short, rapid structural realignment is likely to be a feature of 
the Austrian economic environment for some time. The economic 
capabilities of Central and Eastern Europe will grow quickly as 
infrastructure develops and skills improve, and rising productivity 
attracts greater capital inflows. Although capital flow is only one 
aspect of the ongoing globalization of economic activity, it is the one 
that is of most significance to Austria. 
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2.1.2.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Globalization has had some impact (Table 6) on the ability of oil 
price movements to lower Austrian GDP. The changes brought about 
by globalization, however, seem primarily to be short term. 
Reductions in GDP stemming from an oil shock, combined with a 
larger globalization dimension, occur only in the impact year 
(Figures 8 and 9). The openness dimension appears to have a longer 
term effect, but this may be offset somewhat by the financial 
dimension. When regressed on the size of the GDP change 
stemming from an oil price shock, the financial dimension had a 
negative sign for the year following the oil price shock, suggesting 
that liberalization in this area created forces tending to stimulate 
GDP. 
2.1.2.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
In the 1990s there was relative stability in the economic costs 
associated with oil price increases. Nevertheless, these costs were 
still relatively high and any price reduction brought about by naval 
forward presence/crisis response would be significant. The 
cumulative GDP losses to the Austrian economy in recent years have 
begun to increase (Figure 9), suggesting even higher future benefits 
to Austria stemming from naval forward presence/crisis response. 
Year 
Table 5 








1988 Austria 0.169 1.090 0.243 0.640 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 Austria 0.197 0.849 0.286 0.280 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 Austria 0.467 0.486 -1.131 -0.126 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 -0.722 -0.109 
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Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 Austria 0.372 1.181 0.027 0.182 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
1992 Austria 0.631 1.319 -0.423 -0.414 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 Austria 0.246 1.247 0.209 -0.441 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
1994 Austria 0.284 1.259 0.494 -0.498 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
1995 Austria 0.229 1.665 -0.208 -0.325 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
1996 Austria 0.416 1.462 -0.393 -0.282 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
Average Austria 0.335 1.173 -0.100 -0.109 
Group 1 -0.153 1.492 -0.089 -0.144 
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Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Austria 











Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 ins ins (-) (-) 
Impact Year +2 ins + ins ins 
CumulatiY~ % GD£ 
Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 ins + ins ins 
Impact Year +2 ins + ins + 
Yearly 
Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 ins ins (-) ins 
Impact Year +2 ins ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 country. Austrian data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 
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2.1.3 Canada 
A Group 1 country, Canada has a strong economy that has 
become highly integrated into global trade in goods, services, and 
capital, most notably with the advent of free trade agreements with 
the United States and Latin America in the early 1990s. Although 
Canada is a hydrocarbon producer, it is still adversely affected by 
increases in the international price of oil. The year by year analysis 
of oil shocks indicates that this phenomenon is increasing in 
severity (Figure 14), especially when measured on a cumulative 
basis (Figure 15). With increased future globalization, these trends 
are likely to continue, making Canada an important beneficiary of 
naval forward presence/crisis response. 
2.1.3.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Since Confederation in 1867, Canada has been closely linked to 
the wider global economy. It began as part of the British Empire and 
benefited from associated systems of preferential tariffs, ownership 
and investment by British-based companies. Following World II, 
Canada shifted into the American orbit as it became an important 
component of the Western Hemisphere and North American trade, 
technology and investment flows. Europe, however, has continued to 
be an important Canadian export market and significant source of 
foreign investment in Canada. 
The last stages of protective Canadian economic policy were 
played out in the early 1980s. They largely ended with entry into 
the Canada/United States Free Trade Agreement and the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since then, the country 
has been looking for new ways to assert its international economic 
strengths. 
Unfortunately, the data needed to estimate Canada's 
globalization dimensions were not available after 1993 (Figure 10). 
Still, a brief examination of the data (Table 9) prior to that year put 
the country squarely in Group 1 as having an endogenous growth 
economy. Canada is highly integrated into the world economy 
through both trade and financial flows. Beginning in 1999, 
Canadian businesses have been exporting and importing more than 
$2.2 billion worth of goods and services each day. In 1999 exports 
increased 11% to $412 billion, or 43% of the country's GDP. In that 
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same year, $36 billion in direct investment flowed into Canada, 
bringing the stock of foreign direct investment in Canadian 
enterprises to $240 billion.21 
2.1.3.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Canada's current degree of vulnerability to oil price shocks was 
determined using pre-1994 data and extrapolating subsequent 
trends, on the assumption that Canada has followed a typical Group 
1 evolution in its globalization dimensions. Using this method, 
several statistical links (Table 8) were found between these 
dimensions and the size of an oil shock impact on the economy. 
The general globalization dimension in particular was positive and 
highly significant during this study's focus period in exacerbating 
GDP loss following an oil price increase. The global growth 
dimension reinforced this pattern, although its effect seems to be 
shorter term. Because both of the globalization dimensions had 
positive signs, we can conclude that Canadian globalization has 
increased the severity of oil shocks in terms of lost GDP. 
2.1.3.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
The ability of naval forward presence to limit oil price increases 
during periods of crisis response would no doubt provide growing 
benefits to the Canadian economy into the foreseeable future. 
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Table 7 
Dimensions of Globalization: Canada 1985-1993 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1985 Canada -0.120 -1.410 0.074 0.402 
Group 1 0.111 -1.367 0.342 0.100 
Group 2 -0.334 -0.239 0.080 -0.009 
1986 Canada -0.038 -0.892 -0.206 -0.048 
Group 1 0.113 -1.162 0.12 2 -0.134 
Group 2 -0.0 22 -0.400 -0.261 0.002 
1987 Canada 0.158 -1.169 -0.279 -0.104 
Group 1 -0.007 -1.292 0.020 0.050 
Group 2 0.031 -0.182 -0. 203 0.083 
1988 Canada -0.282 1.297 -0.239 0.546 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 Canada -0.265 0.780 -0.232 -0.120 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 Canada -0.255 0.681 -0.929 0.117 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 -0.722 -0.109 
Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 Canada -0.243 1.275 -0.349 -0.215 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
1992 Canada -0.144 1.140 -0.561 -0.051 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 Canada -0.068 1.200 -0.619 0.412 
38 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
Average Canada -0.210 1.062 -0.488 0.115 
1988-93 Group 1 -0.100 1.425 -0.130 -0.126 
Group 2 0.123 -0.126 -0.189 0.231 
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Figure 10 
Patterns of Globalization: Canada 
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Table 8 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Canada 
Period of Impact Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 
Globalization Openness Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
C:umu1 ati Y~ 
Impact Year + ins ins + 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins + 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Cumu1 ati Y~ % GD£ 
Impact Year + ins ins + 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins + 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Year1y 
Impact Year + ins ins + 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 ins ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 country. Group 1 data used. Complete analysis 
available from the author upon request. + indicates a factor 
enhancing the impact of oil price increases on GDP; ins = 
statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a factor 
weakening the impact of oil price increases on GDP. 
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Figure 11 
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2.1.4 Finland 
Finland has a fairly free and open Group 1 economy, but still 
shows some closed economy tendencies, particularly in its fiscal 
policies. Globalization is an important and rapidly growing aspect of 
Finland's economic policies; one 1995 study ranks Finland as the 
fifth most globalized economy in the world, though it lags in the 
openness category. As with other Group 1 countries, naval forward 
presence/crisis response will be beneficial to Finland's economic 
stability. 
2.1.4.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Fins generally regard globalization more as an opportunity than 
a threat. There are many areas in which the country is ranked 
extremely high in global competition. Finland is generally quite 
open and well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities 
afforded by increased globalization. 
In 1995 the Freedom House Institute studied the economic 
freedom of 85 countries.22 The study quantified the degree of 
freedom individuals and businesses within each country enjoyed in 
the following areas: right of ownership; freedom to earning a living 
(including the freedom to organize in unions); opportunities for 
setting up businesses; scope for investment; freedom in foreign 
trade; and the functioning of the market economy (including the 
rights of minority groups to do business). The Institute divided the 
countries into four categories: free, partly free, mostly un-free, and 
un-free. 
Finland was placed among the 27 "free" countries, and within 
that category ranked slightly below average. Finland shared its 
ranking with Argentina, Austria, Portugal, Switzerland and Poland. 
Above Finland-i.e., ranked as freer-came Denmark, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United 
States, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Norway, and Spain. Below Finland in this 
category-i.e., slightly less free-were Chile, Estonia, Italy, Japan, 
Latvia, and South Africa. 
In a similar 1995 study, the Heritage Foundation ranked 
Finland 23rd out of a total of 150 countries.23 In this study, the 
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criteria for economic freedom comprised the following: trade policy, 
fiscal policy, public consumption, financial policy, capital flows and 
foreign investments, banking policies, wage and price policies, right 
of ownership, regulatory policies, and the black market. The 
countries were divided into five groups according to each criterion 
and with the help of that division the complete picture was formed. 
Finland was ranked at the top for three groups: financial policy, 
right of ownership and the absence of a black market; while the 
lowest scores were given to Finland in fiscal policies. 
The third study of interest, also carried out in 1995, was done 
by the Fraser Institute in cooperation with Florida State University, 
and with the help of a variety of organizations in different 
countries.24 According to this study, the concept of economic 
freedom comprised three primary factors: individual freedom of 
choice, free exchange, and the protection of private property. 115 
countries were analyzed, among which Finland ranked 36th. 
Finally, the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Magazine Index lists 
Finland as the fifth most globalized country, behind Singapore, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland.25 
In sum, according to these studies, Finland would seem to be a 
fairly free and open economy, yet incorporating some features of 
closed and less free economies. These factors are reflected in 
Finland's changing patterns of globalization over the years. As with 
many of the other Group 1 countries, the country's general 
globalization dimension has shown the most dramatic gain (Table 9, 
Figure 13). Financial flows also increased dramatically in the early 
1990s, but these have subsided to their longer term pattern. Much 
less dramatic has been the slight rise in the openness dimension. 
2.1.4.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Increases in the general globalization dimension have been a 
major factor in increasing the severity of external oil price shocks 
on the Finnish economy. The openness and financial dimensions of 
globalization, however, also have contributed to this trend over the 
short run (Table 10). These latter two factors in turn have been 
somewhat offset by the growth dimension. Based on an examination 
of the regression coefficients, it is clear that increased globalization 
in recent years has amplified the negative economic impact on the 
Finnish economy associated with oil shocks. The net effect has been 
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a gradual increase in the share of Finland's GDP adversely affected 
following an oil shock (Figures 14, 15). 
2.1.4.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
Given the clear patterns of globalization-led oil price sensitivity 
and the likelihood that Finland's globalization will continue, naval 
forward presence should have an increasingly positive impact on 
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Table 9 
Dimensions of Globalization: Finland 1988-1996 
Year Structural General Financial Global 












Group 1 -0.190 
Group 2 0.112 
Finland -0.160 
Group 1 0.004 
Group 2 -0.056 
Finland -0.487 
Group 1 -0.024 
Group 2 -0.027 
Finland -0.317 
Group 1 -0.066 
Group 2 0.069 
Finland -0.382 
Group 1 -0.142 
Group 2 0.257 
Finland 0.188 
Group 1 -0.180 
Group 2 0.381 
Finland -0.019 
Group 1 -0.156 
Group 2 0.325 
Finland -0.105 
Group 1 -0.294 


















































1996 Finland 0.048 1.710 -0.463 -0.136 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
Average Finland -0.178 1.83 3 0.092 -0.283 
Group 1 -0.153 1.492 -0.089 -0.144 
Group 2 0.146 -0.089 -0.204 0.264 
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Table 10 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Finland 
Period of Impact 
Cumulative 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Cumulative % GDP 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Yearly 
Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 

























Impact Year + + + (-) 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + + ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 Country. Finnish data used in the analysis. Complete 
analysis available from the author upon request. + indicates a factor 
enhancing the impact of oil price increases on GDP; ins = 
statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a factor 
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2.1.5 France 
France is a Group One country that until recently kept tight 
government controls on its economy through close coordination 
with the business and financial sectors, and outright public 
ownership of key industries. The rapid globalization of world trade 
in the late 20th century led France to relax these policies, but slowly 
and cautiously. The result has been a leap in the general 
globalization dimension of France's economy, while other indicators 
have remained stable. For this reason, the increasing negative 
impact on France's economy of oil price shocks results from general 
globalization alone rather than from an accumulation of factors. 
France therefore represents a clear case in which the dampening of 
sudden oil price increases through naval forward presence/crisis 
stabilization brings obvious benefit. 
2.1.5.1 Patterns of Globalization 
After World War II, the French government intervened strongly 
in the devastated domestic economy to foster long-term economic 
growth. A powerful elite bureaucracy maintained closed ties 
between the governmental, industrial, and financial sectors, while 
French officials nationalized key industries, instituting control 
through direct state ownership. 
As the pace of globalization increased over time, the French 
government relaxed economic controls. This shift was less an effort 
by the government at disengagement than a restructuring of 
regulatory powers in the face of market changes. Edouard Balladur, 
French finance minister in the late 1980s, extended reforms by 
abolishing exchange controls and liberalizing interest rates on 
bonds and long-term deposits. The financial authorities helped 
banks become more independent by giving them a larger role in 
securities markets. These reforms were, however, introduced in a 
carefully calculated manner and maintained a very French style. 
The country has maintained its national sovereignty by adapting to 
globalization cautiously and slowly. 
Since the late 1980s, French governments have concentrated on 
the macro-economic business environment, using restrictive 
monetary policies and tight budgets to bring down inflation. By 
reducing taxes on industry, officials hoped to promote French 
competitiveness across the entire economy. The government also 
significantly diminished potential government control over the 
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economy by implementing a vast array of deregulatory reforms. 
Moreover, the authorities have created the "petit bang," which 
replaced the monopoly of the 60 official French stockbrokers. This 
reform allowed the member countries of the EC to trade on the Paris 
Bourse. 
A large jump in the general globalization dimension in the late 
1980s (Figure 16) reflects these developments. Other dimensions of 
globalization appear much more stable, as a result of the country's 
cautious and controlled approach toward integration into the global 
system. 
2.1.5.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
General globalization clearly is the main force determining the 
strength of the effect oil price shocks have had on France's economy 
(Table 12). None of the other globalization dimensions offset the 
negative impact · of such shocks, so the observed increase over time 
(Figures 17, 18) in lost GDP stemming from rising oil prices is easy 
to interpret. That is, the loss is not the net outcome of a diverse set 
of forces pulling in different directions, but instead simply reflects 
the economic contraction brought about by oil price movements 
flowing through the domestic economy. Furthermore, the positive 
sign on the openness dimension (% GDP) for the impact year 
suggests that as France's globalization proceeds, oil price shocks are 
likely to have an increasingly powerful depressing effect on that 
country's economy. 
2.1.5.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
France represents a clear case in which reduced oil prices 
stemming from increased naval forward presence would provide 




Dimensions of Globalization: France 1988-1996 
Year Structural General Financial Global 



























































































































1996 France -0.424 1.507 -0.392 -0.401 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
Average France -0.308 1.218 -0.366 -0.061 
Group 1 -0.153 1.492 -0.089 -0.144 
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Table 12 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: France 
Period of Impact 
Cumu]atjye 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Cumulative % GDP 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Yearly 
Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 

























Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 Country. French data used in the analysis. Complete 
analysis available from the author upon request. + indicates a factor 
enhancing the impact of oil price increases on GDP; ins = 
statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a factor 
weakening the impact of oil price increases on GDP. 
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Figure 17 
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2.1.6 Germany 
Germany's economy has not globalized as quickly as other 
Western industrialized economies, due primarily to a peculiarly 
rigid form of government based on strict rules of procedure. 
Designed to limit the negative impacts of change on society, these 
rules were successful in keeping the economy stable during the 
costly process of German reunification in the 1990s. Now, however, 
this same structural rigidity is preventing Germany from adjusting 
to the inevitable changes imposed by globalization. Oil price shocks 
have tended to do noticeable short-term damage to the German 
economy. As their economy gradually opens up, Germans are likely 
to feel increasing impacts from sharp increases in oil prices, and 
therefore will benefit more over time from naval forward presence. 
2.1.6.1 Patterns of Globalization 
As with Canada, there is no consistent data available for 
Germany that can be used to calculate globalization dimensions and 
patterns over the entire 1985-97 period. Still, with the little data 
that is available (1992-1997, Figure 19), a number of useful 
observations can be made concerning that country's progress 
toward global integration and the challenges that lie ahead. 
The factor analysis (Table 13) incorporating data over the 
1992-1997 period, suggests that Germany is clearly a Group 1 
country. The country is a bit more closed than the norm for Group 1 
economies, and has a lower score on the general globalization 
dimension of globalization. Germany scores somewhat higher than 
the norm, however, on financial globalization. Finally, German 
growth in global markets has been somewhat below the norm for 
endogenous growth countries. 
Germany, despite its large economy and productive workforce, 
has not globalized as rapidly or consistently as might be expected 
from observing, for example, the United States and Japan. A possible 
explanation of Germany's lag in globalizing is that the country 
traditionally has not looked to global economic integration as a 
source of growth and productivity. Instead, the German economy 
has relied more on its long-standing strengths, including policies of 
low inflation, fiscal prudence and a strong currency, all of which are 
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conducive to investment, growth and employment. The country 
also has a long tradition of industrial excellence. These elements 
have enabled the government to absorb the costs of reunification 
between East and West Germany that began in the early 1990s 
without igniting inflation. Unfortunately, policies that served the 
country so well in the past cannot compensate for many of the 
structural rigidities now confronting officials.26 
This inflexibility may be difficult to overcome. Helmut Wagner 
has observed that Germany has a long tradition of strict 
bureaucratic rules designed to control the pace of change.27 
Countries like the United States or Great Britain are accustomed to 
making discretionary, flexible adjustments to new situations, 
whereas in Germany strict procedural rules are used to make the 
process of change slow and more costly. This practice of limiting 
bureaucratic flexibility is the main reason it takes much longer in 
Germany to build up new enterprises, to close them if they fail, and 
to get new ideas and products into the market. 
The main characteristic of globalization is that it imposes 
permanent new structural changes or paradigm shifts to which 
societies, governments, enterprises, and individuals must react. 
Germany)s traditional reliance on rule-based economic mechanisms 
hampers adjustment to these structural shocks. Wagner predicts 
that the German rule-based system will gradually change.28 In the 
meantime, Germany may steadily fall behind those countries whose 
leaders are able to think and act more flexibly. 
2.1.6.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Wagner's interpretation of the globalization process in Germany 
may explain several of the main patterns found in the analysis 
(Table 14) of oil price shocks on the German economy. The general 
globalization dimension is positive, suggesting that increased levels 
of globalization will be associated with greater declines in GDP 
following an oil price shock. Increased openness stemming from a 
reduction in trade barriers has left the country more vulnerable to 
price movements in the international economy, also tending to 
increase economic losses associated with increased oil prices. These 
linkages are reflected in the fact that after 1993 (Figures 20, 21) 
there has been a tendency for increasingly severe economic 
downturns associated with the price shocks. It is safe to conclude 
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that Germany's endemic structural rigidities delay equilibration to 
shocks, thus imposing a higher short-run cost on the country in the 
form of unemployment, excess capacity and loss of GDP. 
2.1.6.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
As noted above, Germany is somewhat below the norm in the 
openness, general globalization, and growth dimensions of its 
economy, and so has not been highly vulnerable to oil price shocks. 
As Germany's economy approaches the group norm due to ongoing 
globalization, it will suffer from greater reductions in GDP due to 
sharp oil price increases. Naval forward presence is more likely in 
the foreseeable future to produce larger rather than smaller 
economic benefits for the German economy. 
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Table 13 
Dimensions of Globalization: Germany 1992-1997 
Year Structural General Financial Global 





































Average Germany -0.633 
1992-1997 Group 1 -0.299 
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Table 14 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Germany 
Period of Impact 
Cumulative 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Cumu]atjye % GDP 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Yearly 
Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 

























Impact Year + ins ins + 
Impact Year + 1 + + ins ins 
Impact Year +2 ins ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 country. Group 1 data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 
factor weakening the impact of oil price increases on GDP. 
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Figure 2 0 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact: Germany 
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Figure 21 
Cumulative Oil Shock Impact: Germany 
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2.1.7 Italy 
Financially integrated into the global economy but largely 
dependent on small to medium-scale manufacturing for its exports, 
Italy lags behind other Group 1 countries in most dimensions of 
globalization. Its service sector is limited to tourism and design, 
both of which are concentrated in the industrialized north of the 
country. Like France, Italy's vulnerability to oil price shocks lies in 
the globalization dimension, with no offsetting dimensions to 
mitigate those effects. Future oil price stability due to naval forward 
presence would be highly beneficial to Italy. 
2.1.7.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Complete data for only two years, 1988 and 1991, were 
available to calculate the Italian dimensions of globalization. Based 
on these, the country is a member of the endogenous growth 
economies (Table 15). Relative to the other Group 1 countries, Italy 
is less open to trade and has a slightly lower level of general 
globalization, a higher degree of financial globalization and a higher 
global growth dimension. The aggregate figures are a bit misleading 
however, since most of the globalization is confined to the industrial 
north. The agricultural southern part of the country is much less 
integrated into the world economy .29 
In general, Italy's economic structure is comparable to that of 
most other OECD economies, with a small and diminishing primary 
sector and services that contribute well over half of gross value 
added. Apart from tourism and design, however, Italy is not 
internationally competitive in most service sectors. Its key strength 
has been in manufacturing, especially small and medium-sized firms 
specializing in products that require high quality design and 
engineering. Manufacturing accounts for about 25% of GDP and 
about 90% of the country's total merchandise exports. The country 
is a substantial net importer of agricultural products and imports 
most of its energy. 
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2.1.7.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Using the average globalization scores for the Group 1 countries 
and examining the change over time that oil shocks have had on the 
Italian economy, (Table 16) it appears that Italy responds to sharp 
oil price increases in a manner similar to France. Italy's general 
globalization dimension is the only statistically significant 
determinant of the size of GDP loss associated with an oil price 
shock. The magnitude of this loss has remained fairly stable 
throughout the 1990s (Figures 23, 24). 
2.1.7.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
Italy's economy has no dimensions of globalization that would 
tend to reduce the future severity of oil price shocks. In this case, 
reduced oil prices stemming from increased naval forward presence 
and crisis stabilization would provide clear economic benefits. 
Table 15 
Dimensions of Globalization: Italy 1988-1996 

















































Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Italy 
Period of Impact Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 
Globalization Openness Globalization Growth 
------------------------
Cumul ati Y~ 
Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Cumulati Y~ % GDE 
Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Yearly 
Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 Country. Group 1 data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 
























Figure 2 3 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact: Italy 
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2.1.8 Japan 
Although Japan was the first Asian country to open to foreign 
trade, more than one hundred years ago, its modern leaders have 
approached globalization cautiously by maintaining strong 
protection mechanisms for certain domestic sectors. This has 
created a large disparity in Japan's balance of payments, and left 
the Japanese economy extremely vulnerable to oil price shocks. In 
the absence of offsetting globalization dimensions to reduce their 
impact, sharp oil price increases will continue to inflict heavy 
damage on the Japanese economy. Naval forward presence will 
bring only minor benefits until Japan makes the structural changes 
necessary to bring its economy in line with those of other Group 1 
countries. 
2.1.8.1 Patterns of Globalization 
A complete set of data was not available on the Japanese 
economy for the purpose of estimating long run trends in the 
economy's main dimensions of globalization. This analysis is based 
on data from three years, 1991-93. These are enough to provide a 
rough picture of how Japan's main dimensions of globalization 
compare with those of the other major economies comprising Group 
1. In particular, Japan: (1) is much less open to trade; (2) has a 
higher degree of general globalization; (3) is slightly less integrated 
financially; and ( 4) has a considerably higher rate of growth and 
trade in the global economy (Table 17). Oil shock impact patterns 
produced using Group 1 figures for Japan are depicted in Figure 27. 
Japan was the first Asian society to open itself to globalization, 
in the nineteenth century, and to adapt successfully to the rest of 
the world.30 As was the case with France, Japan has preserved its 
national sovereignty by adapting to the globalization phenomenon 
cautiously and slowly.31 Unlike France and other Group 1 countries, 
however, great disparities have developed in many of Japan's major 
balance of payment categories. For example, from 1950 to the end 
of the 1990s, more than $350 billion of Japanese investment went 
abroad, but foreign investment in Japan remains equivalent to less 
than 10 percent of that amount. 
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Japan has a relatively low degree of openness to foreign trade. 
As a percentage of GDP, Japan's two-way foreign trade in 2000 was 
just 16.8%, compared with 54.9% for Germany and 20.1% for the 
United States. The closed nature of Japan's economy also stands out 
when compared with other Asian economies such as China's, which 
in the year 2000 saw foreign trade reach 43.2% of GDP. This 
disparity is largely owing to Japan's official and unofficial 
restrictions on merchandise imports, which remain in place despite 
pressure from the United States and other important trading 
partners to eliminate them. These restrictions are intended to 
protect the less efficient sectors of Japan's industry, such as textiles, 
food and pulp and paper. Japan's low degree of openness to foreign 
trade has often been cited as one reason for the persistent structural 
problems in its economy in general, and the poor productivity of 
companies in the non-tradable sectors in particular. 
At this point, the literature on Japanese globalization goes in 
two different and diametrically opposed directions. One view holds 
that Japan's economic problems stem from its slow response to 
globalization.32 The other view contends that Japan's current 
problems stem from the country's failure to adjust to an overhang 
of excess capacity and surplus employees arising from deregulation, 
structural changes, and the globalization of the economy in the 
1990s.33 According to this view, excess capacity and surplus staff on 
the supply side of the economy are acting as a drag on employment 
and wages, as well as on new investment in plant and equipment, 
contributing further to Japan's long economic downturn and falling 
prices. 
2.1.8.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
While a full analysis is beyond the scope of this study, a brief 
look at oil price shocks should shed some light on the role of 
globalization in Japan's · recent economic performance. Several 
patterns emerge (Table 18): 
1. Increases in general globalization have increased the severity 
of oil price shocks on Japan's economy. This is the dominant 
relationship produced by a regression of the main dimensions 
of globalization on a year-to-year simulation of a 10 percent 
oil price shock. 
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2. The effect of increased general globalization on the costs 
associated with oil price shocks has been offset a bit by an 
increase in the financial dimension of globalization, although 
this appears to affect the severity of the shock over only one 
or sometimes two years. 
3. There has been a general increase in the severity of oil price 
shocks over time-particularly since the mid-1990s (Figures 
24 and 25). 
These results suggest that Japan's slow response to the changes 
imposed by globalization is the most likely cause of its stumbling 
economy. Because the country has lagged in adjusting to 
globalization, especially in the area of trade, the cost structure of 
the economy may be rising relative to its main trading partners. 
When hit with increased oil prices, firms that face weak domestic 
competition have little trouble raising their prices to pass the 
increased costs along to the buyer. 
2.1.8.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
Given the increased costs to Japan's economy in recent years 
associated with oil price increases, naval forward presence should 
produce greater benefits with time. These benefits may be reduced 
somewhat if the country is able to push ahead with major financial 
reforms that bring it more in line with other Group 1 countries on 
the financial dimension of globalization. In light of Japan's existing 
impediments to trade, major progress in trade liberalization would 
reduce the severity of oil price shocks by introducing more 
flexibility into the economic system. This would be a significant 
change for Japan. Japanese leaders' cautious approach to 
globalization so far suggests these reforms are still years away, and 
that oil price shocks will continue to exact a high toll on the 




Dimensions of Globalization: Japan 1991-1993 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1991 Japan -1.220 1.828 -0.268 0.191 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
1992 Japan -1.363 1.535 0.005 0.246 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 Japan -1.472 1.184 -0.017 -0.291 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
Average Japan -1.352 1.516 -0.093 0.049 
Group 1 -0.129 1.442 0.047 -0.220 
Group 2 0.236 0.102 -0.117 0.171 
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Table 18 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Japan 




Structural Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Growth 
-----------------------------------------------------
Cumu1ati~c 
Impact Year + ins (-) ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins (-) ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Cumu1 ati ~c % GD£ 
Impact Year + ins (-) ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins (-) ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Yearly 
Impact Year + ins (-) ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 country. Group 1 data used. Complete analysis 
available from the author upon request. + indicates a factor 
enhancing the impact of oil price increases on GDP; ins = 
statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a factor 



















Figure 2 4 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact: Japan 
0.6~----------------------------------------~ 
1987 1989 1991 
Year 
78 
1993 1995 1997 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact 
--Impact Year 
........... Impact Year +1 















Cumulative Oil Shock Impact: Japan 
1.4 
\ ~-··--6( 
\ l / \\ ' / 
~ ...... .... (/ .... •·········• ,#,' I 





··. . ..... ___ '"' ... 





~ ----·/ I 
1987 1989 1991 
Year 
Figure 2 5 
79 
.f··., I --... ..., 





.. ~ .... ~ .... 
....• ·· .. 
·. 




1993 1995 1997 
Cumulative Oil Shock Impact 
----Impact Year 
--··•·····Impact Year +1 
-e- Impact Year +2 
2.1.9 The Netherlands 
The Netherlands, an age-old seafaring nation located at the cusp 
of Europe's western transport network, has a small Group 1 
economy based on processing and manufacturing. These industries 
rely on almost entirely on international trade to acquire raw 
materials and sell finished goods, leading the Netherlands to 
develop one of the most open economies in the world. Despite its 
size, it is the sixth largest recipient of foreign direct investment 
thanks to generous tax policies and incentives. High indices of 
globalization mean that Holland is particularly vulnerable to oil 
price shocks, which have inflicted significant losses in GDP on its 
economy. This experience appears to be typical of small globalized 
economies, which lack the domestic economic depth to absorb such 
shocks. Price stabilization through naval forward presence therefore 
is bound to be of benefit to the Netherlands, and by extension, to 
other small economies. 
2.1.9.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Holland's geographical position as a crucial hub of Europe's 
transport system, combined with the small size of its domestic 
market, have made the Dutch economy one of the most open and 
outward-looking in the world. A scarcity of natural resources and 
raw materials have turned Holland's economy toward 
manufacturing and processing. With exports and imports of goods 
and services together totaling more than 100% of nominal GDP, the 
Netherlands ranked second (after Singapore) on the A.T. Kearney 
globalization index. 
Trade is especially critical for the manufacturing sector, which 
is almost entirely dependent on imported materials. Prominent 
Dutch multinationals include Royal Dutch/Shell (oil), Unilever 
(food), Philips (electronics), and Heineken (brewing). Holland's open 
economy also attracts foreign companies. Favorable tax treatment 
for multinationals has put the Netherlands ahead of Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). There 
are approximately 5,000 foreign-owned companies in the 
Nether lands, employing 10% of the Dutch workforce. The 
Netherlands ranked fourth in the World Competitiveness Yearbook 
1998, coming from sixth place in 1997, a result of its long-standing 
favorable trading policies. 
80 
Financial flows and foreign direct investment (FDA) in 
particular are as important as trade to Holland's economic well 
being. Most economists now accept the fact that FDI is far more than 
mere "capital." It is a uniquely potent bundle of capital, contracts, 
and managerial and technological knowledge. It is regarded as the 
cutting edge of globalization.34 Over the period 2001-2005, the 
Netherlands is expected to attract $36.1billion in FDI, making it the 
sixth largest recipient after the United States, Britain, Germany, 
China, and France. 
While data is not complete over the entire 1985-97 period, 
several differences between the Netherlands and other Group 1 · 
countries emerge (Table 19). The Dutch economy is much more 
open than those of other Group 1 countries, with its generalization 
dimension also considerably above the norm for the group. By 
contrast, its financial dimension is slightly below the Group 1 norm, 
as was its growth in the global economy. In the years 1992-1995, the 
Dutch economy showed a sharp drop in the openness dimension 
and an equally dramatic increase in the general globalization 
dimension (Figure 26). There was a slight upward trend in the 
financial dimension during the first part of the 1990s. 
2.1.9.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Analysis of the impact of Holland's changing globalization on 
the magnitude of oil price shocks found a clear pattern (Table 20). 
As expected, general globalization, openness, financial globalization 
and global growth all have exacerbated income reduction following 
an increase in the price of oil; a plus sign for the financial 
dimension (greater loss in GDP associated with increases in this 
dimension) in the impact year and a negative sign for the impact + 1 
year is more difficult to interpret. The general globalization 
dimension seems to be the dominant factor here, with the global 
growth dimension also present across all measures and time periods 
of the oil price-induced loss in GDP. 
The impact of oil price increases on Holland's GDP appears to 
have grown considerably over the period under study (1985-97). 
This was particularly true during 1987-1991 (Figures 27, 28). After 
a slight drop in 1992, the subsequent trend again was of gradual 
increases in GDP loss. 
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Whether the experience of the Netherlands (increases in most 
dimensions of globalization causing greater income losses from oil 
price shocks) is typical of small national economies is debatable. A 
recent study of the Netherlands' globalization experience by 
Annelies Hogenbrik and Rajneesh Narula concludes that small 
countries are affected by economic globalization to a greater extent 
than larger economies, and that, in general, the small countries have 
taken a pragmatic view of this fact. 35 Hogenbrik and Globali 
conclude, however, that it is even more crucial for small countries to 
invest in improving their competitiveness, since their activities are 
concentrated in relatively few sectors.36 This means they have less 
leeway in delaying the termination of sunset industries, or in the 
adoption of new technologies and the upgrading of assets to enter 
new and emerging sectors. 
Small economies also are more susceptible to errors of 
judgment: if a small country selects the "wrong" sector to develop 
and build up competencies in, or under-invests in those industries 
so that they are unable to compete effectively on world markets, 
there is no home market to soften- the shock. At the same time, 
small countries such as the Netherlands are beleaguered by 
increased competition for FDI in a globalizing world; the need to 
maintain and upgrade their location advantages in response to 
changing economic realities is central to their survival. 
2.1.9.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
Income losses due to oil price shocks appear to be increasing in 
the Netherlands. This pattern is associated with increases in 
globalization, leading to the assumption that if globalization 
continues, Holland will suffer greater declines in GDP stemming 
from increased oil prices. This is a case in which naval forward 
presence should provide obvious benefits to the national economy. 
The Netherlands experience may be typical of smaller economies in 
general, though how far this assumption should taken is debatable. 
The case of the Netherlands nevertheless suggests that a large group 




Dimensions of Globalization: Netherlands 1988-1996 
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Figure 2 6 
Patterns of Globalization: Netherlands 
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Table 2 0 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Netherlands 
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Impact Year + + + + 
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Impact Year + 2 + ins (-) ins 
Notes: Group 1 country. Netherlands data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 
factor weakening the impact of oil price increases on GDP. 
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Figure 2 7 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact: Netherlands 
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Figure 2 8 
Cumulative Oil Shock Impact: Netherlands 
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2.1.10 Norway 
A major oil producer and exporter, Group 1 member Norway 
has a highly globalized economy that ranks above the group norm 
in most categories. The Norwegian economy has tended to benefit 
from any increase in oil prices, and therefore will endure a lessening 
of those benefits due to naval forward presence. As Norway 
continues to globalize, however, the positive effects of oil price 
increases will diminish, at the same time that naval forward 
presence will have a smaller dampening influence on national 
economic growth. 
2.1.10.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Norway ranks tenth on the A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy 
Magazine Globalization Index, following Singapore, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Austria, and the United 
Kingdom. Its economy falls squarely in Group 1, although it is 
considerably more open to trade than is the norm for these 
countries (Table 27). Norway is slightly above the norm for general 
globalization and lies below the norm for financial globalization and 
global growth. 
As with other Group 1 countries, there has been a fairly 
dramatic increase in the country's general globalization dimension 
(Figure 29) during the period of interest to this study (1985-1997). 
The financial flow dimension has also increased in recent years, but 
the trade openness dimension has fallen slightly since the early 
1990s. 
3.1.10.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Because Norway is a major oil producer and exporter, oil price 
shocks predictably stimulated its GDP. The size of increase in 
incremental GDP, however, was reduced over time by increases in 
general globalization (Table 22). Increases in the openness 
dimension also reduced the economic benefits derived from oil 
price increases, although apparently only in the impact year. 
In our oil price shock calculations the size of incremental GDP 
associated with a 10% oil price increase simulates the economy in 
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question in the absence of oil price increases minus the GDP path 
for three years (shock year plus two years). Since Norway is a major 
oil producer and exporter, the net figure for GDP had a negative 
sign. Regressing this increment in GDP on the country's dimensions 
of globalization produced negative signs on the general 
globalization, openness, and global growth dimensions. In other 
words, increases in all of these facets of globalization would produce 
a larger negative GDP term-in effect, a larger positive benefit for 
the Norwegian economy. Offsetting this was the financial dimension, 
which tended to lessen the increased GDP accruing to the country 
following an oil price increase. 
Over time the patterns of globalization have produce a slight 
increase in the country's GDP following an oil price increase (Figures 
30, 31). If in the near future the Norwegian economy converges to 
Group 1 norms (given that Norway lies above the Group 1 norm for 
structural openness and general globalization), future oil shocks 
should provide less of a stimulus to the Norwegian economy. This 
result would be reinforced by a movement of the financial 
dimension to the norm for Group 1 countries. 
2.1.10.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
Because the Norwegian economy benefits derived from oil price 
shocks, Norway would not be a major beneficiary of naval forward 
presence. Assuming, however, that as the country continues to 
globalize it will benefit less and less from, for example, a 10 percent 
increase in oil prices in any one year, losses due to naval forward 




Dimensions of Globalization: Norway 1988-1996 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1988 Norway 0.030 1.484 -0.091 -0.244 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 Norway 0.367 1.348 -0.215 -0.578 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 Norway 0.331 1.109 -0.712 -0.064 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 -0.722 -0.109 
Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 Norway 0.486 1.363 -0.418 -0.130 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
1992 Norway 0.497 1.704 -0.382 -0.567 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 Norway 0.292 1.571 0.100 -0.122 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
1994 Norway 0.252 1.413 -0.305 -0.076 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
1995 Norway 0.090 1.496 -0.103 -0.282 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
1996 Norway 0.121 2.625 -0.086 0.355 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
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1997 Norway -0.161 3.171 0.047 -0.222 
Group 1 -0.694 2.538 0.079 -0.159 
Group 2 0.461 0.028 -0.558 0.100 
Average Norway 0.231 1.728 -0.217 -0.193 
Group 1 -0.207 1.597 -0.072 -0.145 
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Table 2 2 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Norway 
Period of Impact 
Cumulative 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Cumulative % GDP 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Yearly 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 





































Notes: Group 1 country. Norwegian data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 

























Figure 3 0 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact: Norway 
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2.1.11 Spain 
When Spain emerged from its long economic and political isolation 
following the death of dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, Spanish 
policymakers quickly took steps to bring its backward economy in 
line with the BU. As a result, per capita income has risen 
dramatically; exports have shifted from raw materials to 
manufactured and intermediate goods; Spanish banks are investing 
heavily in Latin America, making Spain the world's sixth largest 
foreign investor; and Spain itself has become an attractive 
destination for FDI. Spain's economy is classified as belonging to 
Group 1, where it scores below the norm for structural openness 
and general globalization, but above the norm for financial 
globalization. As Spain's economy reaches parity with the EU, oil 
price shocks will have an increasingly severe impact on GDP, 
therefore making Spain an obvious beneficiary of naval forward 
presence and crisis response. 
2.1.11.1 Patterns of Globalization 
The Spanish economy has made great strides in recent years. 
According to the IMF, Spain is catching up with its European peers. 
Its per capita GDP has increased from about 75 percent of the EU 
average in the mid-1970s to nearly 87 percent in 2001, with most of 
the growth taking place since 1997. 
This progression up the development curve has gone hand-in-
hand with a dramatic change in Spanish exports. While the export of 
foodstuffs fell from 53 percent of total goods and exports in 1964 to 
13 percent by 2000, the share of nonfood consumer goods in 
exports more than doubled, from 12% percent to nearly 28%, and 
the export of intermediate goods (other than food and energy) 
doubled (from 21% to 42%). 
Trade plays a far more important role in Spain's economy 
today than it used to, with exports of goods and services plus 
imports increasing from 27 percent of GDP in 1970 to 62 percent in 
2000. Spanish banks also are playing an increasingly prominent 
role, particularly in Latin America, where they now control nearly 
20 percent of Latin America's banking sector. Facilitating this flow 
of capital from Europe to Latin America, a stock exchange, the 
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Latbex, recently opened in Madrid to enable Latin American firms to 
be listed in Europe with prices quoted in euros. 
Foreign direct investment from Spain has expanded in the last 
decade from less than 1 percent of GDP to nearly 10 percent, while 
FDI coming into the country has risen from just under 3 percent of 
GDP to nearly 7 percent. Spain has gone from being a net importer 
of investment on the order of 2 percent of GDP annually to being a 
net exporter by a margin of 3 percent. As a result of this shift, Spain 
is now the sixth largest investor in the world, trailing only the 
United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands.37 
The IMF attributes these changes to globalization and the desire 
of Spanish policymakers to integrate with the rest of the world, after 
a long period of protectionism and political and economic isolation 
under the late Fascist dictator, Francisco Franco. 
Several of these trends toward open trade began show up in the 
country's pattern of globalization over the last decade or so (Figure 
32). The factor/discriminant analysis classifies Spain as a Group 1 
country. Although a complete set of data for the country exists only 
for the period 1988 to 1996, it is possible to draw some 
comparisons with other Group 1 countries. Despite the significant 
advances in trade noted above, Spain scores below the norm on the 
structural openness dimension, as well as the general globalization 
dimension (Table 23). By contrast, the country is slightly above the 
norm for progress in financial globalization. Finally, the economy's 
growth in the global context is somewhat above the norm for Group 
1 countries. 
2.1.11.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Analysis of the effects of globalization on the income losses 
associated with oil price shocks found that Spain had the normal 
Group 1 pattern of a positive sign associated with increased levels of 
general globalization (Table 24). This means that over time oil price 
shocks should have a stronger and stronger negative impact on the 
Spanish economy. This pattern is reinforced by a positive sign on 
the openness globalization dimension, i.e., increased openness to 
world market forces may create instability in the economy leading 
to larger declines in GDP associated with oil price shocks. Offsetting 
these tendencies is the negative sign on the financial dimension. 
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Increased capital flows may result in more investment and hence 
higher growth rates even during periods of oil price increases. It 
should be noted, however, that due to an incomplete set of data, 
these findings for Spain were based Group 1 global dimension 
norms. 
With that same caveat in mind, the amount of Spanish GDP loss 
associated with oil price shocks (Figures 33, 34) increased in the 
years 1993-1997. This increase follows a decline from 
approximately 1990 to 1993, following a rather dramatic rise from 
1986 to 1990. It is fairly safe to say that over the long run, Spanish 
GDP losses associated with oil price shocks will increase. 
2.1.11.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
The Spanish economy is rapidly closing the gap between itself 
and the EU, as well as other Group 1 countries. This being the case, 
and given the country's lag in the structural openness and general 
globalization dimensions, future increases in these aspects of 
Spanish globalization should produce greater losses in income 
stemming from oil price shocks. This trend is unlikely to be offset 
by the financial dimension, since Spain's is already above the Group 
1 norm. If these patterns bear out, naval forward presence will play 
an increasingly important role in stabilizing the Spanish economy 
following sudden oil price increases. 
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Table 2 3 
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1995 Spain -0.867 1.104 0.030 0.063 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
1996 Spain -0.646 0.582 -0.551 -0.033 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
Average Spain -0.534 0.967 -0.013 0.112 
Group 1 -0.153 1.492 -0.089 -0.144 
Group 2 0.146 -0.089 -0.204 0.264 
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Figure 3 2 
Patterns of Globalization: Spain 
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Table 2 4 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Spain 
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Impact Year + + (-) 1ns 
Impact Year + 1 + + (-) (-) 
Impact Year + 2 + + (-) (-) 
Notes: Group 1 country. Group 1 data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 

















Figure 3 3 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact: Spain 
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Figure 3 4 
Cumulative Oil Shock Impact: Spain 
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3.1.12 Sweden 
A Group 1 country, Sweden until recently has had one of the 
highest per capita GDPs in the world. It is the home of several 
prominent multinational and manufacturing concerns, as well as 
being a financial power. Over the last three decades, however, the 
Swedish economy has been in a gradual decline compared to other 
highly industrialized countries. Some see this as a result of Sweden's 
high tax rates and relatively closed labor markets, which may 
become unsustainable under globalization. Globalization dimension 
analysis gives mixed results concerning the effect of oil price shocks 
on Swedish GDP, but the trend seems to indicate that suppression of 
oil price shocks through naval forward presence will benefit the 
Swedish economy in the long run. 
3.1.12.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Sweden is a small country of fewer than 9 million people, 
located at the northern edge of Europe. Despite its size, Sweden has 
produced an extraordinary array of multinational 
companies-world beaters such as Ericsson, Electrolux, Volvo and 
Asea. Some economists, such as Christopher Brown-Humes, 
however, warn that the omens for continued success are not entirely 
promising.38 Notwithstanding its apparent strength, the Swedish 
economy has been in a relative decline for the past thirty years. Per 
capita GDP slipped from third in the world in 1970 to 18th place by 
the end of the century. Sweden's economy lacks what are commonly 
considered two of the prerequisites for success: low taxes and 
flexible labor markets. Most experts think that globalization will 
force a number of changes in Sweden, because its historic high tax 
rate is not sustainable in an increasingly global economy. 
Available data from Sweden for the factor/discriminate 
globalization dimension analysis only cover the period 1988 to 
1994. Based on this period, Sweden, a Group 1 country, was more 
open to trade than is the norm for its group (Table 25). The 
economy also had a significantly higher degree of general and 
financial globalization. Reflecting Sweden's longer-run economic 
slowdown, however, the country's global growth dimension was 
below the norm for the Group 1 countries. Recent trends show a 
106 
nsmg degree of financial globalization and a slight decline in 
general globalization (Figure 35). 
3.1.12.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Sweden displays the normal pattern for Group 1 countries. 
Positive signs associated with increased levels of general 
globalization and openness to world market forces leave the Swedish 
economy increasingly vulnerable to oil price shocks (Table 26). 
Offsetting this effect are the negative signs on the financial and 
growth dimensions. Increased capital flows may result in more 
investment and hence higher growth rates even during periods of 
oil price increases, while rising levels of trade may help alleviate 
domestic bottlenecks that create stresses on the economy and lower 
GDP growth. Under these circumstances, the net impact of an oil 
price shock is difficult to assess without further detailed study. It 
does appear, however, that the financial and growth dimensions 
work mainly in the short-run, while the general globalization and 
openness dimensions influence the economy in the longer term. The 
recent pattern shows an increase in the severity of oil price shocks 
on Sweden (Figures 36, 37), suggesting that in the net the forces 
tending to reduce Swedish GDP following oil price increases have 
been greater than those tending to resist this movement. 
3.1.12.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
The recent dominant trend of increasing losses to Sweden's GDP 
following oil price shocks suggests that in the future naval forward 




Dimensions of Globalization: Sweden 1988-1996 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1988 Sweden 0.168 2.766 -0.511 -0.342 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 Sweden 0.248 3.091 -0.312 -0.512 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 Sweden -0.018 3.529 -0.324 -0.546 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 -0.722 -0.109 
Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 Sweden 0.476 2.451 -0.820 -0.731 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
1992 Sweden 0.004 2.261 -0.044 -0.634 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 Sweden 0.169 2.008 1.853 0.035 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
1994 Sweden 0.244 2.667 1.358 0.466 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
Average Sweden 0.184 2.682 0.171 -0.323 
Group 1 -0.108 1.441 -0.077 -0.140 

























Figure 3 5 
Patterns of Globalization: Sweden 
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Table 2 6 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Sweden 
Period of Impact 
Cumulative 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Cumulative % GDP 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Yearly 
Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 

























Impact Year + ins (-) (-) 
Impact Year + 1 + + ins ins 
Impact Year + 2 + + (-) ins 
Notes: Group 1 country. Group 1 data used in the regression 
analysis. Complete analysis available from the author upon request. 
+ indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant; - indicates a factor weakening 
















Figure 3 6 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact: Sweden 
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Figure 3 7 
Cumulative Oil Shock Impact: Sweden 
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2.1.13 United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom's economy has, like most highly developed 
economies, shifted away from manufacturing toward the service 
sector and greater globalization. Above the Group 1 norm in the 
general and financial dimensions, Britain lags in openness to global 
markets. Policymakers are currently preoccupied with maximizing 
Britain's role in European integration and the move to a single 
currency, while minimizing the impact on national sovereignty and 
competitiveness. The negative effect of oil price shocks on British 
GDP has declined in recent years, but price stabilization brought by 
naval forward presence should bring benefit in the longer term. 
2.1.13.1 Patterns of Globalization 
The British economy is about half the size of Germany's, and 
ties with France for the position of fourth largest economy in the 
world. As in most developed countries, manufacturing in the UK 
has declined relative to the services sector and currently represents 
about one fifth of output. Two severe recessions in the early 1980s 
and 1990s, combined with the government's refusal during the 
1980s to extend state subsidies to ailing sectors, reinforced this 
trend. 
Globalization has affected many facets of the British economy. 
Foreign investment activity in the United Kingdom is central to the 
economy, with the proportion of foreign-owned assets in the 
manufacturing sector around 20 percent. Foreign-owned companies 
provide 16 percent of the country's manufacturing employment, 22 
percent of its net output, and 27 percent of its net capital 
expenditure. The United Kingdom is the developed world's second 
biggest recipient of inward investment. The United States and Japan 
have invested more in Great Britain than in any other European 
country. 
With regard to the norm for Group 1 countries, the United 
Kingdom is more open to trade, has a considerably higher degree of 
general globalization, and a higher degree of financial globalization 
(Table 27). On the other hand, Britain lags behind the norm for this 
group in terms of growth in the global market. As with other Group 
1 countries, the most dramatic change in England's globalization 
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over the last 15 years has been the increase m its general 
globalization (Figure 3 8). Britain's other dimensions of 
globalization have been relatively stable since the late 1980s. 
Globalization may accelerate in Britain over the next few years. 
The Blair government recognized the imperatives of competitive 
pressure for innovation in a world where increasing and intensified 
international trade, finance, and foreign direct investment are a 
given. For Britain, globalization involves first and foremost 
European integration, and the issues of compromised sovereignty 
that follow from the Maastricht Treaty, the European Monetary 
Union, and the single currency initiative. From this perspective the 
government's aims are quite clear: to position to the country in a 
way that will maximize its influence in Europe as well as its success 
in global competition.39 
2.1.13.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
England' general globalization term has the normal positive sign 
found in Group 1 countries, meaning that over time oil price shocks 
have had a stronger and stronger negative impact on Britain's GDP 
(Table 28). There are no offsetting effects from the other 
dimensions of globalization, although the strength of these shocks 
has stabilized in recent years (Figures 39, 40). 
2.1.13.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
The United Kingdom recently has suffered less from oil price 
shocks than it had in the past, perhaps due to offsetting benefits 
from the sale of North Sea oil. While naval forward presence/crisis 
response may not offer an immediate benefit to Britain's economy, 
over the longer run price stabilization should have a salutary effect 
as the British economy continues to globalize. 
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Table 27 
Dimensions of Globalization: United Kingdom 1988-1996 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------1988 UK -0.026 2.854 -0.441 -0.612 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 UK 0.171 2.891 -0.226 -0.530 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 UK 0.054 2.332 -0.433 -0.102 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 -0.722 -0.109 
Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 UK 0.073 1.842 -0.467 -0.606 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
1992 UK -0.223 1.800 0.159 -0.1961 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 UK -0.033 2.120 0.491 0.297 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
1994 UK 0.244 2.667 0.173 -0.384 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
1995 UK -0.281 2.543 0.120 -0.255 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
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1996 UK -0.435 2.697 -0.091 -0.119 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
Average UK -0.051 2.416 -0.079 -0.279 
Group 1 -0.153 1.492 -0.089 -0.144 
























Figure 3 8 
Patterns of Globalization: UK 
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Table 2 8 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: United Kingdom 
Period of Impact 
Cumulative 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Cumulative % GDP 
Impact Year 
Impact Year + 1 
Impact Year + 2 
Yearly 
Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 

























Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 country. British data used in the analysis. Complete 
analysis available from the author upon request. + indicates a factor 
enhancing the impact of oil price increases on GDP; ins = 
statistically insignificant; - indicates a factor weakening the impact 















Figure 3 9 
Yearly Oil Shock Impact: UK 
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Figure 4 0 
Cumulative Oil Shock Impact: UK 
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2.1.14 United States 
The United States is classified in this study as a Group 1 
endogenous growth country. Many believe the United States 
economy to be the most globally integrated in the world, but the 
findings do not bear out that assumption in all but the general 
globalization dimension. Despite being an oil producer, its level of 
integration makes the United States vulnerable to oil price shocks, 
and therefore highly likely to benefit from the stabilizing effects of 
naval forward presence/crisis response. 
2.1.14.1 The Economy 
The United States is one of the most advanced economies in the 
world. It leads the way in the information technology revolution and 
in many other areas of technical innovation. Manufacturing 
accounts for less than 20% of GDP, while the agricultural sector is 
very small, but also very productive. The United States is far and 
away the world's leading economic power. Its GDP totaled US $9.3 
trillion in 1999; assuming international purchasing power parity, 
this was 3 times the size of· Japan's output, 4.8 times the size of 
Germany's, and almost 7 times the size of the United Kingdom's. 
Although the volume of its exports and imports exceeds that of any 
other country, the value of the United States' external sector as a 
percentage of its GDP is comparatively low. Exports of goods and 
services accounted for less than 11% of GDP in 1999, considerably 
less than the European Union's 25-29% in recent years. 
Strong economic growth combined with low inflation and a 
pickup in labor productivity growth has led many observers of U.S. 
economic conditions to proclaim the existence of a "new economy" 
in the United States. The adoption of new technology in conjunction 
with globalization are thought to have changed the underlying 
economic relationships in the economy so that continued strong 
growth and low inflation are possible. Thus, although globalization 
and the new economy are somewhat different phenomena, their 
possible overlap has often led them to be discussed simultaneously 
in the literature. 
Despite the amount of attention that the term "new economy" 
has received, there is little consensus on what is now different about 
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the U.S. economy and whether such a difference has fundamentally 
changed the way in which the economy works. The various 
interpretations of what constitutes the "new economy" can be 
organized into three different but related categories:40 
1. The long-run growth view. In this interpretation of the new 
economy, higher long-term growth is achieved through a 
permanently higher growth rate in productivity. The high rate 
of productivity growth stems primarily from continuous 
innovation in IT (information technology), as well as from the 
effects of globalization and deregulation. Empirical evidence 
suggests that there is a link between production and 
widespread use of computers, and the pickup in labor 
productivity in the second half of the 1990s. Based on 
available data, however, it is not yet possible to conclude 
whether the shift to higher productivity ·growth is sustainable. 
The substantial increase in productivity associated with IT in 
recent years may represent simply a one-time transition to a 
higher level of productivity because of a major change in 
technology. This can be considered an "old economy" 
process, in the sense that it represents the traditional process 
of development, adoption and diffusion of new technologies. 
2. The positive feedback view. In this view, the "new economy" 
is characterized by a pickup in total factor productivity 
growth across many sectors based on the adoption of IT. This 
shift results in increasing returns to scale, other network 
economies, and positive spillover effects. In other words, 
investment in IT in one firm improves the productivity of 
other firms as they are able to work together more efficiently. 
Although there is anecdotal evidence to support this theory, to 
date there is little solid empirical evidence that such positive 
feedback effects across industries are more important and 
pervasive now than in the past. 
3. The resource uti1ization view This version of the "new 
economy" is based on the observation that during the recent 
expansion, unemployment has declined below most estimates 
of the natural rate of unemployment (NAIRU) without 
spurring inflation, implying that NAIRU must have declined. 
Proponents of this theory argue that inflationary pressures in 
the United States have remained subdued because of 
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globalization (increased competition for domestic firms facing 
less expensive imports) and IT (increasing productivity and 
efficiency). Because actual productivity is increasing faster 
than what workers perceive, wage demands are muted, and it 
appears as though the NAIRU has declined. Accordingly, labor 
and other utilization rates can be higher without triggering 
inflationary pressures. At present, however it is extremely 
difficult to disentangle whether the decline in NAIRU is 
permanent or simply related to temporary factors such as the 
period of time it takes for workers to incorporate higher trend 
productivity into wage demands. In addition, positive supply 
shocks-for example the past weakness in commodity prices, 
the strength of the US dollar, and restrained health care 
costs-may temporarily have reduced inflationary pressures, 
but have not changed any of the underlying relationships in 
the economy. 
The debate over the existence and implications of a new 
economy has not been resolved and continues largely because of the 
difficulty in establishing a definitive link between IT investment and 
productivity. At a minimum, however, the new economy literature 
makes a strong case that the current phase of globalization is 
different from that experienced in the years prior to World War I. 
Other studies not relying on links with a possible new 
economy also concluded that the current phase of globalization is 
unique when compared with the state of affairs at the turn of the 
century. For example, in "Is Globalization Today Really Different 
than Globalization A Hundred Years Ago?", Bordo, Eichengreen, and 
Irvin conclude that: 
1. The globalization of commodity and financial markets is 
historically unprecedented. Superficial comparisons with the 
late nineteenth century notwithstanding, the international 
integration of capital and commodity markets goes further 
and runs deeper than ever before. 
2. The trade tensions and problems of financial insatiability that 
have accompanied the advent of highly integrated commodity 
and financial markets should not come as a surprise. The 
period of pre-World War I commodity and financial market 
integration that is our basis for comparison also was marked 
by trade tensions and financial instability. The surprise is that 
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these problems are not even more severe today, given that 
financial market integration is so much greater than it was at 
the turn of the previous century.41 
As Bordo et al. note, accounting for this phenomenon is 
difficult. One possibility is that the institutions built in the interim 
have played a stabilizing role. At the national level, this has meant 
the creation of social and financial safety nets. At the international 
level, these institutions include the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMP), and the Basle 
Committee of Banking Supervisors. Although they have come 
under fire for some of their policies, the international organizations 
probably have had a beneficial effect in light of the historically high 
correlation between the level of integration on the one hand and the 
levels of trade conflict and financial stability on the other. The 
domestic financial safety net may raise fears of a moral or social 
hazard, but it prevents widespread financial catastrophe. Contingent 
protection may prevent the full gains from trade from being 
realized, but it sustains a critical mass of political support for open 
markets by dampening some of the negative effects of free trade. In 
the absence of global governance for global markets, outcomes 
would suggest that existing multilateral institutions provide a 
substitute for some of the functions a truly global body might 
undertake. 
The other explanation for the contrast between today's relative 
stability and the turmoil of the past is that the gradual maturation 
of markets over time has made it easier to live with globalization. 
The development of better auditing and accounting practices at the 
national level has made it easier to apply those same practices to 
international transactions, with stabilizing consequences. The 
development of the futures markets on which producers can hedge 
their exposure to world prices has made it easier for them to live 
with global markets that deliver outcomes beyond their control. 
These processes were already underway in the 19th Century, but 
they have since been considerably developed . 
Both the new economy literature and studies like those of Bordo 
et al. establish a good case for treating the current period as 
historically unique. One implication of this viewpoint isthat many 
long-established economic linkages are being strengthened or 
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weakened as a result of the rapid and profound changes in the 
overall environment created by the globalization process. 
2.1.14.2 Patterns of Globalization 
The factor/discriminant analysis of US globalization employed 
in this study found some significant differences between the U.S. 
economy and the norm for Group 1 countries (Table 29): (1) The 
U.S. structural openness dimension scores considerably below the 
group average, suggesting that trade plays less of a role in the 
American economy than it does in other advanced industrial 
nations; (2) the general globalization dimension is also somewhat 
below the group norm; and (3) financial globalization and growth in 
the world market are above the pattern typically found in other 
advanced countries. 
Recent patterns of U.S. globalization (as in the other Group 1 
countries) have been characterized by a rapid increase in the 
general globalization dimension (Figure 41). Contrary to popular 
belief, however, the U.S. position in global openness, financial flows 
and expansion in the global economy has not dramatically increased 
relative to other countries. This finding is consistent with that of 
Robert Dunn, who went on to conclude that the U.S. economy is far 
from being completely globalized.42 Our findings suggest that at 
least with regard to the general globalization dimension, significant 
movement has been made in that direction. 
2.1.14.3 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
With regard to the impact of oil price shocks on its economy, 
the United States has the normal pattern of a positive sign (Table 
30) associated with increased levels of general globalization. Over 
time and everything else being equal, there has been a significant 
increase in the amount of GDP loss associated with oil price shocks 
(Figures 42, 43). 
2.1.14.4 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
The above finding suggests that in the absence of offsetting 
effects produced by the other dimensions of globalization, future 
naval forward presence and crisis response should be increasingly 
important to the U.S. economy by dampening oil price increases. 
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Table 29 
Dimensions of Globalization: United States 1988-1996 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1988 us -1.305 1.367 0.023 0.773 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 us -1.109 1.238 -0.104 -0.078 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 us -1.031 0.615 -1.114 0.143 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 -0.722 -0.109 
Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 us -1.116 1.185 -0.003 -0.108 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
1992 us -1.229 1.007 -0.041 0.280 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 us -1.159 0.876 0.054 0.247 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
1994 us -1.342 0.968 0.590 0.036 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
1995 us -1.278 1.134 0.074 0.214 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
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1996 us -1.115 1.213 -0.160 0.217 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
1997 us -1.146 2.124 0.024 0.316 
Group 1 -0.694 2.538 0.079 -0.159 
Group 2 0.461 0.028 -0.558 0.100 
Average us -1.183 1.173 -0.066 0.204 
Group 1 -0.207 1.597 -0.072 -0.145 
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Table 3 0 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: United States 
Period of Impact Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 
Globalization Openness Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
Cumul ati Ye 
Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Cumul ati Ye % GD~ 
Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Yearly 
Impact Year + ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 + ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 + ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 1 Country. US data used in the analysis. Complete 
analysis available from the author upon request. + indicates a 
factor increasing the impact of rising oil prices on GDP; ins = 
statistically insignificant at the 95% level - indicates a factor 
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2.2 THE CATCH-UP COUNTRIES 
2.2.1 Mexico 
Mexico's economy has been shifting between Group 3 and 
Group 2 since Mexican officials began implementing a new 
development model in 1985. Rules known as the "Golden 
Straitjacket," implemented in large part to bring Mexico into NAFTA, 
have led to greater privatization and openness in the Mexican 
economy. Because Mexico is a major oil exporter, sudden oil price 
increases have tended to have a beneficial effect on its GDP. 
Globalization has not yet had an appreciable impact on these 
increases, but as the Mexican economy opens up to world markets, 
the positive effects of oil price shocks should diminish. In light of 
this trend, naval forward presence can be expected to have less of a 
dampening influence on Mexico's GDP. 
2.2.1.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Starting around 1985, Mexico fundamentally changed its 
development model. Gone is the import-substitution 
industrialization model that had characterized the country since the 
1930s. Mexico now has a more open economy in which state 
intervention is limited by a new legal and institutional framework. 
Under the new model, the tendency has been for the market to 
replace regulation, private ownership to replace public ownership, 
and competition, including that from foreign goods and investors, to 
replace protection.43 
Mexico was classified as a Group 2, or "catch up" country, 
through most of this reform period, although it was placed in Group 
3 (primary producer) in 1987, 1991, 1993, 1994, and 1995. Relative 
to Group 2 countries Mexico is considerably below the norm in the 
globalization dimensions of trade openness, general globalization, 
and financial flows (Table 31). The country also experienced a lower 
than group norm rate of global growth. In the 1990s, however, some 
of the country's attempts at market liberalization were beginning to 
take effect (Figure 44). In particular, there was a fairly dramatic 
increase in the trade openness and general globalization 
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dimensions. By contrast, highly volatile financial flows established 
no clear trend during this period. 
The country's convergence toward Group 2 norms can in part 
be explained by the fact that since 1985 Mexico, like most members 
of this group, has tended to adopt a set of policies or rules known as 
the "Golden Straitjacket" .44 According to Thomas Friedman, to fit 
into the Golden Straitjacket a country must either adopt, or be seen 
as moving toward, the following golden rules: 
• The private sector must become the primary engine of 
economic growth, inflation must be kept low and prices stable, 
state bureaucracy shrunk, and the budget brought as close to 
balance as possible, if not put in surplus; 
• Tariffs on imported goods have to be lowered or eliminated, 
foreign investment freed of restrictions, quotas and domestic 
monopolies eliminated, and exports increased; 
• State-owned industries and utilities must be privatized, capital 
markets deregulated, the currency made convertible, and 
domestic industries, stock and bond markets opened to direct 
foreign ownership and investment; 
• The economy has to be deregulated to promote as much 
domestic competition as possible; 
• Government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks should be 
eliminated to the extent possible; 
• Banking and telecommunications systems must be opened to 
private ownership and competition; 
• Citizens should have the freedom to choose from an array of 
competing pension options and foreign-run pension plans and 
mutual funds. 
Mexico put these policy initiatives in place partly to conform to 
NAFTA guidelines and requirements for membership. 
2.2.1.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Since Mexico is a major oil producer and exporter, it is to be 
expected that oil price increases would have a positive impact on 
the economy. Analysis of the impact of the country's globalization 
patterns on the size of this GDP change identifies only a short run 
effect from globalization on the size of these shocks (Table 32). The 
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negative sign on the general globalization dimension of 
globalization is similar to that found for other Group 2 countries, 
while the negative sign on the openness dimension no doubt reflects 
more leakages into imports following trade liberalization. 
The size of GDP change following a shock seems to have been 
fairly stable from the late 1980s onward (Figures 45, 46), with the 
only apparent trend being a lowering of the benefits in the impact 
year. 
2.2.1.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
Because Mexico is an oil exporting country, lower prices 
stemming from naval crisis response would not bring a direct 
benefit to the economy. If globalization of the Mexican economy 
continues toward converge with other Group 2 countries, however, 
increased openness and general globalization should reduce the 
increases in GDP following an oil price shock. Naval forward 
presence therefore would reduce the positive effect of oil price 
increases less and less over time. Finally, a more exhaustive 
examination of markets affected by naval forward presence might 
~dentify benefits to them in the form of lower prices for some of 
Mexico's major imports. 
134 
Table 31 
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1996 Mexico 0.045 -0.097 -0.306 0.889 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
1997 Mexico 0.480 -0.585 -1.270 1.114 
Group 1 -0.694 2.538 0.079 -0.159 
Group 2 0.461 0.028 -0.558 0.100 
Average Mexico -0.324 -0.507 -0.831 0.056 
Group 1 -0.207 1.597 -0.072 -0.145 
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Table 3 2 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Mexico 
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2.2.2 The Philippines 
Since the fall of dictator Ferdinand Marcos from power in 1986, 
successive Philippines administrations have made efforts to improve 
the islands' economy through economic reforms aimed at increasing 
globalization and decreasing protectionism. The sporadic nature of 
these efforts led to a repeating boom-bust cycle exacerbated by 
external shocks and natural disasters. The Philippine economy 
wavered between Group 2 and Group 3 for the period under study 
as globalization progressed and faltered. Oil price shocks have 
tended to have a minor initial impact on the islands' economy, 
probably because of this pattern of cyclical boom and bust. 
Although naval forward presence will have only minor short term 
benefits in mitigating the effects of increased oil prices on the 
Philippine economy, in the long run it should prove highly 
beneficial. 
2.2.2.1 Patterns of Globalization 
The Philippines received considerable attention in the early 
1990s as it emerged from a long period of slow growth and 
economic imbalances, and again in 1997 when it managed to escape 
the Asian economic cns1s relatively unscathed. The country 
provides an important example of the intertwining of growth 
strategy, macroeconomic imbalances, and globalization, and of the 
difficulties of separating these elements, all of which can affect the 
impact of oil shocks on a national economy. 
Although the Philippines' economic growth averaged over 6 
percent from 1975 through 1980, it was accompanied by a large 
buildup of external debt, much of which was used to fund an 
expansion of the public sector. Easy credit encouraged excessive 
borrowing by private firms, and protectionist industrial and trade 
policies caused investment to increase mainly in import-substitution 
and non-tradable activities, undermining competitiveness. A series 
of external shocks in the early 1980s (including the 1983-84 oil 
price shock, a jump in world interest rates, recession in 
industrialized countries and the Latin American debt crisis) exposed 
141 
these weaknesses. Compounded by domestic events, these shocks 
led to a major cns1s characterized by default on external 
obligations, widespread failure of domestic banks and corporations, 
and a deep recession.45 
Growth resumed in 1986 under a new government, but faltered 
again in 1990-91 in the wake of natural disasters (earthquake, 
drought and a major volcanic eruption), more external shocks, and 
renewed domestic instability. The setback was compounded by 
policy slippages, inducing a sharp widening of the fiscal deficit, lax 
monetary policy, and real currency appreciation, leading to a sharp 
increase in the current account deficit, a jump in inflation and a 
near balance of payments crisis in 1991. The repeat boom and bust 
cycle also reflected structural constraints including high import 
dependence and a shallow domestic capital market. 
Although there was considerable instability after strongman 
Ferdinand Marcos fell from power, the Aquino government (1986-
1992) initiated outward looking and market oriented reforms 
starting in 1986 that, although implemented only partially and . not 
without setbacks, signaled a shift in policy direction on which the 
comprehensive reforms of the 1990s would build. 
The 1990s witnessed impressive economic progress in the 
Philippines, reflecting sound economic policies in a more favorable 
external environment and under greater political stability. The 
government, led by President Fidel Ramos (1992-98), embraced a 
comprehensive reform strategy aimed at further opening up the 
economy, reducing macroeconomic imbalances, and addressing 
other structural rigidities. A number of important sectors, including 
banking, telecommunications, domestic shipping and the oil sector, 
were opened to competition, while some limits on foreign 
participation were liberalized. Quantitative import restrictions on 
commodities (except for rice) were removed and the average import 
tariff dropped to around 10 percent, one third the level of the mid-
1980s. 
These economic developments greatly influenced the country's 
pattern of globalization. For most of the years under study, the 
Philippines was classified as a Group 2 country by the 
factor/discriminant model. In 1991-1994 and 1997, however, it was 
placed in Group 3 (primary producer). In comparison to the norm 
for Group 2 countries, the Philippines was less open to trade 
(structural openness dimension), had a much lower level of general 
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globalization, and lagged in financial globalization, but experienced 
a higher rate of global expansion (Table 33). 
Reflecting events and policy shifts, globalization in the 
Philippines appears to have been a cyclical process, making gains in 
the late 1980s only to retrogress in the early 1990s. The latter 
1990s saw gains in trade openness and general globalization, but 
again retrogression in financial globalization (Figure 47). 
2.2.2.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Globalization has had a limited or at least short-run effect on 
the impact of oil price shocks on the Philippines' GDP. The country 
has the normal Group 2 pattern of a negative sign associated with 
increased levels of general globalization (Table 34), i.e., over time 
oil price shocks should have a weaker and weaker impact on the 
economy. This pattern is reinforced to a certain extent by the 
negative sign on the openness dimension, because freer trade may 
allow for goods imported at world prices to offset higher energy 
prices. These effects, however, appear only the initial shock year. 
Subsequent years may be influenced more by the financial 
dimension, which has tended to increase the GDP loss associated 
with oil price increases. The net effect of these diverging forces has 
been to reduce the size of GDP losses in the impact year and 
increase them in the two subsequent years (Figures 48 49). 
2.2.2.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
The lack of strong links between globalization and the 
consequences of oil price shocks in the Philippines may be due to 
the cyclical pattern characterizing the country's efforts at 
globalization. If this is the case, naval forward presence, while not 
having as significant a short run impact as in other parts of the 
world, would still play an important role in reducing the 
Philippines' longer run GDP losses following oil price shocks. 
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Table 33 
Dimensions of Globalization: Philippines 1988-1997 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1988 Philippines -0.001 -0.727 -0.543 0.997 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 Philippines -0.035 -0.730 -0.506 0.611 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 Philippines -0.085 -0.806 -0.411 0.096 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 -0.722 -0.109 
Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 Philippines -0.145 -0.623 -0.057 -0.118 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0 .. 116 0.132 
1992 Philippines -0.053 -0.695 -0.121 -0.004 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.182 0.306 
1993 Philippines 0.091 -0.771 -0.153 0.239 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
1994 Philippines 0.189 -0.711 -0.290 0.788 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
1995 Philippines 0.221 -0.605 -0.311 0.887 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
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1996 Philippines 0.372 -0.323 -0.216 0.653 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
1997 Philippines 0.854 -0.445 -0.628 0.270 
Group 1 -0.694 2.538 0.079 -0.159 
Group 2 0.461 0.028 -0.558 0.100 
Average Philippines 0.141 -0.644 -0.324 0.442 
Group 1 -0.207 1.597 -0.072 -0.145 
Group 2 0.178 -0.077 -0.240 0.248 
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Table 3 4 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Philippines 
Period of Impact Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 
Globalization Openness Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
CumulatiY~ 
Impact Year (-) (-) ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 ins ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 ins ins + ins 
Cumul ati Y~ % GDf 
Impact Year (-) ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 ins ins + ins 
Impact Year +2 ins ins + ins 
Y~arl~ 
Impact Year (-) (-) ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 ins ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 ins ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 2 country. Philippine data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 
factor weakening the impact of oil price increases on GDP. 
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2.2.3 Portugal 
Portugal is a Group 2 country that has benefited greatly from 
membership in the EU. While its low labor costs were an enticement 
to FDI, Portugal has found itself losing market share to the newly 
independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which are 
located nearer to major markets or transportation routes. EU 
structural investments have made a significant contribution to 
Portugal's development, while increased trade with Europe has 
helped its leaders open the economy to globalization. Oil price 
shocks have not had a major impact on Portugal's GDP, and naval 
forward presence will not bring large benefits for the near term. 
2.2.3.1 Patterns of Globalization 
Portugal, like its European neighbors, has developed an 
increasingly service-based economy over the past 25 years. 
Agriculture and fishing accounted for just 3.8 percent of GDP in 
2000, down from 24% in 1960. The primary sector still accounted 
for 12.5% of employment in 2000, however, well above the EU 
average. This statistic reflects the low productivity of the 
agricultural sector. 
The Portuguese economy also has markedly lower labor costs 
compared to mainstream EU economies. Low labor costs combined 
with unrestricted access to the EU market attracted substantial 
foreign investment in new Portuguese manufacturing projects, 
particularly in the automotive and electronics sectors. FDI, however, 
has slowed as alternative low-cost manufacturing operations in 
Central and Eastern Europe-often better placed geographically to 
supply the main European markets, and themselves front-runner 
candidates for EU membership-became increasingly appealing to 
foreign investors. Portugal can therefore no longer afford to rely 
solely on low wages to attract further investment. 
Acceptance into the EC has brought about considerable change 
in the Portuguese economy. Ever since it joined the Community in 
1986, Portugal has qualified for structural funds from Brussels. 
These funds constituted more than 3% of Portugal's GDP during 
most of the 1990s, and added up to more than 4 trillion escudos. 
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A second effect of tying itself to Europe has been to make 
Portugal more open to trade and investment, especially from other 
European countries. The long process began with membership in the 
European Free Trade Area and a trade deal with the then European 
Economic Community in 1972. Between 1975 and 1985, exports as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 20% to 33 % and imports from 33% to 
40%, but the figures have changed little since then. Portuguese trade 
did become more oriented towards the country's new European 
partners after 1985. Also, foreign direct investment surged after 
Portugal joined the EC. The stock of FDI in Portugal more than 
doubled between 1985 and 1990, and more than doubled again by 
1999. 
Portugal was classified as a Group 2 country by the 
factor/discriminant analysis. The comprehensive data needed for 
the generation of factor scores/globalization dimensions, however, 
does not exist for Portugal over the entire 1985-97 period. The data 
that is available for the 1988-95 period shows that relative to other 
Group 2 countries, Portugal has a greater degree of openness to 
trade, a much higher level of attainment of general globalization, 
and greater financial globalization. Its global growth dimension, by 
contrast, is slightly lower (Table 35). 
Despite the gains made in opening its economy, Portugal's 
openness dimension has declined more or less steadily since 1990. 
Despite this, significant improvements have occurred with regard to 
the general globalization and financial dimensions (Figure 50). 
2.2.3.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Portugal fits the normal Group 2 pattern of showing a negative 
sign associated with increased levels of general globalization: Over 
time, oil price shocks should have a weaker and weaker impact on 
the economy (Table 36). This pattern is reinforced to a certain 
extent by the negative sign on the global growth dimension, 
meaning that continued rapid economic growth should also reduce 
the loss in income typically associated with an oil price shock. On 
the other hand, these globalization dimensions may have a 
relatively weak effect on the loss in GDP associated with oil price 
increases. From about 1987 on, there has been little change in the 
loss to Portugal's GDP associated with increased oil prices (Figures 
51, 52). It should be noted, however, that due to the limited data 
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available for Portugal, the oil shock impact analysis was carried out 
using the average globalization scores for Group 2 countries, rather 
than those specific to Portugal. 
2.2.3.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
Under Portugal's circumstances, the benefits associated with 
naval forward presence, while still positive, will be considerably 
lower than would be the case for a typical Group 1 country. This is a 
result of the fact that Portugal's general globalization dimension 
remains too insignificant to have increased the loss in GDP 
associated with higher oil prices. 
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Table 35 
Dimensions of Globalization: Portugal 1988-1995 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1988 Portugal 0.445 0.360 0.353 0.663 
Group 1 -0.190 1.166 -0.081 0.116 
Group 2 0.112 -0.290 -0.080 0.690 
1989 Portugal 0.436 0.327 0.072 0.539 
Group 1 0.004 1.669 -0.119 -0.103 
Group 2 -0.056 -0.292 -0.102 0.148 
1990 Portugal 0.879 0.089 -0.892 0.630 
Group 1 -0.024 1.387 . -0.722 -0.109 
Group 2 -0.027 -0.481 -0.600 0.037 
1991 Portugal 0.443 0.983 -0.237 0.223 
Group 1 -0.066 1.423 -0.200 -0.208 
Group 2 0.069 0.161 0.116 0.132 
1992 Portugal 0.277 0.563 0.040 0.126 
Group 1 -0.142 1.504 -0.067 -0.269 
Group 2 0.257 0.043 -0.18 2 0.306 
1993 Portugal 0.047 0.618 0.887 -0.249 
Group 1 -0.180 1.399 0.407 -0.182 
Group 2 0.381 0.102 -0.285 0.074 
1994 Portugal 0.091 1.036 0.353 -0.444 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
1995 Portugal -0.138 1.345 0.474 -0.251 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
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Average Portugal 0. 3 1 0 
Group 1 -0. 13 1 
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Table 3 6 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: Portugal 
Period of Impact Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 
Globalization Openness Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
CumulatiY~ 
Impact Year (-) ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 (-) ins ins (-) 
Impact Year +2 (-) ins ins (-) 
CumulatiY~ % GD~ 
Impact Year (-) ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 (-) ins ins (-) 
Impact Year +2 (-) ins ins (-) 
Yearly 
Impact Year (-) ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 ins ins ins (-) 
Impact Year +2 ins ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 2 Country. Group 2 data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 
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2.2.4 Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
While no stranger to world trade, Group 2 member South Korea 
protected its domestic markets and export firms through an 
informal system of "crony capitalism." Only in 1994 did President 
Kim Young Sam introduce major, society-wide globalization reforms 
intended to bring South Korea's economy in line with those of the 
industrialized West. Although these reforms were successful in 
increasing South Korea's globalization indices, they may have been 
a major contributing factor in the Asian financial crisis of 1997. 
Globalization also has increased South Korea's potential 
vulnerability to oil price shocks, making the country a likely 
beneficiary of naval forward presence. 
2.2.4.1 Patterns of Globalization 
To discuss South Korea's globalization experience, it is 
necessary to delve into the factors underlying the Asian financial 
crisis that hit the economies of the entire region in August 1997. 
Globalization is not new to South Korea (Figure 53), although 
the word has only come into vogue following the reforms of 1994 
(discussed below). South Korea was listed in the Endogenous Growth 
(Group 1) category by Sachs. The factor/discriminate analysis 
undertaken here, however, placed it consistently in Group 2 
("catching-up"). Relative to other Group 2 countries (Table 37), 
South Korea: (a) Is less open to international trade (but more open 
than Group 1 countries); (b) has attained a higher degree of general 
globalization (although considerably below that of Group 1 
members); (c) shows a lower level of financial globalization than 
Group 2 norms; and (d) has a higher rate of global growth than 
Group 2 as a whole. 
South Korea has been engaged in global competition ever since 
it adopted an outward-oriented development strategy in the 1960s. 
It successfully exported many of its manufactured products all over 
the world; in fact its rapid economic growth was associated with its 
rapid export expansion. South Korea's participation in global 
competition, however, was limited to several major chaebol s 
(trading companies), while most of its domestic markets and 
informal institutions were for many years insulated from the 
pressure of global competition. 
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The end of the Cold War greatly changed the manner in which 
the South Korean economy interfaced with the world economy.46 
During the Cold War, the U.S. foreign policy goal of containing 
communism in Europe and Asia led to a "free-rider" problem in the 
area of international trade. Throughout East Asia, but in South 
Korea in particular, states were protected by the American nuclear 
umbrella and prospered through export-led growth strategies based 
on open U.S. markets. With the end of the Cold War, however, 
incentives for the United States to seek military alliance benefits in 
exchange for trade concessions disappeared. Changed global 
relationships meant new realities for the South Korean government 
to deal with. 
One implication of the new world order for South Korea was 
that the government could no longer maintain the kind of 
production autonomy and capacity established by the Japanese 
prototype of the 1960s. A plethora of international organizations 
and multi-national corporations has come to regulate, shape, and to 
some extent determine the industrial policies these states can 
formulate in competition with domestic constituents. In short, the 
integration of financial, information, and trade networks shifts 
power from governments to markets. As a result, the globalization 
forces that push for increasing transparency in financial 
interactions would not allow for the kind of crony capitalism 
previously embraced by the South Korean government. 
In what has come to be knows as the Sydney Declaration, 
President Kim Young Sam faced this reality in November 1994 by 
articulating a new national goal for South Korea: Globalization. The 
South Korean term for globalization is segyehwa, a term that 
incorporates all segments of society, including politics, economics, 
culture and the arts, education and mass communication. Its 
purpose was not to copy foreign models, but to raise South Korean 
standards in all these areas to the levels of the world's advanced 
economies.47 
It is still controversial whether the 1994 shift in South Korea's 
globalization strategy indirectly caused the 1997 financial crisis, or 
whether that cns1s reflected more long-standing structural 
weaknesses. South Korea's financial flows, trade openness and 
general globalization all increased relative to other countries in the 
post-1994 period. The extent to which the reforms required 
fundamental changes in South Korea's formal as well as informal 
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institutions is also debated at length in the literature. More 
agreement exists on the direct causes of the crisis. These are usually 
classified in terms of three major factors: (1) the decline in export 
competitiveness; (2) the imbalance between short-term debt and 
foreign exchange reserves; and (3) structural problems arising from 
an unregulated banking sector and the economy's dependence on 
the chaebols (see Figure 54).48 
2.2.4.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
An assessment of globalization's role in mitigating the effects of 
oil price shocks on the South Korean economy found that increased 
general globalization tended to reduce the magnitude of lost GDP 
attributable to an oil price shock (Table 38). This pattern is common 
to the other Group 2 countries in our sample. By contrast, increased 
integration into world markets-the openness dimension-has 
tended to increase the severity of oil price shocks. The same also is 
true of increases in the financial dimension, although this does not 
appear to be a factor for South Korea during the actual shock year. 
Finally, there is some evidence that increased global growth 
tends to· suppress the loss in GDP associated with oil price shocks. 
The global growth effect is not present for South Korea across both 
measures of the oil price shocks, suggesting that it has not had a 
major effect on the magnitude of change in South Korea's GDP due 
to oil price shocks. After increasing rapidly from 1985-1991, the 
amount of lost GDP associated with oil price shocks varied only 
slightly after that period, and stabilized after 1994 (Figures 55, 56). 
2.2.4.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
As a condition for IMP loans, South Korea's leaders are 
proceeding with financial and trade liberalization. Since both of 
these factors are associated with increased severity of oil price 
shocks, it is fairly safe to say that South Korea may suffer greater 
lost income during periods of rapid increases in oil prices. If this is 
the case, naval forward presence, by suppressing oil price increases 
during periods of crisis, will play an increasingly important role in 
stabilizing South Korea's economy. 
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1996 Korea -0.222 0.325 -0.344 0.593 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
1997 Korea -0.116 0.658 -0.313 -0.044 
Group 1 -0.694 2.538 0.079 -0.159 
Group 2 0.461 0.028 -0.558 0.100 
Average Korea -0.153 0.050 -0.351 0.586 
Group 1 -0.207 1.597 -0.072 -0.145 
Group 2 0.178 -0.077 -0.240 0.248 
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South Korean Crisis of 1997: 




































Table 3 8 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: South Korea 
Period of Impact Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 
Globalization Openness Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
Cumulath::e 
Impact Year (-) + ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 (-) + + ins 
Impact Year +2 (-) + + ins 
Cumul ati Ye % GD£ 
Impact Year (-) + + (-) 
Impact Year + 1 (-) + + (-) 
Impact Year +2 (-) + + ins 
Yearl~ 
Impact Year (-) + ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 (-) + + ins 
Impact Year +2 (-) + + (-) 
Notes: Group 2 country. South Korean data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 
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2.2.5 South Africa 
Until 1983, South Africa's Group 2 economy was highly 
protected and export-focused.· Around 1983, however, policymakers 
in Pretoria began to liberalize the import regime by shifting their 
focus from those goods that would be allowed into the country to 
which goods would be prohibited. International trade sanctions 
imposed against the apartheid government of South Africa 
beginning in 1985 disrupted South Africa's balance of trade, but did 
not reverse the trend of slow trade growth. Growth nevertheless 
remained weak until the sanctions began to be lifted in 1991. 
Limited data for the study period indicate that South Africa will not 
benefit greatly from naval forward presence until its economy 
approaches more closely the norm for Group 2 global growth 
dimensions. 
2.2.5.1 Patterns of Globalization 
During the 1960s and 1970s, South Africa's trade was 
characterized by high tariffs and extensive import controls.50 In 
response to the perception that the possibilities for growth through 
import substitution were being exhausted, and in the wake of 
declining manufacturing and trade, policymakers attempted to 
mitigate the anti-export bias of the system. They focused on export 
promotion measures, however, rather than on liberalization of the 
import regime. It was only in 1983 (at which time about 77 percent 
of imports were subject to direct import controls) that the first 
systematic attempt was made to dismantle the controls. In 1985, 
South Africa switched from listing only permitted imports to listing 
only prohibited imports; the latter amounted to 23 percent of all 
imports. 
In 1985, the imposition of international financial sanctions 
against South Africa's apartheid regime resulted in balance of 
payments pressures that halted and even reversed progress on trade 
liberalization. By the end of the 1980s, South Africa had the most 
tariff lines (more than 13,000), most tariff rates (200 ad valorem 
equivalent rates), the widest range of tariffs, and the second highest 
level of dispersion among developing countries. In sum, South 
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Africa ended up with a highly distorted system of protection as a 
direct result of trade sanctions. 
The impetus for liberalization started gaining momentum once 
again in the early 1990s, when the country adopted a two-pronged 
approach to trade liberalization as a result of the sanctions being 
lifted and the election of a new government. This approach 
consisted of: (1) multilateral trade liberalization in the context of 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations; and (2) unilateral trade 
liberalization. 
As a result of these changes, South Africa's trade regime has 
been liberalized considerably. Virtually all quantitative restrictions 
have been eliminated. The tariff regime has been rationalized, with 
the number of lines reduced from over 13,000 in 1990 to about 
7,900 in 1998. 
The imposition of trade and financial sanctions on South Africa 
in the 1980s had an enormous economic impact. While capital flight 
from South Africa dates back to the early 1960s, in the rnid-1980s a 
number of Western banks, under pressure at home to end support 
of the racist government in Pretoria, precipitated more concerted 
action by creditors when they indicated that they would not be 
rolling over loans to South Africa. Financial sanctions forced South 
Africa to move from running current account deficits in the early 
1980s of over 5 percent of GDP to running current account 
surpluses until the early 1990s. The impact on trade volumes, 
however, may not have been as significant as often believed. 
Imports actually grew somewhat during the late 1980s (although 
they accelerated sharply after the removal of sanctions). Likewise, 
exports increased slowly under sanctions, and picked up strongly in 
the 1990s. 
In comparison with other Group 2 countries over the 1994-97 
period, South Africa is still considerably more closed than the norm 
for this group, despite gains in trade liberalization. South Africa has 
a slighter greater level of general globalization and financial 
globalization than the group norm, but has experienced a lower 
global growth dimension (Table 39). 
2.2.5.2 Globalization and Oil Price Shocks 
Like other Group 2 countries, South Africa has a negative sign 
associated with increased levels of general globalization, i.e., over 
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time oil price shocks should have a weaker impact on the economy 
(Table 40). This pattern is offset to a certain extent by the positive 
sign on the financial dimension (year of impact) and the growth 
dimension (year following impact). These mean that increased 
capital flows and higher growth of trade may create domestic 
bottlenecks or shortages, resulting in sharp price increases following 
an oil price shock. In turn, these price increases may result in an 
overall decline in demand, thus reducing GDP. 
These results should be taken as very tentative, however, 
because the analysis relies on the globalization dimensions for 
Group 2 as a whole (the norm) rather than that for South Africa. 
Group 2 dimensions combined with South African oil price shocks 
demonstrate a slight increase over time in the strength of oil price 
shocks (Figures 57, 58), suggesting that in the net the financial and 
growth dimensions of globalization have offset the dampening effect 
of the general globalization dimension. 
2.2.5.3 Implications for Naval Forward Presence 
As with most Group 2 countries, naval forward presence is 
likely to produce considerably less economic benefit for South 
Africa than that accrued by the Group 1 countries. If South Africa's 
economy converges with Group 2 norms over time, however, this 
benefit will most likely become positive and stronger. 
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Table 39 
Dimensions of Globalization: South Africa 1988-1996 
Year Structural General Financial Global 
Openness Globalization Globalization Growth 
------------------------------------------------------
1994 SA -0.853 0.183 0.722 -0.180 
Group 1 -0.156 1.541 0.244 -0.223 
Group 2 0.325 0.110 -0.071 0.146 
1995 SA -0.497 0.006 -0.613 0.285 
Group 1 -0.294 1.618 -0.023 -0.208 
Group 2 0.096 -0.117 -0.294 0.706 
1996 SA -0.189 -0.455 -0.942 0.119 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.159 -0.034 -0.341 0.140 
1997 SA -0.562 0.404 -0.179 -0.544 
Group 1 -0.326 1.724 -0.239 -0.106 
Group 2 0.461 0.028 -0.558 0.100 
Average SA -0.525 0.035 -0.253 -0.080 
Group 1 -0.276 1.652 -0.064 -0.161 
Group 2 0.260 -0.003 -0.316 0.273 
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Table 4 0 
Summary Oil Shock Impact Analysis: South Africa 
Period of Impact Globalization Dimensions 
General Structural Financial Global 
Globalization Openness Globalization Growth 
C11m11l atj Y~ 
Impact Year (-) ins + ins 
Impact Year + 1 (-) ins ins + 
Impact Year + 2 (-) ins ins ins 
cllmlllatjy~ ~ QD£ 
Impact Year (-) ins ins ins 
Impact Year + 1 (-) + ins + 
Impact Year + 2 ins ins ins ins 
Y~arl~ 
Impact Year (-) ins + ins 
Impact Year + 1 ins ins ins ins 
Impact Year +2 ins ins ins ins 
Notes: Group 2 country. Group 2 data used in the analysis. 
Complete analysis available from the author upon request. + 
indicates a factor enhancing the impact of oil price increases on 
GDP; ins = statistically insignificant at the 95% level; - indicates a 
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3. CONCLUSION 
The analyses of globalization and oil price shocks presented in 
this paper reveal some interesting and unanticipated patterns. The 
nature of these findings (Appendix F) is consistent with that of a 
recent major study published by the National Defense University.51 
More importantly, the findings have important implications for the 
role of naval forward presence, both at present and in the 
foreseeable future. 
First the study demonstrated that it is possible to develop an 
operational definition for quantifying globalization. To date, the 
literature has had a hard time generalizing about globalization and 
the implications of this phenomenon for national economic 
performance. In large part this is due to the multidimensional 
nature of globalization. The factor and discriminate analysis 
undertaken here shows globalization to be comprised of four main 
dimensions: 
1. Structural openness: The share of imports and exports in GDP, 
i.e., the proportion of national income accounted for by trade; 
2. Financial globalization: Flows of various forms of capital such 
as foreign direct investment; 
3. Global growth: The rate of expansion in imports and exports, 
and of the overall economy (as measured by GDP); and 
4. General globalization: A dimension built around the growth 
model best depicting a country's national economic dynamics. 
Over time aspects of globalization such as openness, finance, 
and growth have become more closely associated with the general 
globalization dimension, suggesting an increasingly strong link 
between elements in the global economy and the dynamics of 
economic growth in individual countries. Largely because of the 
general globalization dimension, it is possible to group most 
countries in the world into one of several categories defined by their 
pattern of integration into the world economy. The groupings 
include: 
1. Endogenous growth countries, which are characterized by 
internally generated rapid innovation and technological 
adaptation. Most members of Group 1 are among the main 
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industrial countries of North America, Europe and 
Japan/Australia. In the period since 1985 these countries have 
seen a rapid increase in their general globalization dimension; 
2 . Catching up countries are characterized by steady trade 
expansion and an increasing degree of general globalization, 
but at a much slower pace than the endogenous growth 
countries. They are increasing their structural openness, but 
face declining relative financial globalization. 
Because of data limitations, it was impossible to undertake a 
detailed examination of the economies belonging to Groups 3 
(primary producers), 4 (Malthusian economies), and 5 (isolated 
economies). It is fair to say, however, that Groups 1 and 2 include 
those economies responsible for the bulk of world trade and 
production. 
Second, the analysis found clear linkages between the levels of 
certain globalization dimensions in Group 1 and 2 economies and 
the manner in which oil shocks affect economic growth (Table 41, 
Figure 59). Over time and contrary to popular opinion, Group 1 
countries have become more vulnerable to oil price shocks. For 
example, a 10 percent increase in the price of oil today would cause 
a greater reduction in income, as measured by GDP growth, in 
highly globalized economies than it would have some twenty years 
ago. 
General globalization and structural openness have been most 
responsible for the increased severity of oil shocks. Changes in the 
financial and global growth dimensions of globalization have not 
only played a much smaller role in this regard, but have made some 
countries less vulnerable and others more vulnerable, so that no 
clear patterns emerge from these aspects of globalization. Because 
naval forward presence/crisis response tends to suppress oil shocks 
and return prices to their equilibrium levels, the role of naval 
activities has taken on increased importance in recent years. With 
the likely continuation of trends in economic globalization, the 
ability of the navy to stabilize oil prices through crisis response 
should play an even greater positive economic role for the United 
States and other trade-dependent countries in the foreseeable 
future. 
The two Group 1 exceptions to this overall trend toward 
vulnerability are Spain. and Japan, where high levels of financial 
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flow have somewhat lessened the severity of oil price shocks. 
Nonetheless, oil price shocks still inflict considerable economic 
losses on these countries, highlighting an important and continuing 
role for naval crisis response. 
As might be expected, the two oil economies included in the 
study, Mexico and Norway, would experience declines in income 
associated with forward deployed naval operations. Despite windfall 
oil revenues, however, increased globalization means Norway is 
obtaining smaller and smaller economic gains from oil price shocks, 
while Mexico's gains have stabilized. In both instances, the losses 
associated with naval forward presence are lower than might have 
been the case if the trends in globalization had been similar to those 
in the Group 1 countries as a whole. 
A very different globalization/oil shock pattern characterizes 
Group 2 (catch up countries).On the one hand, increases in the 
general globalization dimension over time have lessened the impact 
of oil price shocks on these countries. On the other hand, growth in 
the financial dimension has worked to increase the severity of oil 
shocks on most Group 2 members. The net effect is that the 
Philippines, Portugal and South Africa have experienced a gradual 
increase in the damage oil price shocks inflict on economic growth. 
In South Korea's case, the forces of globalization have appeared to 
neutralize each other. The net effect has been a measurable loss in 
income associated with oil price shocks. Given these patterns, naval 
forward presence/crisis response should continue to play an 
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APPENDIX A 
Globalization and Naval Forward Presence 
The following is a section from our FY 2000 study outlining our tentative conclusions on the effect 
of globalization on the economic benefits derived from naval forward presence. This outline provided the 
framework for the empirical work on globalization undertaken in the current study. 
Components of Globalization 
As usually defined "globalization" means the process of making something worldwide in scope and 
application. It most commonly refers to the stunning increase in the number and variety of transnational 
transactions. The process of adapting to global conditions requires adjustments on the part of both 
producers and consumers. Specifically globalization refers to the worldwide convergence of supply and 
demand This convergence or system takes many forms: 
• Trade (goods, services) 
• Finance (banking, investment, foreign exchange, capital movements) 
• Communication (information, education, technology) 
• Governance (institutions, education, technology) 
• Culture (art, music, entertainment) and 
• Work and leisure (labor, migration, tourism). 
From a purely economic perspective the main trends of importance are: 
Upsurge of trade and changing trade linkages. 
During the 1985-2000 period supported by the proliferation of multilateral and regional trade 
initiatives, the ratio of world trade to GDP rose approximately three times faster than in the ten years prior 
and twice as fast as in the 1960s. Developing countries increased their share of world trade from 23 
percent in 1985 to over 30 percent in 2000; they also deepened and diversified trade linkages; inter-
developing country trade increased from 31 percent of total developing country trade in 1985 to over 40 
percent by 2000. Between 1985 and 2000 the share of manufactured products in developing countries' 
exports increased from 47 percent to around 85 percent. A significant share of world trade is intra-firm 
and stimulated by FDI (foreign direct investment), as firms seek to reduce costs and tap markets. 
Integration of world capital markets. 
Developing countries are becoming increasingly integrated into the global financial system, 
following the liberalization of financial markets of recipient and source countries. Often with the aid of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), many developing countries have removed restrictions on 
payments for current account transactions, and lifted controls on cross-border financial flows, especially 
controls on foreign inflows. The good growth performance of some developing countries has contributed 
to make emerging markets more attractive to investors from advanced countries wishing to diversify their 
portfolios. 
Increased importance of private flows and foreign direct investment (FDD. 
The magnitude of private flows now overwhelms official financing. Capital inflows more than 
doubled in relation to developing country GDP between the early 1980s and 2000, with private capital 
flows rising from an annual 0.5 to 1.0 percent of developing country GDP to over 2 percent by 2000. 
Contributing to the rapid growth of FDI to developing countries in recent years has been the adoption of 
strong outward-oriented policies, including substantial improvements in their investment codes, 
embodying a shift from sovereign discretion to a free flow of FDI. FDI however has flowed massively 
towards only a few developing countries experiencing fast economic growth: for example during 1990-96 
Asian countries received twice as much in percent of their GDP than African countries. Two thirds of all 
· FDI during the last decade went to just eight developing countries, and half received almost none. 
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Advances in telecommunications and transport. 
The main factor behind globalization has been the increased ease and falling cost of 
communications-including transportation. The cost of phone calls has fallen by a factor of sixty since 
1930; air-passenger miles per capita have increased 15 times in the last 20 years, and the advent of faxes 
and a global computer network has brought fundamental changes in the ways businesses and governments 
operate. 
Changes in the movement of labor. 
As the world becomes more interconnected, flows of people across national borders have 
increased-though they remain small-contributed to ease of labor bottlenecks and transfer managerial 
know-how. The largest flows are between developing countries, but flows from developing to industrial 
countries have accelerated over the past two decades. In the future one can expect pressures for increased 
migration from developing countries, whereas developed countries will lower their demand for immigrant 
labor. 
Globalization is spreading at an uneven pace, but wherever it develops, it has important security 
implications. Clearly in an economic sense it blurs national boundaries. Whether and to what extent it 
erodes the power of nation-states, even as it extends their sovereignty into new areas is a controversial 
issue with strong arguments made pro and con. However it clearly changes regional and international 
power relationships, shifts the mixture of interests at stake, and redefines long-standing alliances and 
conflicts. It will greatly influence the shape, content, and legitimacy of the future global security order 
(Strategic Assessment 1999, p. 19). 
During the Cold War, the U.S. consciously pursued its own version of globalization. It sought to 
integrate and expand the democratic, market-oriented, Western or pro-Western community of nations 
[and was not afraid of using military force to achieve the goal of spreading democracy]. This community-
building strategy encompassed both security and economics. The security component created a Western 
alliance system anchored in containment, deterrence, and collective defense. The economic component 
established a cooperative, rules-based trading system that rejected protectionism and lowered trade and 
investment barriers. Both components encouraged the notion that cooperation serves national interests 
better than conflict. Both stimulated greater efficiency, which freed up military and economic resources 
for more productive investment. In the post-Cold War era, this dual policy of expanding economic and 
security cooperation remains the main U.S. policy instrument for building a just, stable, and prosperous 
world order (Strategic Assessment 1999, pp 20-22). 
It is generally felt that the United States is well positioned to compete in the global economy. 
Economic globalization is broadly consistent with U.S. international security and foreign policy interests. 
It: 
• Facilitates integration 
• Promotes openness 
• Encourages institutional reforms 
• Increases efficiency 
• Accelerates the growth of US Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
• Helps control domestic inflationary forces. 
Globalization and the Economic Impact of Naval Forward Presence 
Within the environment of deepening globalization, naval forward presence gives the U.S. the 
ability to shape environments through the strategic positioning of people and equipment. The inherent 
mobility of naval forces provides the ability to rapidly project and concentrate military power worldwide, 
deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression. U.S. naval forces receive an increasing share of crisis 
response missions because forward deployed naval forces will be the only timely option unconstrained by 
access agreements in contingencies. 
Naval forward presence can be manifested in a number of ways, but the most common is the 
presence of a carrier battle group in an area of interest such as the Mediterranean Sea or the Persian Gulf. 
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On average, 50 percent of the U.S. Navy's active fleet is underway on any given day, and more than a 
third is forward deployed. 
The United States is a maritime nation, and international ocean policy is important to Americans. 
Today, 95 percent of U.S. trade is transported by sea, which represents 20 percent of the GDP (Strategic 
Assessment 1999, p. 308). In today's global economy, any interruption in free trade, caused by a military 
crisis for example, has a negative economic impact, and influences a nation's well being (not only in the 
troubled region but worldwide). Timely responses by external military forces can stabilize the situation 
and restore confidence and economic activity. 
In the economic sense, naval forward engagement allows/provides: 
• Stability and security of free trade 
• Quick crisis responses. 
In our earlier study both were found to affect the market outlook through 
• Generally more stable prices (lower price fluctuations) 
• Decreases in future prices following a naval crisis response (e.g. decrease in oil prices after 
naval crisis response examples: 1990 Gulf War, 1994 Iraq-Kuwait Border Incident, 1987 
Iranian Attacks on Gulf Shipping) 
Economic benefits include increases in Gross Domestic Product (GDP), reduced unemployment 
and inflation, expanded industrial production, etc. However, because the role of forward-deployed naval 
forces is primarily preventive in nature it is difficult to measure the full benefits derived from that 
activity. In effect all quantitative measurements of benefits are by nature underestimates because we have 
no way of assessing the economic costs of many crisis that were prevented simply because of the 
presence of naval forces. 
With this caveat in mind the findings of the present study of four specific instances of naval 
forward presence/crisis response suggests that both globalization and naval forward presence complement 
each other in creating an environment in which the United States economy is able to fare better than 
would be the case if either or both were absent. These effects and linkages are summarized in Figure A-
1. 
Figure A-1 
Naval Forward Presence and Globalization: 
Complementarities and General Impact on the United States Economy 
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In particular the V AR forecasting models were based on the linkage from oil/exchange rate/share 
market shifts resulting from Naval forward presence/crisis response to increased rates of investment and 
ultimately higher levels of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). While the details (role of exchange rates and 
share markets) may have varied slightly from one case to another the basic mechanism was similar in all 
cases. On the globalization side of the equation (right hand column) a number of developments in the 
world market economy tend to reinforce the positive Naval Forward presence impact on the US economy. 
It is also clear that the process of globalization can only proceed in an environment characterized by 
stable, secure trading conditions, provided in large part by forward deployed naval forces. Specifically 
(Figure A-2), more stable oil prices derived from naval crisis response induce greater trade through 
reducing some of the risks associated with unexpected increases in transport costs. The stronger more 
stable dollar associated with naval forward presence aids the development of stronger US Share markets 
(foreign investors avoid much of the exchange risk associated with other markets). The increased value 
in share markets associated with naval forward presence also increases investment and ultimately 
economic growth. 
Figure A-2 
Naval Forward Presence and Globalization: 
Affect of Naval Forward Presence on the Components of Increased Globalization 
~---·-----~--. 
While the results of the study suggest that naval forward presence/crisis response have a strong and 
positive impact on the United States economy, some observers have argued that in the future these 
impacts are likely to be diminished. For example one might argue that oil accounts for a lower share of 
GDP (energy conservation/alternative fuels) so that the oil shocks that have disrupted the economy in the 
past are becoming less and less of a threat to prosperity. A corollary is that the so-called new economy is 
more of a service economy and much less dependent on energy and raw materials. 
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Despite the fact that this is a commonly held view, it is not based on any real hard evidence. Our 
results suggest a fairly significant oil related impact on the United States economy under a series of 
alternative environments. While the magnitudes of each case vary greatly, there is no apparent trend 
towards diminished effectiveness of forward deployed naval forces in stabilizing oil markets. 
Finally several recent studies avoid the new economy arguments by contending that the recent 
expansion in the economy is due to a good oil shock (fairly long period of low oil prices preceding the 
boom). 
Conclusions 
As for the future, it is likely that increased world trade (Figure A-3) and increased economic growth 
associated with globalization will place a growing demand on oil supplies creating the chance of more 
volatile oil shocks associated with crisis around the world. These developments rather than lower the 
scope for naval forces will actually enhance the chance of favorable interventions by forward deployed 
naval forces. Similar arguments can be made for likely changes in the share and foreign exchange 
markets. 
In sum, likely changes in the various facets should strengthen the economic impacts of Naval 
forward presence/crisis response. In turn, the stability provided by Naval forward presence should assure 
continued deepening of the globalization process. This would set up a virtuous circle that would reinforce 
itself over time. 
Figure 24 
Naval Forward Presence and Globalization: Affect of Likely Globalization Trends 
on the Economic Impacts Associated with Naval Forward Presence 
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APPENDIXB 
Series Definitions From the World Bank Development Indicators 
Series: Credit to private sector(% of GDP) (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS) 
Credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector-such as through loans, 
purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable-that establish a claim 
for repayment. For some countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. For more information, 
see WDI table 5.1. 
Series: Current account balance (% of GDP) (BN.CAB.XOKA.GD.ZS) 
Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods, services, net income, and net current 
transfers. For more information, see WDI table 4.17. 
Series: Domestic absorption(% of GDP) (NE.DAB.TOTL.ZS) 
Domestic absorption is the sum of private consumption, general government consumption and gross 
domestic investment. For more information, see WDI table 4.9. 
Series: Domestic credit provided by banking sector(% of GDP) (FS.AST.DOMS.GD.ZS) 
Domestic credit provided by the banking sector includes all credit to various sectors on a gross basis, with 
the exception of credit to the central government, which is net. The banking sector includes monetary 
authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions where data are available 
(including institutions that do not accept transferable deposits but do incur such liabilities as time and 
savings deposits). Examples of other banking institutions are savings and mortgage loan institutions and 
building and loan associations. For more information, see WDI table 5.4. 
Series: Domestic financing, total(% of GDP) (GB.FIN.DOMS.GD.ZS) 
Domestic financing (obtained from residents) refers to the means by which a government provides 
financial resources to cover a budget deficit or allocates financial resources arising from a budget surplus. 
It includes all government liabilities--other than those for currency issues or demand, time, or savings 
deposits with government--or claims on others held by government and changes in government holdings 
of cash and deposits. Government guarantees of the debt of others are excluded. Data are shown for 
central government only. For more information, see WDI table 4.13. 
Series: Energy imports, net(% of commercial energy use) (EG.IMP.CONS.ZS) 
Net energy imports are calculated as energy use less production, both measured in oil equivalents. A 
negative value indicates that the country is a net exporter. Commercial energy use refers to apparent 
consumption, which is equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and 
fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport. For more information, see WDI 
table 3.7. 
Series: Expenditure, total (% of GDP) (GB.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS) 
Total expenditure of the central government includes both current and capital (development) expenditures 
and excludes lending minus repayments. Data are shown for central government only. For more 
information, see WDI table 4.13. 
Series: Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) (NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS) 
Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to or 
received from the rest of the world. Included is the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, 
travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, 
information, business, personal, and government services. Labor and property income (formerly called 
factor services) is excluded. Transfer payments are excluded from the calculation of GDP. For more 
information, see WDI table 4.9. 
Series: Exports of goods and services (annual% growth) (NE.EXP.GNFS.KD.ZG) 
Annual growth rate of exports of goods and services based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars. Exports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and 
other market services provided to or received from the rest of the world. Included is the value of 
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merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as 
communication, construction, financial, information, business, personal, and government services. Labor 
and property income (formerly called factor services) is excluded. For more information, see WDI table 
4.10. 
Series: Financing from abroad(% ofGDP) (GB.FIN.ABRD.GD.ZS) 
Financing from abroad (obtained from nonresidents) refers to the means by which a government provides 
financial resources to cover a budget deficit or allocates financial resources arising from a budget surplus. 
It includes all government liabilities--other than those for currency issues or demand, time, or savings 
deposits with government--or claims on others held by government and changes in government holdings 
of cash and deposits. Government guarantees of the debt of others are excluded. Data are shown for 
central government only. For more information, see WDI table 4.13. 
Series: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (%of GDI) (BX.KLT.DINV.DT.GI.ZS) 
Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. Gross domestic investment (used in the denominator) is gross 
domestic fixed investment plus net changes in stocks. For more information, see WDI table 5.1. 
Series: Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) (BX.KLT.DINV.DT.GD.ZS) 
Foreign direct investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. 
It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as 
shown in the balance of payments. For more information, see WDI table 5.1. 
Series: GDP growth (annual%) (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG) 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are 
based on constant 1995 U.S. dollars. GDP measures the total output of goods and services for fmal use 
occurring within the domestic territory of a given country, regardless of the allocation to domestic and 
foreign claims. Gross domestic product at purchaser prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the 
products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion 
and degradation of natural resources. The residency of an institution is determined on the basis of 
economic interest in the territory for more than a year. For more information, see WDI tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
Series: Gross foreign direct investment(% of GDP, PPP) (BG.KLT.DINV.GD.PP.ZS) 
Gross foreign direct investment is the sum of the absolute values of inflows and outflows of foreign direct 
investment recorded in the balance of payments financial account. It includes equity capital, reinvestment 
of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital. This indicator differs from the standard 
measure of foreign direct investment (see table 6.7), which captures only inward investment. The 
indicator is calculated as a ratio to GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parities 
(see WDI tables 4.10 and 4.11 for a discussion ofPPP). For more information, see WDI table 6.1. 
Series: Gross private capital flows(% of GDP, PPP) (BG.KAC.FNEI.GD.PP.ZS) 
Gross private capital flows are the sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment 
inflows and outflows recorded in the balance of payments financial account, excluding changes in the 
assets and liabilities of monetary authorities and general government. The indicator is calculated as a ratio 
to GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parities (see WDI tables 4.10 and 4.11 
for a discussion of PPP). For more information, see WDI table 6.1. 
Series: Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) (NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS) 
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to or 
received from the rest of the world. Included is the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, 
travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, 
information, business, personal, and government services. Labor and property income (formerly called 
factor services) is excluded. For more information, see WDI table 4.9. 
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Series: Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) (NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS) 
Imports of goods and services represent the value of all goods and other market services provided to or 
received from the rest of the world. Included is the value of merchandise, freight, insurance, transport, 
travel, royalties, license fees, and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, 
information, business, personal, and government services. Labor and property income (formerly called 
factor services) is excluded. For more information, see WDI table 4.9. 
Series: Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people) (IT.MLT.MAIN.P3) 
Telephone mainlines are telephone lines connecting a customer's equipment to the public switched 
telephone network. Data are presented per 1,000 people for the entire country. For more information, see 
WDI table 5.10. 
Series: Trade(% of GDP) (NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS) 
Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic 
product. For more information, see WDI table 4.9. 
Series: Trade(% of GDP, PPP) (TG.V AL.TOTL.GD.PP.ZS) 
Trade in goods as a share of PPP GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports measured in current 
U.S. dollars divided by the value of GDP converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity 
rates (see WDI tables 4.10 and 4.11 for a discussion ofPPP). For more information, see WDI table 6.1. 
Series: Trade (% of goods GDP) (TG.V AL.TOTL.GG.ZS) 
Trade in goods as a share of goods GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by the 
current value of GDP in U.S. dollars after subtracting value added in services. For more information, see 
WDI table 6.1. 
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APPENDIX c 
Structural Variables Included in the Factor/Discriminant 
Analysis 
----------------------------------------------------------
Country Structural Variable 
SACHS SACHSA SMALL OIL SUBAF 
----------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan 4 4 0 0 0 
Albania 4 0 0 0 
Algeria 3 3 0 1 0 
American Samoa 0 0 
Andorra 1 0 0 
Angola 3 3 0 1 1 
Antigua and Barbuda 1 0 0 
Argentina 2 0 0 0 
Armenia 5 5 0 0 0 
Aruba 1 0 0 
Australia 1 1 0 0 0 
Austria 1 1 0 0 0 
Azerbaijan 5 5 0 0 0 
Bahamas, The 1 0 0 
Bahrain 3 0 1 0 
Bangladesh 2 2 0 0 0 
Barbados 1 0 0 
Belarus 5 5 0 0 0 
Belgium 1 1 0 0 0 
Belize 0 0 0 
Benin 4 4 0 0 1 
Bermuda 1 0 0 
Bhutan 0 0 0 
Bolivia 3 3 0 0 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 0 0 
Botswana 4 3 0 0 0 
Brazil 2 0 0 0 
Brunei 3 0 0 0 
Bulgaria 2 2 0 0 0 
Burkina Faso 4 4 0 0 1 
Burundi 4 0 0 0 
Cambodia 4 4 0 0 0 
Cameroon 3 3 0 0 1 
Canada 1 1 0 0 0 
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Structural Variables Included in the Factor/Discriminate Analysis (cont'd) 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Country Structural Variable 
SACHS SACHSA SMALL OIL SUBAF 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Cape Verde 4 1 0 1 
Cayman Islands 1 0 0 
Central African Republic 4 4 0 0 1 
Chad 4 4 0 0 1 
Channel Islands 1 0 0 
Chile 3 3 0 0 0 
China 2 2 0 0 0 
Colombia 3 0 0 0 
Comoros 1 0 1 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 4 4 0 0 1 
Congo, Rep. 3 3 0 0 1 
Costa Rica 3 3 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 3 3 0 0 1 
Croatia 0 0 0 
Cuba 0 0 0 
Cyprus 1 0 0 
Czech Republic 2 0 0 0 
Denmark 1 1 0 0 0 
Djibouti 1 0 0 
Dominica 0 0 0 
Dominican Republic 2 2 0 0 0 
Ecuador 3 3 0 0 0 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2 0 0 0 
El Salvador 4 0 0 0 
Equatorial Guinea 4 0 0 1 
Eritrea 4 4 0 0 0 
Estonia 2 0 0 0 
Ethiopia 4 4 0 0 1 
Faeroe Islands 0 0 
Fiji 1 0 0 
Finland 1 1 0 0 0 
France 1 1 0 0 0 
French Polynesia 1 0 0 
Gabon 4 4 0 1 1 
Gambia, The 3 3 0 0 1 
Georgia 5 0 0 0 
Germany 1 1 0 0 0 
Ghana 3 3 0 0 0 
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Structural Variables Included in the Factor/Discriminate Analysis (cont' d) 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Country Structural Variable 
SACHS SACHSA SMAIL OIL SUBAF 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Greece 2 0 0 0 
Greenland 1 0 0 
Grenada 1 0 0 
Guam 0 0 
Guatemala 4 4 0 0 0 
Guinea 3 3 0 0 1 
Guinea-Bissau 3 3 0 0 1 
Guyana 4 0 0 0 
Haiti 4 4 0 0 0 
Honduras 3 3 0 0 0 
Hong Kong, China 1 1 0 0 0 
Hungary 2 2 0 0 0 
Iceland 1 1 0 0 0 
India 2 0 0 0 
Indonesia 2 2 0 1 0 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 3 0 1 0 
Iraq 4 4 0 1 0 
Ireland 1 1 0 0 0 
Isle of Man 1 0 0 
Israel 1 1 0 0 0 
Italy 1 1 0 0 0 
Jamaica 2 2 1 0 0 
Japan 1 1 0 0 0 
Jordan 4 4 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan 5 5 0 1 0 
Kenya 3 3 0 0 1 
Kiribati 0 0 0 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 5 0 0 0 
Korea, Rep. 1 1 0 0 0 
Kuwait 3 3 0 1 0 
Kyrgyz Republic 5 5 0 0 0 
Lao PDR 4 4 0 0 0 
Latvia 0 0 0 
Lebanon 0 0 0 
Lesotho 4 4 0 0 0 
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Structural Variables Included in the Factor/Discriminate Analysis (cont'd) 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Country Structural Variable 
SACHS SACHS A SMALL OIL SUBAF 
---------------------------------------------------------------
Liberia 4 4 0 0 1 
Libya 3 0 1 0 
Liechtenstein 1 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 
Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 
Macao, China 1 0 0 
Macedonia, FYR 0 0 0 
Madagascar 4 0 0 1 
Malawi 4 0 0 1 
Malaysia 2 2 0 0 0 
Maldives 1 0 0 
Mali 4 4 0 0 1 
Malta 1 0 0 
Marshall Islands 0 0 
Mauritania 3 3 0 0 0 
Mauritius 2 2 1 0 1 
Mayotte 0 0 
Mexico 2 2 0 1 0 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0 0 
Moldova 5 5 0 0 0 
Monaco 1 0 0 
Mongolia 2 2 0 0 0 
Morocco 3 0 0 0 
Mozambique 3 3 0 0 1 
Myanmar 4 0 0 0 
Namibia 4 4 0 0 1 
Nepal 4 4 1 0 0 
Nether lands 1 1 0 0 0 
Netherlands Antilles 1 0 0 
New Caledonia 1 0 0 
New Zealand 1 1 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 2 2 0 0 0 
Niger 4 4 0 0 1 
Nigeria 3 3 0 1 1 
Northern Mariana Islands 0 0 
Norway 1 1 0 0 0 
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Structural Variables Included in the Factor/Discriminate Analysis (cont'd) 
Country Structural Variable 
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FACTOR/DISCRIMINANT COUNTRY ANALYSIS: 1995 
TABLED-I 
Dimensions of Globalization: 
Principal Components--Initial Country Classification, 1995 
Rotated V arimax Component Matrix 
Factor! Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Structural Global- Global Trade 
Openness ization Finance Expansion 
Trade (%GDP) 0.969* 0.156 
Expenditure (%GDP) 0.925* -0.239 
Imports (%GDP) 0.867* 0.445 
Trade (%Goods GDP) 0.859* 0.189 0.159 0.110 
Small Country Dummy 0.417 -0.121 -0.232 -0.163 
Telephone Mainlines (1000 people) 0.895* -0.131 
Gross PCF (%GDP PP) 0.894* 
Country Classification 0.163 -0.714* 0.303 -0.277 
Exports (%GDP) 0.300 0.626* 0.390 
Gross FDI (% GDP PP) 0.243 0.622* 0.470 
Domestic Credit Banking System (%GDP) 0.506* -0.196 0.194 
Domestic Absorption (%GDP) 0.191 -0.192 0.872* 0.112 
Financing From Abroad (%GDP) -0.170 0.634* -0.302 
GDPGrowth -0.120 0.813* 
Import Growth 0.770* 
Export Growth 0.172 0.742* 
Sub-Saharan Dummy -0.297 -0.153 -0.318 
Oil Dummy -0.121 -0.173 -0.214 -0.106 
Domestic Financing (%GDP) -0.201 0.237 -0.393 
















Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 9 iterations. * = factor loadings 0.50 or greater; Due 
to missing values, 54 countries remained in the analysis. 
Country Factor Scores 
United States -1.242 1.185 0.450 0.209 -0.023 
Group 1 Average -0.249 1.555 0.196 -0.066 0.176 
Group 2 Average 0.089 -0.098 -0.282 0.383 -0.053 
Group 3 Average 0.241 -0.731 -0.105 -0.401 -0.309 
Group 4 Average 0.417 -1.224 1.456 0.329 1.211 
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TABLED-2 
Dimensions of Globalization: Initial Country Classification Factor Scores, 1995 
Factor! Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 FactorS 
Structural Global- Global Trade Global 
Openness ization Finance Expansion Structure 
1.0 Endogenous Growth Countries 
1.00 Australia -0.645 1.211 0.406 0.264 -0.287 
1.00 Austria 0.175 1.646 -0.068 -0.349 0.433 
1.00 Finland -0.213 1.975 -0.445 -0.065 0.703 
1.00 France -0.674 1.633 0.096 -0.229 0.664 
1.00 Germany -0.645 1.503 0.317 -0.294 0.186 
1.00 Iceland -0.268 1.008 0.134 -0.883 0.053 
1.00 Netherlands 1.136 2.678 0.875 -0.396 0.021 
1.00 Norway 0.170 1.464 0.383 -0.227 -0.261 
1.00 Korea, Rep. -0.359 0.381 -0.473 1.500 -0.066 
1.00 United Kingdom -0.170 2.418 0.481 -0.251 0.513 
1.00 United States -1.242 1.185 0.450 0.209 -0.023 
Group Average -0.249 1.555 0.196 -0.066 0.176 
2.0 Catching IJp Growth Countries 
2.00 Argentina -1.298 -0.122 0.439 -0.535 -0.721 
2.00 Bulgaria 0.350 0.381 -0.917 0.968 0.729 
2.00 China -0.642 -0.507 -0.407 1.099 -0.604 
2.00Egypt -0.545 -0.285 -0.304 0.379 0.377 
2.00 Estonia 2.288 -0.072 -0.082 -0.131 -0.223 
2.00 Greece -1.144 0.555 -0.119 -0.223 1.075 
2.00 Hungary 0.525 0.690 1.112 0.040 -0.844 
2.00 India -1.465 -0.666 -0.503 1.764 0.332 
2.00 Indonesia -0.369 -0.836 -0.165 0.890 -1.894 
2.00 Dominican Republic 0.078 -0.492 -0.355 0.103 -0.577 
2.00 Malaysia 3.318 0.090 -1.071 1.599 -0.530 
2.00 Mauritius 2.176 -0.327 -3.571 -0.910 1.064 
2.00Mexico -0.207 -0.397 1.137 -1.187 -3.007 
2.00 Nicaragua 0.643 -0.085 -0.102 0.968 0.641 
2.00 Philippines 0.192 -0.569 -0.477 0.859 -0.104 
2.00 Poland -0.538 -0.045 0.238 1.275 0.011 
2.00 Portugal -0.064 0.923 0.646 -0.352 0.472 
2.00 South Africa -0.653 0.148 -1.146 0.108 0.892 
2.00 Spain -0.766 0.847 0.254 -0.027 0.473 
2.00 Sri Lanka -0.000 -0.558 -0.003 -0.153 0.719 
2.00 Thailand 0.514 -0.355 -0.504 1.424 -0.109 
2.00 Tunisia 0.599 -0.279 0.080 -0.397 -0.005 
2.00 Turkey -0.935 -0.292 -0.670 1.238 0.610 
Group Average 0.089 -0.098 -0.282 0.383 -0.053 
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TABLE D-2 (cont'd) 
Dimensions of Globalization: Country Factor Scores, 1995 
Factor! Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 FactorS 
Structural Global- Global Trade Global 
Openness ization Finance Expansion Structure 
3.0 Primm Commodit~ &oducers 
3.00 Bolivia -0.447 -0.778 1.293 0.274 -0.793 
3.00 Botswana 0.608 -0.649 -0.307 -0.080 -0.660 
3.00 Cameroon -0.565 -1.018 -0.939 -0.951 -0.074 
3.00 Colombia -1.035 -0.822 -0.139 0.224 0.164 
3.00 Costa Rica 0.629 -0.491 -0.326 -0.144 -0.246 
3.00 Cote d'Ivoire 0.284 -0.955 -0.155 -0.256 -0.084 
3.00 Iran -0.709 -0.846 -0.182 -1.498 -1.615 
3.00Kenya 0.030 .-0.961 -0.981 -0.321 0.829 
3.00 Morocco -0.485 -0.335 -0.426 -0.512 0.635 
3.00 Peru -1.081 -0.967 0.729 1.052 -0.324 
3.00 Sierra Leone -0.795 -0.997 0.138 -3.447 0.244 
3.00 Trinidad 0.943 -0.125 0.523 0.475 -2.864 
3.00 Venezuela -0.642 -0.557 -0.306 0.263 -1.606 
3.00 Yemen, Rep. -0.110 -0.739 -0.397 -0.698 2.065 
Group Average 0.241 -0.731 -0.105 -0.401 -0.309 
4.0 Malthusian Economies 
4.00 Albania -0.868 -1.088 0.598 0.916 1.154 
4.00 Jordan 1.440 -0.984 0.150 0.321 0.660 
4.00 Lesotho 2.105 -1.779 4.935 0.314 2.521 
4.00 Pakistan -1.009 -1.045 0.142 -0.232 0.511 
Group Average 0.417 -1.224 1.45625 0.32975 1.2115 
5.0 Isolated Economies 
5.00 Belarus 0.743 -0.816 -0.279 -3.474 0.286 
Notes: Based on factor analysis in Table D-1. 
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TABLED-3 
Initial Country Group Differences, 1995 
Group Statistics 
Expanded Country •lirl N llislwisel 
Mean Strl n. ·,n 
1.00 REGR factor score 
-.2490591 .61469719 11 11.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
1.5552225 .64344942 11 11.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.1962049 .40578344 11 11.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.0656132 .60314872 11 11.000 4 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.1761513 5 for analysis 1 .35226058 11 11.000 
2.00 REGR factor score 
.0893338 un45910 23 23.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.0982351 .48891236 23 23.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.2824317 .93237854 23 23.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.3826997 .83056070 23 23.000 4 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.0530621 .96479733 23 23.000 5 for analysis 1 
3.00 REGR factor score 
-.3081488 .62381020 13 13.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.7504410 .27255626 13 13.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.0885453 .63560731 13 13.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.4211962 1.12477483 13 13.000 4 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.3141481 1.24962415 13 13.000 5 for analysis 1 
4.00 REGR factor score 
.4595255 1.38022827 5 5.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-1.07772 .45998370 5 5.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 1.1000793 2.16905209 5 5.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.2351810 .45866835 5 5.000 4 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.9206226 1.02654064 5 5.000 5 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score a 
1 1.000 5.00 .7435160 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score a 
1 1.000 2 for analysis 1 -.8169858 
REGR factor score a 
1 1.000 3 for analysis 1 -.2797282 
REGR factor score a 1 1.000 4 for analysis 1 -3.47422 
REGR factor score a 
1 1.000 5 for analysis 1 .2861587 
Total REGR factor score 
-.0311276 .98280336 53 53.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.0210051 .99747028 53 53.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.0050584 1.00887188 53 53.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.0057826 1.00865771 53 53.000 4 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.0287280 .98681698 53 53.000 5 for analysis 1 
a. Insufficient data 
TABLED-4 
Initial Country Group Discriminant Analysis, 1995 
Variables in the Analysis 
Sten I= tn 
1 REGR factor score 1.000 40.317 2 for analysis 1 
2 REGR factor score 
.968 41.183 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.968 6.665 4 for analysis 1 
TABLED-5 





Pairwise Group Comparison§·b 
Sten Expanded Country_ 1_QQ_ ? nn '< nn 
1 1.00 F 87.681 136.520 
Sig. .000 .000 
2.00 F 87.681 15.227 
Sig. .000 .000 
3.00 F 136.520 15.227 
Sig. .000 .000 
4.00 F 102.708 16.983 1.667 
Sig. .000 .000 .203 
5.00 F 22.233 2.134 .018 
Sig. .000 .151 .895 
2 1.00 F 42.940 71.397 
Sig. 
.000 .000 
2.00 F 42.940 13.227 
Sig. .000 .000 
3.00 F 71.397 13.227 
Sig. .000 .000 
4.00 F 50.861 8.873 1.597 
Sig. .000 .001 .213 
5.00 F 21.708 12.090 6.100 
Sig. 
.000 .000 .004 
a. 1, 48 deQrees of freedom for step 1. 
b. 2, 47 deqrees of freedom for step 2. 
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Dimensions of Globalization: Initial Country Group Discriminant Scores, 1995 
Country Function 1 Function 2 
Endogenous Growth Countries 
Australia 2.66623 0.08132 
Austria 3.39466 -0.70308 
Finland 4.16923 -0.43349 
France 3.40392 -0.56252 
Germany 3.10971 -0.61465 
Iceland 1.89346 -1.20641 
Netherlands 5.54714 -0.93894 
Norway 3.04833 -0.52992 
United Kingdom 5.04455 -0.72591 
United States 2.59313 0.02280 
Group Average 3.48704 -0.56108 
Other Countries 
Albania -1.96665 1.23825 
Argentina -0.37577 -0.60576 
Belarus -2.71543 -3.87149 
Bolivia -1.50856 0.44326 
Botswana -1.34645 0.01105 
Bulgaria 1.13484 1.03870 
Cameroon -2.38099 -0.92738 
China -0.69398 1.34692 
Colombia -1.61778 0.39339 
Costa Rica -1.03193 -0.09006 
Cote d'Ivoire -2.04161 -0.13788 
Dominican Republic -0.96077 0.19606 
Egypt, Arab Rep. -0.44338 0.47741 
Estonia -0.14876 -0.14876 
Greece 1.14121 -0.36632 
Hungary 1.50349 -0.08549 
India -0.82818 2.14066 
Indonesia -1.44718 1.16317 
Iran -2.18470 -1.58836 
Jordan -1.92765 0.53328 
Kenya -2.07299 -0.21132 
Korea, Rep. 1.29471 1.65264 
Lesotho -3.59893 0.66571 
Malaysia 0.71195 1.81710 
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TABLE D-6 (cont'd) 



































































Dimensions of Globalization: Initial Country Group Discriminate Classification, 1995 
Initial Group Model Placement 
Group! Group2 Group3 Group4 Group5 
Australia 1.00 0.969 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Austria 1.00 0.998 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Finland 1.00 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
France 1.00 0.998 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Germany 1.00 0.995 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Iceland 1.00 0.868 0.126 0.004 0.000 0.000 
*Korea, Rep. 1.00 0.083 0.903 0.007 0.005 0.000 
Netherlands 1.00 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Norway 1.00 0.994 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
United Kingdom 1.00 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
United States 1.00 0.963 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Group Average 0.897 0.101 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Argentina 2.00 0.001 0.499 0.390 0.108 0.000 
Bulgaria 2.00 0.079 0.895 0.016 0.008 0.000 
China 2.00 0.000 0.589 0.157 0.252 0.000 
*Dominican Republic 2.00 0.000 0.357 0.374 0.267 0.000 
Egypt 2.00 0.000 0.619 0.224 0.156 0.000 
Estonia 2.00 0.002 0.660 0.247 0.089 0.000 
Greece 2.00 0.209 0.742 0.041 0.006 0.000 
Hungary 2.00 0.422 0.560 0.013 0.002 0.000 
India 2.00 0.000 0.573 0.100 0.325 0.000 
*Indonesia 2.00 0.000 0.242 0.253 0.504 0.000 
Malaysia 2.00 0.010 0.949 0.018 0.021 0.000 
*Mauritius 2.00 0.000 0.233 0.604 0.159 0.003 
*Mexico 2.00 0.000 0.142 0.686 0.157 0.013 
Nicaragua 2.00 0.002 0.864 0.070 0.062 0.000 
Philippines 2.00 0.000 0.473 0.217 0.309 0.000 
Poland 2.00 0.003 0.908 0.042 0.045 0.000 
*Portugal 2.00 0.792 0.203 0.004 0.000 0.000 
South Africa 2.00 0.013 0.839 0.109 0.037 0.000 
*Spain 2.00 0.693 0.300 0.004 0.000 0.000 
*Sri Lanka 2.00 0.000 0.247 0.461 0.290 0.000 
Thailand 2.00 0.000 0.780 0.080 0.139 0.000 
*Tunisia 2.00 0.000 0.404 0.432 0.161 0.000 
Turkey 2.00 0.000 0.792 0.086 0.120 0.000 
Group Average 0.097 0.560 0.201 0.140 0.001 
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TABLE D-7 (cont'd) 
Dimensions of Globalization: Initial Country Group Discriminate Classification, 1995 
Initial Group Model Placement 
Group1 Group2 Group3 Group4 GroupS 
*Bolivia 3.00 0.000 0.184 0.381 0.434 0.000 
Botswana 3.00 0.000 0.202 0.458 0.339 0.000 
Cameroon 3.00 0.000 0.023 0.613 0.351 0.011 
*Colombia 3.00 0.000 0.152 0.393 0.454 0.000 
Cote d'lvoire 3.00 0.000 0.062 0.487 0.449 0.000 
Iran 3.00 0.000 0.020 0.670 0.203 0.104 
Kenya 3.00 0.000 0.057 0.500 0.441 0.000 
Morocco 3.00 0.000 0.326 0.493 0.179 0.000 
*Peru 3.00 0.000 0.178 0.225 0.595 0.000 
*Sierra Leone 3.00 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.998 
*Trinidad 3.00 0.001 0.764 0.144 0.089 0.000 
Venezuela 3.00 0.000 0.341 0.351 0.306 0.000 
Yemen, Rep. 3.00 0.000 0.083 0.607 0.306 0.002 
Group Average 0.000 0.184 0.409 0.319 0.086 
Albania 4.00 0.000 0.105 0.239 0.654 0.000 
*Costa Rica 4.00 0.000 0.298 0.442 0.258 0.000 
Jordan 4.00 0.000 0.095 0.360 0.543 0.000 
Lesotho 4.00 0.000 0.004 0.207 0.788 0.000 
Pakistan 4.00 0.000 0.046 0.466 0.487 0.000 
Group Average 0.000 0.110 0.343 0.546 0.000 
Belarus 5.00 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.998 
Note: Based on the Discriminant Analysis in Table B-4. 
*=misclassified country 
Group 1 Average 0.897 0.101 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Group 2 Average 0.097 0.560 0.201 0.140 0.001 
Group 3 Average 0.000 0.184 0.409 0.319 0.086 
Group 4 Average 0.000 0.110 0.343 0.546 0.000 
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TABLED-8 
Summary of Initial Country Classification Results 
Classification Result$>•0 
Expanded Country l'::rntln 
1 nn ? nn <~ nn "'nn "nn 
Original Count 1.00 10 1 0 0 0 
2.00 2 15 5 1 0 
3.00 0 1 8 3 1 
4.00 0 0 1 4 0 
5.00 0 0 0 0 1 
% 1.00 90.9 9.1 .0 .0 .0 
2.00 8.7 65.2 21.7 4.3 .0 
3.00 .0 7.7 61.5 23.1 7.7 
4.00 .0 .0 20.0 80.0 .0 
5.00 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
Cross-validated3 Count 1.00 10 1 0 0 0 
2.00 2 15 5 1 0 
3.00 0 2 7 3 1 
4.00 0 0 2 3 0 
5.00 0 0 1 0 0 
% 1.00 90.9 9.1 .0 .0 .0 
2.00 8.7 65.2 21.7 4.3 .0 
3.00 .0 15.4 53.8 23.1 7.7 
4.00 .0 .0 40.0 60.0 .0 
5.00 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 
a. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the 
functions derived from all cases other than that case. 
b. 71.7% of oriqinal qrouped cases correctly classified. 
























Dimensions of Globalization: 
Principal Components--Revised Country Classification, 1995 
Factor! Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 FactorS 
Structural Global- Global Global Global 
Openness ization Expansion Finance Structure 
Trade (%GDP) 0.974* 0.127 
Expenditure (%GDP) 0.919* -0.269 0.118 
Trade (%Good~ GDP) 0.891 * 0.185 0.119 
Imports (%GDP) 0.882* 0.418 
Small Country Dummy 0.352 -0.131 -0.106 -0.282 -0.345 
Gross PCF (%GDP PP) 0.885* 
Telephone Mainlines (1000 people) 0.884* -0.130 
Revised Country Classification -0.799* -0.309 0.278 
Exports (%GDP) 0.283 0.669* 0.363 
Gross FDI (% GDP PP) 0.195 0.635* 0.478 0.263 
Domestic Credit Banking System (%GDP) 0.508* 0.191 -0.193 -0.168 
GDPGrowth 0.115 -0.111 0.814* 
Import Growth 0.774* 
Export Growth 0.158 0.728* 0.206 
Domestic Absorption (%GDP) 0.230 -0.181 0.108 0.869* -0.183 
Financing From Abroad (%GDP) -0.335 0.621* 0.312 
Oil Dummy -0.221 -0.145 -0.253 0.658* 
FDI New Inflows (%GDP) 0.179 0.240 0.620* 
Domestic Financing (%GDP) -0.277 0.289 -0.354 -0.554* 
Sub-Saharan Dummy -0.286 -0.299 -0.161 -0.392 
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization; Rotation converged in 15 iterations. 
* = Factor loadings 0.50 or greater; Due to missing values, 54 countries remained in the analysis 
Country Factor Score 
United States -1.278 1.134 0.214 0.074 0.094 
Group 1 Average -0.294 1.618 -0.208 -0.023 -0.083 
Group 2 Average 0.096 -0.117 0.706 -0.294 0.007 
Group 3 Average 0.293 -0.629 -0.477 -0.308 -0.015 
Group 4 Average -0.280 -0.835 0.424 1.162 0.274 
Group 5 Average -0.036 -0.907 -3.458 0.299 -0.548 
Discriminating Factors 2, 3 and 4 
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TABLED-10 
Dimensions of Globalization: 
Factor Scores--Revised Country Classification, 1995 
Factor! Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 FactorS 
Structural Global- Global Global Global 
Openness ization Expansion Finance Structure 
l.Q Endo~enous QrQwth CQuntries 
1.00 Australia -0.677 1.191 0.236 -0.085 0.396 
1.00 Austria 0.229 1.665 -0.325 -0.208 -0.387 
1.00 Finland -0.105 1.940 -0.037 -0.585 -0.764 
1.00 France -0.575 1.605 -0.194 -0.125 -0.494 
1.00 Germany -0.756 1.509 -0.298 0.008 -0.084 
1.00 Iceland -0.252 1.022 -0.885 -0.100 -0.069 
1.00 Netherlands 1.085 2.861 -0.476 0.221 0.562 
1.00 Norway 0.090 1.496 -0.282 -0.103 0.452 
1.00 Portugal -0.138 1.345 -0.251 0.474 -0.165 
1.00 Spain -0.867 1.104 0.063 0.030 -0.297 
1.00 United Kingdom -0.281 2.543 -0.255 0.120 -0.244 
1.00 United States -1.278 1.134 0.214 0.074 0.094 
Group Average -0.294 1.618 -0.208 -0.023 -0.083 
2.0 Catching Up Growth Countries 
2.00 Argentina -1.378 -0.110 -0.565 -0.015 0.601 
2.00 Bulgaria 0.615 0.277 1.025 -0.667 -0.779 
2.00 China -0.692 -0.648 1.085 -0.556 0.362 
2.00Egypt -0.548 -0.299 0.446 -0.096 -0.460 
2.00 Estonia 2.273 0.051 -0.222 -0.112 0.586 
2.00 Greece -1.081 0.590 -0.143 0.067 -1.023 
2.00 Hungary 0.335 0.866 -0.121 0.290 1.525 
2.00 India -1.392 -0.762 1.835 -0.259 -0.548 
2.00Kenya 0.114 -0.751 -0.058 -0.314 -1.275 
2.00 Korea, Rep. -0.286 0.063 1.431 -0.384 -0.105 
2.00 Malaysia 3.468 -0.016 1.517 -0.993 0.605 
2.00 Nicaragua 0.636 -0.029 1.029 0.252 -0.371 
2.00 Philippines 0.221 -0.605 0.887 -0.311 -0.049 
2.00 Poland -0.577 0.003 1.256 0.095 0.245 
2.00 South Africa -0.497 0.006 0.285 -0.613 -1.412 
2.00 Thailand 0.537 -0.423 1.453 -0.300 0.001 
2.00 Trinidad 0.806 0.042 0.229 -1.039 3.052 
2.00Turkey -0.820 -0.369 1.331 -0.342 -0.831 
Group Average 0.096 -0.117 0.706 -0.294 0.007 
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TABLE D-10 (cont'd) 
Dimensions of Globalization: 
Factor Scores--Revised Country Classification, 1995 
Factor! Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 FactorS 
Structural Global- Global Global Global 
Openness ization Expansion Finance Structure 
3.0 Primm Commodit~ Producers 
3.00 Botswana 0.689 -0.619 -0.116 -0.475 0.539 
3.00 Cameroon -0.530 -1.065 -0.829 -0.558 -0.669 
3.00 Costa Rica 0.793 -0.238 -0.066 -0.517 0.213 
3.00 Cote d'lvoire 0.290 -0.843 -0.193 0.116 -0.065 
3.00 Dominican Republic 0.233 -0.737 0.046 -0.338 0.292 
3.00Iran -0.687 -0.908 -1.580 -0.849 1.125 
3.00 Lithuania 1.045 -0.474 -0.284 0.304 -0.026 
3.00 Mauritius 2.539 -0.942 -0.763 -2.035 -2.490 
3.00Mexico -0.364 -0.554 -1.572 -0.281 3.076 
3.00 Morocco -0.342 -0.304 -0.416 -0.160 -0.784 
3.00 Sri Lanka 0.113 -0.598 -0.154 0.515 -0.621 
3.00 Tunisia 0.715 -0.367 -0.455 0.250 0.091 
3.00 Venezuela -0.631 -0.661 0.116 -1.068 1.298 
3.00 Yemen, Rep. 0.242 -0.493 -0.413 0.782 -2.193 
Group Average 0.293 -0.629 -0.477 -0.308 -0.015 
4.0 Malthusian Economies 
4.00 Albania -0.919 -0.767 0.982 1.067 -0.626 
4.00 Bolivia -0.685 -0.729 0.096 0.964 1.302 
4.00 Colombia -1.019 -0.976 0.203 0.144 -0.325 
4.00 Indonesia -0.416 -1.340 0.564 -0.687 1.656 
4.00 Jordan 1.443 -0.703 0.351 0.673 -0.225 
4.00 Lesotho 1.564 -0.287 0.388 5.999 0.336 
4.00 Pakistan -0.992 -0.882 -0.154 0.419 -0.487 
4.00 Peru -1.218 -0.994 0.958 0.714 0.559 
Group Average -0.280 -0.835 0.424 1.162 0.274 
5.0 Isolated Economies 
5.00 Belarus 0.773 -0.611 -3.448 -0.104 -0.424 
5.00 Sierra Leone -0.845 -1.203 -3.467 0.702 -0.671 
Group Average -0.036 -0.907 -3.458 0.299 -0.548 
Notes: Based on factor analysis in Table B-9. 
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TABLED-11 
Revised Classification: Country Group Differences, 1995 
Group Statistics 
ValidN . 
r.:, rn MP"n Std I 
1.00 REGR factor score 
-.2939010 .61243764 12 12.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
1.6184571 .57575972 12 12.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.2078325 .30767135 12 12.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.0232551 .25553476 12 12.000 4 for analysis 1 
2.00 REGR factor score 
.0964128 1.23797490 18 18.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.1174576 .43981624 18 18.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.7057373 .72921171 18 18.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.2944551 .37880069 18 18.000 4 for analysis 1 
3.00 REGR factor score 
.2933569 .85787312 14 14.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.6292466 .24811066 14 14.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.4774113 .53920239 14 14.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.3081543 .72046903 14 14.000 4 for analysis 1 
4.00 REGR factor score 
-.2805163 1.12767959 8 8.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.8353101 .30123489 8 8.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.4237757 .39900724 8 8.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
1.1619245 2.03162493 8 8.000 4 for analysis 1 
5.00 REGR factor score 
-.0357425 1.14479775 2 2.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-.9076579 .41889719 2 2.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
-3.45786 .01331971 2 2.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.2990089 .57093216 2 2.000 4 for analysis 1 
Total REGR factor score 
.0000000 1.00000000 54 54.000 1 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.0000000 1.00000000 54 54.000 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.0000000 1.00000000 54 54.000 3 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.0000000 1.00000000 54 54.000 4 for analysis 1 
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TABLED-12 
Revised Country Group, Discriminant Analysis, 1995 
Variables in the Analysis 
Wilks' 
Stl::m ...Eto,..., I <>mhri<> 
1 REGR factor score 
1.000 63.722 2 for analysis 1 
2 REGR factor score 
.965 65.137 .283 2 for analysis 1 
REGR factor score 
.965 32.020 .161 3 for analysis 1 
3 REGR factor score 
2 for analysis 1 .878 71.246 .209 
REGR factor score 
3 for analysis 1 .963 31.454 .109 
REGR factor score 
4 for analysis 1 .910 5.743 .044 
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TABLEB-13 
Revised Country Group Comparisons, 1995 
Pairwise Group Comparisom~·b,c 
~t.•n RPvi~Prl r.n1mtn. C::rnnn 1 nn ? nn ~ nn 4 nn !> nn 
1 1.00 F 124.402 187.177 165.709 62.723 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
2.00 F 124.402 11.827 16.364 6.444 
Sig. .000 .001 .000 .014 
3.00 F 187.177 11.827 1.239 .778 
Sig. .000 .001 .271 .382 
4.00 F 165.709 16.364 1.239 .048 
Sig. .000 .000 .271 .827 
5.00 F 62.723 6.444 .778 .048 
Sig. .000 .014 .382 .827 
2 1.00 F 63.715 99.034 81.168 73.534 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
2.00 F 63.715 28.250 9.964 59.992 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
3.00 F 99.034 28.250 6.717 27.416 
Sig. .000 .000 .003 .000 
4.00 F 81.168 9.964 6.717 40.440 
Sig. .000 .000 .003 .000 
5.00 F 73.534 59.992 27.416 40.440 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
3 1.00 F 43.587 68.769 68.846 51.718 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
2.00 F 43.587 19.025 15.742 40.772 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
3.00 F 68.769 19.025 9.672 18.691 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
4.00 F 68.846 15.742 9.672 26.589 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
5.00 F 51.718 40.772 18.691 26.589 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 
a. 1. 49 deQrees of freedom for step 1. 
b. 2, 48 degrees of freedom for step 2. 
c. 3, 4 7 degrees of freedom for step 3. 
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TABLED-14 
Dimensions of Globalization: Initial Country Group Discriminant Scores, 1995 
Country Revised Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 
Classification 
Endogenous Growth countries 
Australia 1.00 3.18345 -0.12064 0.12547 
Austria 1.00 4.05381 -1.30783 0.09706 
Finland 1.00 5.09488 -0.97610 -0.26922 
France 1.00 3.95627 -1.04641 0.17167 
Germany 1.00 3.58967 -1.16673 0.30221 
*Hungary 2.00 1.97369 -0.54990 0.48355 
Iceland 1.00 2.02319 -1.97912 0.10752 
Netherlands 1.00 6.77843 -2.03538 0.79563 
Norway 1.00 3.61379 -1.14691 0.17826 
Spain 1.00 2.80250 -0.36684 0.23983 
Portugal 1.00 3.01341 -0.96036 0.77755 
United Kingdom 1.00 6.16844 -1.52922 0.61962 
United States 1.00 2.96086 -0.11455 0.29023 
Group 1 Average 3.78557 -1.02308 0.30149 
Bulgaria 2.00 1.65539 1.56485 -0.70217 
China 2.00 -0.67546 2.08394 -0.75787 
Egypt 2.00 -0.41659 0.88664 -0.17385 
Estonia 2.00 0.02855 -0.41889 -0.10708 
Greece 2.00 1.35996 -0.49590 0.18949 
India 2.00 -0.58977 3.45835 -0.47634 
Korea, Rep. 2.00 1.26819 2.39083 -0.44489 
Malaysia 2.00 1.37933 2.50110 -1.12598 
Nicaragua 2.00 0.50284 1.81408 0.24150 
Philippines 2.00 -0.80328 1.75303 -0.47707 
Poland 2.00 0.80121 2.17132 0.07132 
South Africa 2.00 0.46264 0.41607 -0.67412 
Thailand 2.00 0.02372 2.64936 -0.44630 
Trinidad and Tobago 2.00 0.69497 0.25380 -1.12982 
Turkey 2.00 0.09847 2.41148 -0.47800 
Group 2 Average 0.38601 1.56267 -0.43275 
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TABLE B-14 (cont'd) 





























Group 4 and 5 Average 
1995 Summary: 
United States 
Group 1 Average 
Group 2 Average 
Group 3 Average 





































































































































Dimensions of Globalization: Revised Country Group Discriminate Classification, 1995 
Initial Group Model Placement 
Group1 Group2 Group3 Group4 GroupS 
Australia 1.00 0.988 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Austria 1.00 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Finland 1.00 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
France 1.00 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Germany 1.00 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Iceland 1.00 0.986 0.011 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Netherlands 1.00 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Portugal 1.00 0.997 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Spain 1.00 0.976 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 
United Kingdom 1.00 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
United States 1.00 0.976 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Group Average 0.993 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
*Argentina 2.00 0.000 0.110 0.864 0.024 0.000 
Bulgaria 2.00 0.004 0.994 0.000 0.000 0.000 
China 2.00 0.000 0.893 0.033 0.073 0.000 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2.00 0.000 0.780 0.142 0.076 0.000 
Estonia 2.00 0.000 0.551 0.428 0.018 0.000 
Greece 2.00 0.208 0.748 0.041 0.001 0.000 
Hungary 2.00 0.778 0.217 0.003 0.000 0.000 
India 2.00 0.000 0.907 0.002 0.089 0.000 
*Kenya 2.00 0.000 0.068 0.777 0.154 0.000 
Korea, Rep. 2.00 0.000 0.998 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Malaysia 2.00 0.000 0.999 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Nicaragua 2.00 0.000 0.978 0.004 0.016 0.000 
Philippines 2.00 0.000 0.794 0.068 0.137 0.000 
Poland 2.00 0.000 0.992 0.001 0.005 0.000 
South Africa 2.00 0.000 0.927 0.067 0.004 0.000 
Thailand 2.00 0.000 0.976 0.003 0.020 0.000 
Trinidad 2.00 0.001 0.937 0.058 0.001 0.000 
Turkey 2.00 0.000 0.979 0.003 0.016 0.000 
Group Average 0.055 0.769 0.139 0.035 0.000 
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TABLE D-15 (cont'd) 
Dimensions of Globalization: Revised Country Group Discriminate Classification, 1995 
Initial Group Model Placement 
Group! Group2 Group3 Group4 GroupS 
Botswana 3.00 0.000 0.108 0.814 0.077 0.000 
Cameroon 3.00 0.000 0.000 0.974 0.025 0.000 
Costa Rica 3.00 0.000 0.464 0.510 0.025 0.000 
Cote d'Ivoire 3.00 0.000 0.017 0.699 0.283 0.000 
Dominican Republic 3.00 0.000 0.108 0.716 0.175 0.000 
Iran 3.00 0.000 0.000 0.987 0.001 0.010 
Lithuania 3.00 0.000 0.0579 0.761 0.180 0.000 
Mauritius 3.00 0.000 0.004 0.994 0.001 0.000 
Mexico 3.00 0.000 0.000 0.993 0.002 0.003 
Morocco 3.00 0.000 0.099 0.861 0.039 0.000 
Sri Lanka 3.00 0.000 0.040 0.576 0.383 0.000 
Tunisia 3.00 0.000 0.049 0.856 0.093 0.000 
Venezuela 3.00 0.000 0.293 0.670 0.036 0.000 
Yemen, Rep. 3.00 0.000 0.019 0.663 0.316 0.000 
Group Average 0.000 0.090 0.791 0.117 0.001 
Albania 4.00 0.000 0.057 0.014 0.928 0.000 
Bolivia 4.00 0.000 0.017 0.184 0.798 0.000 
Colombia 4.00 0.000 0.030 0.370 0.599 0.000 
Indonesia 4.00 0.000 0.051 0.386 0.562 0.000 
Jordan 4.00 0.000 0.066 0.170 0.762 0.000 
Lesotho 4.00 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.999 0.000 
*Pakistan 4.00 0.000 0.010 0.516 0.473 0.000 
Peru 4.00 0.000 0.034 0.021 0.943 0.000 
Group Average 0.000 0.033 0.208 0.758 0.000 
Belarus 5.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
Sierra Leone 5.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 






l:loui~orll"nnnt"' Grouo 1 00 ? on 300 4 nn o;nn Tnt:> I 
Original Count 1.00 12 0 0 0 0 12 
2.00 1 15 2 0 0 18 
3.00 0 0 14 0 0 14 
4.00 0 0 1 7 0 8 
5.00 0 0 0 0 2 2 
% 1.00 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
2.00 5.6 83.3 11.1 .0 .0 100.0 
3.00 .0 .0 100.0 .0 .0 100.0 
4.00 .0 .0 12.5 87.5 .0 100.0 
5.00 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 100.0 
Cross-validated • Count 1.00 12 0 0 0 0 12 
2.00 1 14 3 0 0 18 
3.00 0 1 13 0 0 14 
4.00 0 0 2 6 0 8 
5.00 0 0 0 0 2 2 
% 1.00 100.0 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 
2.00 5.6 n.8 16.7 .0 .0 100.0 
3.00 .0 7.1 92.9 .0 .0 100.0 
4.00 
.0 .0 25.0 75.0 .0 100.0 
5.00 .0 .0 .0 .0 100.0 100.0 
a. Cross validation is done only for those cases in the analysis. In cross validation, each case is classified by the functions 
derived from all cases other than that case. 
b. 92.6% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
c. 87.0% of cross-validated Qrouped cases correctly classified. 
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APPENDIXE 
Notes on NPS Research on 
Naval Forward Presence and the NDU Study on Globalization 
David Denoon's Approach to Globalization 
The research undertaken in the current study delves into many of the same issues recently 
addressed in a in the major NDU study on globalization (Richard Kugler and Ellen Frost, the 
Global Century: Globalization and National Security, Volumes 1 and 2, Washington: NDU Press, 
2001). Because the NDU study comprises 49 somewhat independent essays, it is hard to define a 
"NDU position or view" on globalization. However, our study focuses on a common set of issues 
also discussed by David Denoon (Volume 1, Chapter 1 0) and in this case there is broad 
agreement. Patrick Clawson's observations on oil markets (Chapter 34) are also similar to the 
assumptions underlying the current study. 
Definitions and Relevance of Globalization 
Denoon defines globalization in a manner that is consistent with our use use. According to 
Denoon, globalization means mean the creation of truly worldwide markets on the input side for 
labor, capital, and technology and on the output side for final products and services. While our 
study considered Robert Dunn's argument ("Has the U.S. Economy Really Been Globalized?" 
Washington Quarterly, Winter 2001) that stressed the fact that by many conventional measures 
the economy was more integrated into the world markets in the pre-World War I days, Denoon is 
correct in noting that even though trade accounted for a higher percentage of world GDP in those 
days, this fact is not central to addressing a number of current issues. Instead it is the change in 
the character and the extent of international interaction that make globalization today more 
intrusive and more important than the forms it took in the Victorian period (Denoon, p. 245). 
Uniqueness of the Current Phase of Globalization 
Denoon goes on to note that the key aspect of the current phase of globalization which 
makes it different from earlier periods is the speed with which orders for trade, capital, and 
technology are carried out. These elements make it much harder for governments to respond 
when a crisis develops. This fact may go a long way in explaining our findings concerning the 
manner in which globalization impacts on oil price shocks. One of the main patterns here (Table 
41) was that the advanced industrial countries all experienced increases in the severity of oil 
shocks as their level of general globalization increased, while for the developing countries the 
reverse was the case. 
Given the fact that there are theoretically a wide spectrum of public policy responses to 
oil price increases, either: (1) globalization places severe limits on the actually available; or (2) 
more broadly globalization creates a unique environment where despite the desire for national 
autonomy in policymaking, policy options carried out by governments have a similar impact. 
Dani Rodrick' framework (How Far Will International Economic Integration Go? Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, vol14, no. 1 Winter 2000, pp. 177-186) outlined in Figure G-1 suggests 
that globalization has forced countries to make choices between three main areas, achieving 
integrated national economies, preserving the nation states or allowing for mass politics. The 
uniformity of oil shock outcomes found in the current study suggests that most countries have 
opted for preserving the nation state, while pursuing international integration. This would place 
severe limits on governmental responses to oil price increases tending to yield a fairly uniform set 
of outcomes across countries. 
Country Classification Schemes 
Our country classification scheme is similar to that proposed by Denoon. As we have 
defined them, Group 1 countries are largely synonymous to those Denoon refers to as industrial 
democracies or members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). All of these countries are intricately linked with the global economy. Our group 2 
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countries fall largely in Denoon's category of transition states or countries that are partially 
integrated within the global economy. According to Denoon, transition states are typically ones 
that have a vibrant modern sector of high per capita incomes and modern technology coexisting 
with a traditional sector of agriculture and extractive industries. Governments of the transition 
states, which include a mixture of authoritarian and democratic states, are often deeply 
ambivalent about how closely they want to be linked to the global economy and frequently 
attempt to limit the influence of outside economic, political, political or cultural influences. 
Finally his traditional states or countries are those in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America 
and parts of the former Soviet Union having low incomes, low levels of technical skills and only 
rudimentary links to the world economy. This group of countries is roughly the same as our 
primary producers (group 3), Malthusian (group 4) and isolated (groupS). 
Denoon's country and ours are fairly similar. Both identify groups of countries with an 
environment as defined by globalization. They also are designed so as to facilitate 
generalizations about policy goals and outcomes. However while we focus on the manner in 
which external shocks impact on these groups, Denoon addresses a different set of issues: (1) 
should lower income countries try to maximize their economic growth rates? How far should 
countries go in opening their capital markets? And (3) will greater integration with the global 
economy reduce or accentuate inequality within traditional and transitional states? 
The U.S. Global Presence 
Our conclusions concerning the U.S. global presence and those of Denoon are also similar, 
although approaching the issue from a different perspective, although again, both approaches 
complement each other. Denoon notes (p. 248) that when considering U.S. security policy it is 
absolutely essential that the U.S. role in the world economy be appreciate as a key asset for 
leverage. "To put it bluntly, most of our allies and many of our antagonists need us far more than 
we need them." 
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Figure G-1 





















Source: Dani Rodrik, How Far Will International Economic Integration Go? Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol14, no. 1 (Winter 2000), p.181. 
While our study stresses the direct economic gains appropriated by countries as a result of 
the dampening effect on oil markets (and presumably other markets as well as demonstrated in 
our FY 2000 study), Denoon notes that while there is no question that the United States benefits 
from an open world economy, those countries that trade with the United States benefit even more. 
Here he gives China as an example. 
In short Denoon notes that the size and openness of American markets is an enormous 
inducement for other countries to cooperate with the United States. The trade figures he cites are 
obvious examples. Unfortunately the benefits produced by Naval forward presence are much 
more subtitle, though no less significant. 
Importance of Oil in the Economy 
Finally, oil is another area where our findings on the increased severity of oil shocks which 
go against the conventional wisdom are complementary to Denoon's observations on natural 
resources. Denoon notes (p.249) that as the United States has shifted from an industrial to a 
service economy, the livelihood of its citizens depends less on imported raw materials than it did 
at the time of the Paley Commission (early 1950s). As Denoon notes the United States is less 
worried about chrome from East Africa or copper from Chile that it once was. Also, as materials 
science has become more sophisticated, it has yielded a host of synthetic products that can 
directly substitute for natural ones or prior manufactured ones. On the other hand, the principal 
exception is oil. As he observes, there is still no substitute for gasoline. Unless there are some 
unforeseen major technological breakthroughs, the United States will remain highly dependent 
upon imported oil and the world will be increasingly dependent on Persian Gulf oil. 
Patrick Clawson's Observations on Oil Marekts 
In our study, as in the one by Partrick Clawson (Chapter 34), the chief assumption is that 
oil markets are highly globalized and for that reason comparable oil price shocks confront most 
countries around the world. 
Globalization of Oil Markets 
While our study concludes that globalization has tended to increase the severity of oil price 
shocks, Clawson asks the question of whether this globalization of oil markets has contributed to 
Western security-including making possible a safer and more prosperous future-or whether it 
has exacerbated its troubles. As he notes (p. 727) the Western democratic community's reliance 
on imported oil is its most significant strategic vulnerability to turmoil in the rest of the world. 
Nearly all other resources-physical, technological, financial and human-are largely available 
within the Western democratic community, with the international flows of these resources being 
largely among the Western states. By contrast the West depends heavily on energy imports from 
areas that are outside the community of industrial democracies. 
Reliance on Markets 
Despite noting the vulnerabilities of oil dependence, Clawson goes on to argue that energy 
globalization has generally been good for security: with effective policies and use of markets, the 
democratic community should be able to retain its access to vital supplies of oil and other energy. 
As Clawson sees it, while the U.S. Government is a strong supporter of globalization it 
remains as it should unconvinced that globalization's market dynamics alone can guarantee full 
access to energy. More precisely (p. 740) while globalization has done much to provide a steady 
supply of energy at reasonable prices, it cannot be relied on as the sole guarantor of energy 
security. Energy resources are too concentrated in one region (the Persian Gulf), global energy 
markets have too mixed a record (sometimes exacerbating instability instead of dampening it) 
with irrational expectations often resulting in wider fluctuations than pure supply and demand 
factors would anticipate. 
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Oil Market Failures 
Reading Clawson's paper it is not entirely clear how he would compensate for these market 
failures in energy. The strategic petroleum reserve (SPR) would help in certain cases, but clearly 
not in all. Apparently he is reluctant to advocate more direct government involvement in the 
markets out of fear that policy makers will be driven by a number of conflicting goals 
(environment, economic growth, self sufficiency etc) leading to a poorly designed set of arbitrary 
market price ranges for petroleum products. Instead, he simply notes (p.741) that reliance on 
international markets can help greatly in ensuring that the future supply of oil and other energy 
resources meets demand at acceptable price. He does not, as our studies show look to naval 
forward presence as a stabilizing element, especially in situations involving conflict in the Gulf or 
in the major sea trading lanes. 
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